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Abstract
This thesis develops the concept of a rhythmic ontology that emerges from Nietzsche’s
thought, and argues that eternal return functions as a rhythmic disruption to our current
understanding of the relationship between thought and becoming. By exploring the role of
rhythm in Nietzsche’s work, both in his early unpublished notes and in The Gay Science
leading up to the introduction of eternal return, I argue that we need to understand eternal
return as a  rhythmic theory of  time if  it  is  to  offer  a  convincing  challenge  to  nihilistic
thought, and that we find the most effective mobilisation of this approach in the work of
Deleuze and Guattari.
The first chapter of this thesis explores the breakdown in the relationship between thought
and becoming through the motif of love that Nietzsche draws on in  The Gay Science. I
introduce the thought of eternal return as Nietzsche’s attempt to address this problem and
usher in  amor fati  as a new way of thinking, but show that we must affirm the rhythmic
process of thought if we are to achieve this.
The following two chapters examine the role of rhythm within Nietzsche’s work, arguing
that he develops an understanding of rhythm as the structure through which becoming
appears  to  us.  This  allows  us  to  understand  the  creative  and  nihilistic  tendencies  of
thought as different aspects of our relationship with time.
In the final two chapters of the thesis I reconsider eternal return as a rhythmical theory of
the relationship between thought and becoming in a manner that goes beyond Nietzsche’s
published work, arguing that its development within the thought of Deleuze and Guattari is
ultimately the most successful at countering the nihilistic problem that Nietzsche wishes to
address.
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Introduction
This thesis develops the concept of a rhythmic ontology that emerges from Nietzsche’s
thought, and argues that eternal return functions as a rhythmic disruption to our current
understanding of the relationship between thought and becoming. By exploring the role of
rhythm in Nietzsche’s work, both in his early unpublished notes and in The Gay Science
leading up to the introduction of eternal return, I argue that we need to understand eternal
return as a  rhythmic theory of  time if  it  is  to  offer  a  convincing  challenge  to  nihilistic
thought, and that we find the most effective mobilisation of this approach in the work of
Deleuze and Guattari.
This thesis takes up the problem of how we think our relationship to becoming, in particular
how we  can  understand  thought  as  the  creation  of  something  new,  that  nonetheless
emerges from what has gone before. This problem unites two predominant themes within
Nietzsche’s work. On the one hand, Nietzsche understands our thought as suffused with
the values of the past. "I" am not a separate soul or subject who performs certain actions
or  thinks  certain  thoughts.  Instead "I"  am no more than this  activity.  The actions  and
thoughts that I think of as mine are not the result of the decision of a subject, but are that
which emerges from all  the past  activity of  the world.  Were I  to wish for  myself  to be
different,  I  would therefore need to rewrite the past – while  to wish for  the past  to be
different would equally be to unwittingly seek my own annihilation.1 My identity, and the
past that makes it up, are inextricably entwined. 
But  Nietzsche  also  demands  that  we  learn  to  think  in  a  new  way.  In  the  post-
Enlightenment modern period, our understanding of who and what we as thinking beings
are has been fundamentally called into question. Bound up with this doubt is a sense of
our discomfortingly uncertain relationship with the future. Previously we lived with a sense
of  travelling  towards  a  “better”  state,  whether  this  futural  heaven  be  founded  on  a
knowledge of God or an earthly confidence in the progress of human reason. Now both of
1 "The individual is a piece of fate from top to bottom, one more law, one more necessity for all that 
is to come and will be. Telling him to change means demanding that everything should change, 
even backwards..." (TI 'Morality as Anti-Nature' §6)
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these former certainties are lost to us, and we are caught in a situation in which we do not
know how to construct the new relationship with the future that we so desperately need.
The  critical  effort  Nietzsche  directs  towards  uncovering  the  origins  of  our  thought  is
intended to give us the tools with which to question the way we think, learning to view it as
something changeable rather than eternal fact, and in so doing offering the possibility that
we may actively guide this change. 
The problem Nietzsche raises is therefore how there can be difference (a "new" kind of
thought) that is at the same time identifiably connected to the past. The problem of how an
identity  can be  said  to  change  in  time is  one  that  has  a  long  history  within  Western
philosophy.2 But Nietzsche approaches this problem from the opposite direction. Rather
than beginning with static being, and asking how we are able to perceive change within it,
he instead argues that there is no such static being. Instead, everything is in a continual
state of change, flux, or becoming. The question then becomes not how things change, but
how we are able to perceive static beings or "things" at all. 
This change from the primacy of being to that of becoming does not merely reverse the
terms of  the relationship.  We may traditionally  have berated our thought  for  being too
transient to understand the perfection of static being, but we cannot now simply replace
this  concern with the fear  that  our thought  is  too  stolid to keep up with the fluidity  of
becoming.3 The whole basis on which we have traditionally judged the value of our thought
is on how closely it is able to match the reality it aims to represent. The world of Being (as
we formerly understood it) is One - it  is completely self-identitical,  the "Same." "Better"
thought is therefore that which draws closest to this identity, by minimising the difference
2 A tradition that dates back to Aristotle, who struggled with the question of at which point in time 
change could be said to happen. Presumably, if an object is in the process of changing, that change
is happening "now." Yet this would mean that at one and the same time (now), the object is 
apparently, and impossibly, occupying two different states - its old state, and its new state. We are 
thus left with the problem that there must be change, specifically the change from the past to the 
future, and yet there seems to be nowhere within the now to put this change. For an account of 
Aristotle's theory of change and time, see Widder (2008:13ff), Coope (2001), and Roark (2011). We
shall turn to Nietzsche and Deleuze's accounts of the passage of time in the moment in the final 
chapters of this thesis.
3 As we shall see in chapter two, this is an issue with Nietzsche's early work in The Birth of 
Tragedy, in which he at times presents thought as an imperfect representation of the world of 
becoming, which only ancient tragedy comes close to adequately conveying. 
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between  thought  and  reality.  But  becoming  is  not  the  "same"  -  on  the  contrary,  it  is
precisely that which changes, which never remains the the same. If that which we are
trying to think is not being, but becoming, why should we privilege a thought which tries to
replicate it? Becoming is transformation, so a thought which aims to remain faithful to this
must in some sense transform that which it thinks.
This  is  the  dual  nature  of  the  problem  of  thinking  our  relationship  with  the  continual
becoming from which we build our world. Not only must we undo the longstanding habit of
thinking being as primary, which is the task of Nietzsche’s critical project, we must also
learn how to evaluate the creative transformational nature of our thought. The nature of
thought is that which captures some of becoming, and holds it still  for us. Nietzsche is
clear that we could not survive in a world of becoming that we did not transform in some
fashion. The privileging of stable identities has grown up for a reason – it is not only easier
to get up and go to work in the morning if I do not have to reconstruct the world anew each
time I wake, the restriction of form imposed upon becoming is how the creativity of thought
functions, as a necessary departure from and transformation of becoming. The problem
then  becomes  how we are  to  judge  what  constitutes  a  sympathetic  transformation  of
becoming. The question of what is a good way to think is the question of how best to
introduce form within the continuum of becoming.
This is the problem many commentators4 suggest that Nietzsche is addressing with the
thought of eternal return – the problem of how to reconcile the thinking self with the world
of becoming that it  attempts to comprehend. Nietzsche’s presentation of the thought of
eternal  return  however  appears  oblique,  contradictory,  and  on  the  face  of  it  runs
discouragingly counter to the project of how to think becoming in a new way.  A central
problem  for  those  engaging  with  Nietzsche’s  thought  is  therefore  not  only  how  to
understand the relationship between thought and becoming that emerges from his work,
but also to see how that which Nietzsche describes as his most fundamental thought is
supposed to address his most fundamental concern, by helping us understand thought as
an expression of  becoming.  How does eternal  return help us to capture the forces of
becoming in thought, in a way that does not nullify the movement of becoming?
4 See for example Löwith (1997) and Stambaugh (1988).
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As I was struggling to find a satisfactory way to understand the nature of thought as an
interruption to the flow of becoming, my son was learning to play the trumpet. Listening to
him practice, I realised that he was facing a similar problem. Take, for example, this piece
of music (Mozart’s ‘Theme from a musical joke,’ adapted for beginners):
The three consecutive notes in the opening have the rhythm of a question: “Do you see?”
When my son played the piece, however, it would emerge in one of two ways. Either:
or:
The  alternatives  my  son  produced  either  ran  all  the  notes  together  (“doyousee?”)  or
separated them to the point that their connection was lost altogther (“Do? You? See?”). He
was struggling with the problem of how the notes could be distinct, but at the same time
joined together. His attempt to understand the rhythm of the music, I realised, expressed
the problem that we face in thinking becoming. How can thought create something distinct
within the ceaseless flow of becoming, without completely breaking it apart, to the point
that it becomes nonsensical? How can we produce a future that is distinct from the past,
while at the same time retaining a connection to it? 
These  two  apparently  contradictory  attributes,  of  smooth  undivided  flow  and  discrete
identifiable point,  together constitute the phenomenon of  rhythm. If  one or the other is
absent, the rhythm disintegrates. This tension "between rhythm as continuously ‘flowing’
and rhythm as periodically punctuated movement"5 is prevalent throughout etymological
attempts to define rhythm, and as Benveniste identifies is captured in the ancient Greek
word rhythmos that indicates form as a particular instantiation of flow, which is inherently
5 London 2001
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"improvised, momentary, changeable."6 As I will argue, it is this understanding of form as a
temporary  arrangement  of  the  flow  of  becoming  that  Nietzsche  is  striving  to  convey
throughout  his  work,  and  that  points  towards  a  healthier  way  in  which  thought  can
momentarily  capture or  interrupt  becoming.  As a philologist  who devoted considerable
attention to the study of rhythm early in his career, this rhythmical understanding of the
problematic tension between thought  and becoming is the beat that drives Nietzsche's
work, and that we can use to bring clarity to the thought of eternal return that he hopes will
allow us to think becoming in a new and more productive manner.
Nietzsche’s  work on rhythm has only  been taken up by commentators within the past
couple of decades. The chapter that Porter devotes to Nietzsche’s early rhythm notes in
his  study  of  Nietzsche’s  early  philological  notebooks  remains  the  most  in-depth
engagement  with  Nietzsche’s  work  on  rhythm,  but  while  Porter  indicates  the  possible
connections between Nietzsche’s early thoughts on rhythm and his later work, his focus
here remains  on Nietzsche’s  early  thought  rather  than developing  these connections.7
Miller’s  paper  on Nietzsche’s  understanding of  rhythm does more to develop the links
between Nietzsche’s earlier understanding of rhythmic temporality and his later theory of
time, while Cohen provides a reading of Nietzschean rhythmic temporality based primarily
on the works from The Gay Science onwards, without however making reference to the
key aphorism of The Gay Science which most directly addresses rhythm.8 None of these
commentators apply the insights that we gain into Nietzschean temporality from the notes
on rhythm to the thought of eternal return, which is Nietzsche’s most explicit engagement
with time in the published works. Sauvanet does suggest that we should approach eternal
return as a rhythmic thought, but does not explore the rhythmic theory of time that would
support this reading.9 
6 Benveniste 1971:286. In contrast to skhema which is a fixed form, rhythmos "designates the form 
in the instant that it is assumed by what is moving, mobile and fluid, the form of that which does not 
have organic consistency; it fits the pattern of a fluid element, of a letter arbitrarily shaped, of a robe
which one arranges at one's will, of a particular state of character or mood." (Benveniste 1971:285-
6) Plato's work signals a move away from the earlier understanding of rhythm that Benveniste 
describes, as for Plato rhythmos is not the characteristic form of a movement, but instead a regular 
feature. In this way, the earlier understanding of rhythm as moving form shifts to the sense of a 
continuous movement punctuated by regular meter (Benveniste 1971:286ff).
7 Porter 2000:127ff
8 Miller (1999) and Cohen (2008)
9 Sauvanet 2001
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This thesis therefore brings together rhythm and eternal return as Nietzsche’s most explicit
engagements with temporality. I focus on The Gay Science, in which Nietzsche prepares
us for the introduction of eternal return in GS §341 by highlighting the nature of our thought
as a loving, artistic, and above all  rhythmical process. Taking my cue from Nietzsche's
emphasis here on the role of rhythmic repetition in shaping our thought, I examine the links
that emerge between rhythm and temporal identity in Nietzsche's unpublished notes from
the period 1869-71. The inherently fragmentary nature of these notes prompts a further
turn  to  The  Birth  of  Tragedy, published  shortly  afterwards.  Here  we  find  a  clearer
discussion  of  the  metaphysical  structure  that  frames  Nietzsche's  thought  during  this
period, allowing us to see how Nietzsche's early understanding of rhythm as the form of
time is transformed in his writings on rhythm and eternal return in  The Gay Science ten
years later.  The figure of  Zarathustra who follows  GS §341 provides Nietzsche's  most
sustained  expression  of  eternal  return,  and so I  then go  on to  draw on  Thus  Spoke
Zarathustra in the light of the account of temporalising rhythm that we find in  The Gay
Science and  the  early  notes,  to  see  whether  the  presentation  of  eternal  return  in
Nietzsche’s published work provides a convincing solution to the problem laid out in The
Gay Science. Nietzsche's attempt to convey the complex nature of individuating rhythmical
time through the mouthpiece of Zarathustra is not ultimately entirely successful,  as the
multitude of contradictory interpretations of eternal return indicate. I therefore also turn to
Nietzsche’s  later  unpublished  notes  to  elucidate  the  thought  of  eternal  return  that  he
struggles to express in Zarathustra.
My decision to focus on certain texts of Nietzsche's, both published and unpublished, is
driven  throughout  by  the task  of  using  Nietzsche's  understanding  of  rhythm to  find  a
reading of eternal return that feels consistent with the problematics and concerns of The
Gay Science. I argue that we find the necessary theoretical underpinnings for a rhythmical
reading of eternal return in the theory of "moment time" developed from the unpublished
notes.10 There is a wealth of secondary literature on Nietzsche's thought of eternal return,
and a thorough examination of  this lies beyond the scope of  this thesis.  I  concentrate
instead firstly on the traditional "anthropological" and "cosmological" readings, in order to
show how these interpretations of eternal return fail to engage with its rhythmical character
10 Principally by Stambaugh (1987, 1988)
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as temporal individuation. I then contrast these to the more successful ontological readings
of Stambaugh and Deleuze, showing how their attention to the rhythmical nature of eternal
return is what produces interpretations that are not only more consistent with the rest of
Nietzsche's thought, but also more convincing as theories of time and subjectivity. 
I noted earlier the problem of how to evaluate the validity of thought as in some sense
"faithful" to becoming, when becoming is continual transformation. This issue is echoed by
that of interpreting Nietzsche's work. Nietzsche's thought demands transformation - like
Zarathustra, he bids his readers to "lose me and find yourselves."11 The question therefore
is  how to perform a sympathetic  transformation or  interpretation  of  Nietzsche,  for  one
cannot remain faithful to Nietzsche by remaining with him alone. The theory of moment
time that Stambaugh reconstructs from Nietzsche's unpublished notes leaves us with the
task  of  not  only  fleshing  out  the  rhythmic  temporality  of  eternal  return,  but  also  of
attempting a new way of thinking becoming, once eternal return has freed us from our
overdependence on the rhythms of the past. This is what necessitates the turn to Deleuze
and  Guattari.  The  reading  of  eternal  return  that  Deleuze  develops  in  Nietzsche  and
Philosophy and Difference  and  Repetition takes  up  and  advances  Nietzsche’s  critical
project to challenge the existing relationship between thought and becoming. I argue that
in doing so Deleuze resolves the tensions, without collapsing the differences, that we find
in both Nietzsche's account of rhythm and in the phenomenon of rhythm itself. However it
is  only  in  A Thousand Plateaus, co-authored with Guattari,  that  the ontological  role of
rhythm is made explicit. Deleuze's engagement with rhythm is by no means restricted to A
Thousand Plateaus, and it would be impossible to do justice to either his theory of time or
his  writings  on  rhythm  within  a  single  chapter.12 I  draw  on  Deleuze  as  a  reader  of
Nietzsche who realises some of the rhythmical possibilities of eternal return in his own
work, and I therefore concentrate on the account of eternal return we find in Nietzsche and
Philosophy and  Difference and Repetition, before indicating how Deleuze and Guattari's
11 TSZ IV ‘On the bestowing virtue’ §3
12 Deleuze’s other most in-depth engagement with rhythm is in the context of painting in Francis 
Bacon:The Logic of Sensation.For philosophical engagements with Deleuze’s work on music see 
Bogue (2003) and Buchanan and Swiboda (2004), while Hulse and Nesbitt (2010) provides 
responses to Deleuze from the perspective of music scholars. Deleuze’s account of the three 
syntheses of time has received extensive attention in for example Widder (2008), Williams (2011), 
and Somers-Hall (2013).
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concept of the refrain undertakes the creative task of trying to think becoming in a new
way. 
Eternal return therefore functions within this thesis as a repeating musical theme, in my
own (highly imprecise) approximation of sonata form. We begin with the first exposition of
eternal return, but require the second theme of rhythm to provide its context. The rhythmic
concerns of Nietzsche's work are then developed and modulated, before the recapitulation
of eternal return is followed by a Deleuzo-Guattarian coda which completes the piece. My
son's struggle to encompass the sense of both continuum and differentiation within rhythm
has been resolved by the time-honoured process of rhythmical repetition that, as we are
about to see, is how "we have learned to love everything we now love."13 It seems only fair
to try the same approach with the thought of eternal return.
I will start by exploring Nietzsche’s understanding of thought as a creative act through the
metaphor of love that features in The Gay Science, by examining the repetitive process of
learning to love that he describes there as one which involves an initial act of separating
thought  from becoming,  before  tracing the way in  which our  misunderstanding  of  this
process has led to nihilism. I will then turn to the alternative model of love that Nietzsche
names  amor fati, and introduce the thought of eternal return as Nietzsche’s prospective
way of achieving this new relationship with becoming. I shall consider the anthropological
reading of eternal return as a test of affirmation, and show that it  does not adequately
address the task of affirming the rhythmical process of creative thought. 
In the second chapter I shall explore Nietzsche’s early unpublished work on rhythm, which
forms the background to the rhythmical process of thought that he describes in The Gay
Science as learning to love. I will trace the way in which a theory of rhythm as the form of
time emerges from Nietzsche's  work on Aristoxenus,  and use  The Birth of Tragedy to
provide  the  metaphysical  context  for  the  rhythm  notes,  showing  the  ambiguity  in
Nietzsche’s  early  understanding  of  rhythm  as  a  phenomenon  that  is  inherently
transformative but at the same time complicit in a process of nihilistic degeneration.
13 GS §334
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Then in chapter three I will revisit the account of the existing relationship between thought
and  becoming  that  emerged  from  The Gay Science  in  the  light  of  Nietzsche's  earlier
understanding  of  the  rhythmic  nature  of  thought,  showing  how  his  earlier  ambiguous
attitude to rhythm emerges as both the creative and nihilistic aspects of rhythmic thought.
This is brought out most clearly in aphorisms GS §84 and GS §109, in which I identify the
specific issues with our current thought as the manner of its comportment to the future.
This will then allow us to understand eternal return as Nietzsche's attempt to disrupt our
existing rhythmic relationship with time. 
In chapter four I shall turn to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, this time examining eternal return as
a theory of time specifically designed to interrupt the negative aspects of rhythm that we
have  encountered.  I  shall  first  examine  cosmological  interpretations  of  eternal  return
before exploring a more successful theory of time based on the moment, but show that
Nietzsche’s own presentation of this in his published work does not successfully address
the needs of rhythmic time.
In the final chapter I shall turn to the thought of Deleuze and Guattari to find the account of
rhythmic  temporality  that  is  implied  by  Nietzsche’s  unpublished  notes  but  remains
unrealised  in  his  published  work.  I  shall  show the way in  which Deleuze’s  reading of
Nietzsche emphasises the plural  aspects of  becoming and how the account  of eternal
return in the three syntheses of time draws on the aspects of rhythm as both discontinuous
and  continual  flow.  Finally,  I  shall  indicate  the  way  in  which  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s
concept  of  the  refrain  makes  explicit  the  rhythmic  nature  of  becoming  and  temporal
individuation that we have traced throughout this thesis.
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1. Exposition: Eternal return as an intervention into thought as love
This chapter will  set up the problem we shall be exploring throughout this thesis: if we
accept Nietzsche's insight that the world is composed of becoming, then what is the status
of our thought, as something that performs a creative interruption into this becoming? The
way we have misunderstood the relationship between thought and becoming has led to
the  state  of  modernity  which  Nietzsche  calls  "nihilism,"  in  which  this  relationship  has
completely broken down. Nietzsche introduces the thought of eternal return as an attempt
to disrupt our unhealthy relationship with becoming and to usher in a new way of thinking
in its place. However, how he intends eternal return to achieve this is anything but clear.
Throughout the rest of this thesis I will be drawing on Nietzsche's early work on rhythm
and existing readings of the temporality of eternal return to argue that we must think the
relationship  between  thought  and  becoming  as  a  rhythm.  First  however  we  need  to
understand the extent of the problem of nihilism that Nietzsche is trying to address, and
how it has arisen through tendencies that are inherent within the activity of thinking. This is
what we shall explore in this chapter.
Nihilism is a concept that appears in several different forms within Nietzsche's thought,
reflecting its perpetually recurring nature within our history. The first form of nihilism is the
dangerous spectre of  meaninglessness,  in  which the realisation of  our "smallness  and
accidental occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away"1 proves an obstacle to
life.  As we shall  go on to explore throughout  this  thesis,  Nietzsche's  understanding of
humanity is that of an animal whose consciousness is fundamentally goal-directed. We
have survived through learning to tie the present to a perceived future2 - we build fires so
we can keep warm, we get up and go to work so we can pay our mortgage. Ultimately,
however, there is no happily ever after - none of the goals we aim at will have any lasting
effect,  and so in  the final  instance,  "the aim is  lacking;  'why?'  finds no answer."3 The
Platonic-Christian conception of an ideal good or purpose existing beyond the world acted
for a long time as "the great  antidote" against this nihilistic realisation of the absence of
1 WTP §4 (June 10, 1887)
2 Although a future that, as we shall see in the account of rhythm in chapter three, is constructed as
a reflection of the past.
3 WTP §2 (Spring-Fall 1887)
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purpose in the world, a "means of preservation"  which "prevented man from despising
himself as man, from taking sides against life; from despairing of knowledge."4 But this
preservative sense of a single eternal good, which allowed us to partake in its value, is
itself another form of nihilism which involves gifting any sense of our own individual self-
worth over to this unity. As we shall go on to explore, the means of avoiding one kind of
nihilism set us up for another, as we are forced to look outside the transient world entirely
to find something which does not ultimately disappoint us, and as Nietzsche concludes
"the categories 'aim,' 'unity,' 'being' which we used to project some value into the world—
we  pull  out again;  so the world  looks  valueless."5 Nihilism in  all  these forms has two
aspects or sides - the fiction that attracts and redirects our values beyond becoming, and
the realisation that this faith is misplaced. The belief in teleology and the recognition of
ultimate meaninglessness, the entrenchment of values within a divine or logical unity and
the loss of all values - both the belief and its loss are nihilistic. The extent to which all
these forms of nihilism are entwined within our thought becomes apparent in modernity,6
leading to a final  "most  extreme form of  nihilism"7 in which we react  to the poor track
record of all our previous nihilistic beliefs and conclude that we can no longer believe in
anything, but instead must believe in nothing itself.
Given the many different ways in which it  is expressed, it  is  perhaps unsurprising that
commentators emphasise different aspects of what nihilism means for Nietzsche. Löwith
stresses that this crisis in which "the highest values devaluate themselves"8 results in a
state in which "nothing is true any more, but everything is permitted,"9 whereas Conway in
contrast argues that Nietzsche does not wish to imply that "humankind now believes in
nothing,"  but  rather  that  "Nietzsche  understands  nihilism as  delivering  a  single,  grand
(though generally  unappealing)  truth -  namely,  that  the world admits of  no antecedent
moral  order  or  pre-ordained  telos.  The  world  simply  is,  in  its  brute,  undifferentiated
4 WTP §4 (June 10, 1887)
5 WTP §12 (Nov 1887-March 1888)
6 As Deleuze puts it, "the sensational news spreads: there is nothing to be seen behind the curtain."
(NP 140)
7 WTP §15 (Spring-Fall 1887)
8 WTP §2 (Spring-Fall 1887)
9 Löwith 1997:24
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immanence."10 Rosen interprets Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism as a state in which
we have nothing on which to base our value, so that everything becomes arbitrary, and
proceeds  ex  nihilo  (from  nothing),  and  argues  that  Nietzsche  attempts  to  overcome
nihilism through "a doctrine of human creativity," but fears that "without  a standard for
distinguishing  between  noble  and  base  creations,  the  advocacy  of  creativity  is  itself
debased."11 This issue of how to evaluate the forms that we create, given a necessary
separation from becoming that occurs in thought, is what I shall go on to explore as the
role of rhythm in thought. But in order to do this, we must understand more about how we
currently think, in order to see how this gives rise to the many symptoms of nihilism that
Nietzsche detects.
Nietzsche  identifies  Plato  as  the  figure  whose  misunderstanding  of  the  relationship
between thought and becoming is at the root of the nihilism that we find in modern thought.
We shall first examine the different ways in which both Plato and Nietzsche characterise
thought as a type of love. Plato understands both love and thought as motivated by the
lover's recognition that they lack a state or quality that exists in the object of their desire.
For Nietzsche however that which the lover desires does not exist outside them, but is
created through the activity of loving. As the creation of something new, rather than an
attempt at re-creation, love and thought transform both the world and the self that relates
to it.  We shall begin to explore the way the act of thinking occurs though a process of
selection, in which we form something from the flow of becoming, and then mould and
strengthen  this  selection  through  repetition.  In  doing  so,  however,  we  exclude  the
movement of becoming from our thought. We shall see how this exclusion leads to the
occlusion of our creative role in this process, and the misunderstanding of the relationship
between thought  and becoming that  develops into nihilism, and that we find in Plato's
model of love. Having diagnosed this problem, Nietzsche indicates a different model of
love that he calls  amor fati, which resists the unhealthy tendencies of nihilism. We shall
consider the thought of eternal return as a test of affirmation, and ask whether this can
achieve  amor fati,  but conclude that we cannot substantially  alter  the way our thought
operates on becoming without understanding more about the initial moment of selection
that thought performs. It is the tension inherent in this movement, in which thought must
10 Conway 2000:118
11 Rosen 1969:199
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shape the flow of becoming, that we shall  go on to explore throughout the rest of this
thesis through the problem of rhythm.
The creativity of thought as love 
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche recounts the "History of an error"12 in which the transient
world  we  perceive  around  us  becomes  devalued  in  favour  of  an  eternal  backworld.13
Nietzsche identifies Plato's thought as the "most ancient form" of this idea that the eternal
world is the "real" one, in contrast to the continual change we live with every day. It is
Plato's formative role in this error which drives one of Nietzsche’s earliest aims that his
philosophy  should  be  a  “reversed  Platonism,”14 in  which  the  world  of  artifice  and
semblance would regain the prestige it  had lost in Plato’s search for a supersensuous
world of truth.15 The Platonic beginnings of the error appear relatively positive, as "the real
12 TI ‘How the “real world” finally became a fable’
13 The "Hinterwelt" - “hinterworld” or “backworld”, literally meaning a "world behind" the sensuous 
world, with the negative connotations of “backwards”, “backside” etc. (see Löwith 1997:261 and 
265) 
14 “Meine Philosophie umgedrehter Platonismus: je weiter ab vom wahrhaft Seienden, um so reiner
schöner besser ist es. Das Leben im Schein als Ziel.” 
(http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1870,7[156] eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 
Ende 1870 — April 1871)
15 For Heidegger, this presents a problem - by merely reversing Platonism, rather than challenging 
the dichotomy between truth and imitation, between being and becoming, Nietzsche fails to escape 
it. It is this interpretation that leads Heidegger to place Nietzsche firmly within (although at the 
dissolution of) the Western metaphysical tradition, as although “Nietzsche wants Becoming and 
what becomes, as the fundamental character of beings as a whole … he wants what becomes 
precisely and before all else as what remains, as ‘being’ proper” and in this way is guilty of the 
“permanentizing of Becoming into presence” - in other words, Nietzsche turns seeming or becoming
into a new metaphysical “ground.” (Heidegger 1991: Vol III 156) Löwith argues that Nietzsche's 
attempt to reverse Platonism involved an attempt to return to a pre-Platonic relationship with being 
(Löwith 1997:174ff) that Nietzsche himself recognised was impossible. As I shall argue throughout 
this following chapters, we need to understand the rhythmic nature of Nietzsche's project in order to
see how eternal return can function as neither a return to a pre-existing state, nor an inversion of 
the hierarchy between being and becoming, but rather as Nietzsche's attempt to create a new 
relationship between past and future, being and becoming. Deleuze takes up Nietzsche’s desire to 
reverse the Platonic distinction between becoming and reality, challenging Plato's understanding of 
becoming as that which lacks the differentiation of reality. Deleuze writes that “the task of modern 
philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism,” while nonetheless noting that Plato’s thought 
at the inception of the history of the error of nihilism captures the traces of an alternative image of 
thought, “like an animal in the process of being tamed, whose final resistant movements bear 
witness better than they would in a state of freedom to a nature soon to be lost: the Heraclitan world
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world" is "attainable for the wise man, the pious man, the virtuous man—he lives in it, he is
it."16 But  this  initially  promising  situation  decays,  as  the  "real"  eternal  world  gradually
becomes first  unattainable,  then unthinkable,  and finally  disproven altogether,  with the
unfortunate result that its enemy, the "apparent" world of the senses, is caught up in the
downfall of the "real" world and discredited along with it. We shall return to this unfortunate
history later in the chapter, but first we shall examine its beginning, showing how even at
this early stage the supposedly "attainable" eternal world is already suffused with a sense
of lack through the connection Plato draws between thought and love.
Plato's develops this understanding of thought as love, with truth as its object, through the
figure of Socrates as both thinker and lover. Plato makes the connection between love and
thought  in  one  of  his  earliest  dialogues,  the  Lysis,  in  which  we  first  find  Socrates
discussing the nature of love and friendship and describing himself as one who, though he
may know nothing else, is an expert in identifying the lover and the beloved.17 As this self-
confessed  expert  in  love,  the  defining  characteristic  Socrates  recognises  in  this
relationship is a need or absence, that “what desires, desires whatever it’s lacking.”18 Plato
develops this theme in the Symposium, in which various speakers present their thoughts
on the nature of  love,  including the comic poet  Aristophanes who presents a mythical
account of a time in which hermaphroditic and perfectly spherical humans rolled across the
earth. However, their ambitions reached towards the control of heaven as well. In order to
distract as well as to punish them, Zeus had these fleshy balls of hybris divided in half,
allowing them to be reunited only via the temporary respite of sexual union. 
Although the drunk and hiccoughing Aristophanes' account of love as the continual search
for our missing or "other half" is presented as a comedy, Socrates own account shows that
still growls in Platonism.” (DR 71) It is for this reason that Deleuze notes that Nietzsche’s own 
characterisation of his relationship with Plato in terms of a reversal “has the disadvantage of being 
abstract; it leaves the motivation of Platonism in the shadows,” whereas Deleuze specifies that his 
own task is to perform this reversal by bringing “this motivation out into the light of day.” (PS 253) In 
the final chapter of this thesis we will explore the ways in which Deleuze’s interpretation of eternal 
return performs a similar task of making explicit and bringing into the light of day the motivations of 
this thought that are only implicit within Nietzsche’s published work.
16 TI ‘How the “real world” finally became a fable’
17 Plato, Lysis, 204c1
18 Plato, Lysis, 221e1
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it is correct in one respect at least - that love is caused by lack.19 Socrates argues that
even in the case of someone who apparently wants nothing more than to keep having
what they already have (for example, a healthy man, who wishes to remain healthy), this is
still the love of something that they lack. Someone who is healthy in 2018 does not yet,
cannot yet have the health in 2021 that they desire, because the future is not here yet - it
is fundamentally absent, as opposed to the (present) present. “This and any other case of
desire,” stresses Socrates, “is desire for something which is inaccessible and absent. If
there’s something you need, miss, or lack, then that’s the kind of thing you can desire and
love.”20 However,  Aristophanes  mischaracterises  the  nature  of  that  which  we  lack,  as
Socrates argues that it is not our physical other half who we are searching for, or indeed
any earthly  state that  will  necessarily  pass in  time.  Rather  than good things,  beautiful
people, or virtuous acts, it is the idea of the unchanging good, beauty, or virtue that we
ultimately  seek.  Philosophy,  as  that  which  is  explicitly  bound  up  with  these  goals,  is
therefore the purest instantiation of love. 
For Plato, the similarity between thought and love lies in their movement of reaching out
towards something that  we desire,  because we measure ourselves  against  it  and find
ourselves  lacking.  The  thinker  is  identified  with  the  lover,  Socrates  becomes  the
personification of love,21 while Love similarly is portrayed as “bound … to love knowledge,”
“because knowledge is one of the most attractive things there is, and attractive things are
Love’s province.”22 In this way, the philosopher or lover of wisdom is one who has learned
enough to realise how much knowledge they are missing, knowledge which lies extant and
perfect  beyond  them,  and  who  has  become  driven  to  try  and  repair  this  ultimately
irreparable gap. Truth as the object of thought is something that thought lacks, and that it
therefore strives towards. But both physical and philosophical love are motivated by an
19 As Bloom puts it, "for both Aristophanes and Socrates, Eros, in its overwhelming and 
immoderate demands, is the clearest and most powerful inclination toward lost wholeness" but 
whereas "Aristophanes' loves are pointed toward each other horizontally, with no upwardness or 
transcendence implied in them... Socrates' loves, as we shall see, are vertical, pointing upward and 
beyond." (Bloom 1993:480).
20 Plato, Symposium, 200e
21 In the Symposium both Socrates (174a) and Love (203d) are described as typically wandering 
the streets unshod, while Socrates takes the place of Love in Alcibiades’ eulogy (214b)
22 Plato, Symposium, 204b
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impossible drive to completion through the attainment of a goal that stands beyond us, and
that we can never achieve. 
Nietzsche draws on this  Platonic  motif  of  thought  as love in  the Preface to  The Gay
Science, where he describes the desire for truth above all else that drives modern science
and philosophy as the “love of truth.”23 Nietzsche however  uses the parallel between the
thinker and the lover to undercut Plato's model, by suggesting that what we actually fall in
love with is never "reality" (whether this be the reality of a person, or an idea), but that the
object of our love is instead a product of our own creativity.24 In this way he introduces the
idea that thought is a creative process, rather than an attempt to achieve correspondence
or  adequation  with  an  underlying  reality.  In  the  poems  that  open  The  Gay  Science,
Nietzsche  introduces the connection  between creativity  and love in  the  context  of  the
divine:
The Pious One Speaks
God loves us because he created us!
'Man created God!' - respond the jaded.
And yet should not love what he created?
Should even deny it because he made it?
Such cloven logic is limping and baited.25
The atheist asserts the illusionary status of God as a creation of man, and thinks that by so
doing he has rendered God worthless. However as Nietzsche suggests here, it is precisely
the act of creation that grants worth or value. According to “the pious one,” divine love is
motivated by  the act  of  creativity  that  brought  about  its  object  -  God loves  the  world
23 GS Preface to the second edition §4 [my emphasis]. The metaphor of truth as a woman, with the 
philosopher as the inadequate, abusive, or buffoonish lover crops up throughout The Gay Science, 
as we shall go onto explore. See also Beyond Good and Evil which Nietzsche opens by musing 
“Suppose that truth is a woman – and why not? Aren’t there reasons for suspecting that all 
philosophers, to the extent that they have been dogmatists, have not really understood women?” 
(BGE Preface)
24 Han-Pile defines the contrast between these two types of love based on "the type of valuation 
they involve" as that between eros and agape, in which "in the first case, the object is loved 
because we value it; in the second, we value the object because we love it" (Han-Pile 2011). Stern 
(2013) however argues convincingly that this division ignores the "learned" aspect of love that 
changes the lover as well as the beloved, for with agapic love, only the beloved is transformed. We 
shall go on to explore Nietzsche's account of learning to love in GS §334 in a moment.
25 GS 'Joke, Cunning, and Revenge' Prelude in German Rhymes §38
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because he created it. Should man, therefore, not love God as his own creation?26 This
first, all-encompassing, supposedly originary love, loves precisely because it produced the
beloved -  it  is  the love of  the craftsman for  his  “workmanship,”27 of  the Father  for  his
“offspring.”28 Nietzsche points out that animal and human mothers, too, love their children
not because of their intrinsic worth but because they are their creations, a love that “is to
be compared to the love of an artist for his work.”29 In the case of parental love, we do not
expect the child to have any special characteristics that distinguish them from any other
child in order to justify the parent’s love, beyond the fact that they are  theirs, that they
made them. The act of creativity, of making something new that is not me and yet reveals
and extends my influence, is thrown into relief in both these cases as the driving force of
love, as of thought. 
But although this may be true of parental or divine love, what of other types of love, such
as romantic love? Nietzsche stresses that here too we exercise our creative talents. As we
fall in love, we create our own version of the beloved as we go along, so that the person
that we love always differs to some extent from the person that others see, or that they
experience themselves to be. We “idealise” the beloved, as we emphasise some aspects
of them and are proverbially blind to others, in order to make them into someone we are
capable of loving, a love that changes the beloved, as “man makes for himself the image
(Bild) of woman, and woman shapes herself (bildet sich) according to this image (Bild).'”30
To love and to think is this process of transforming the world into something lovable, into
something thinkable. This, however, is not something that we aware of when we love. We
are often only aware of the extent to which we have manufactured the object of our love
when something happens to interrupt this process - perhaps the lover commits an act that
we cannot see as lovable, that we can neither ignore nor encompass into our picture of the
beloved, and we are forced to admit that they are “not the person we thought they were.”
26 And as Nietzsche will go on to argue, he does - or rather, man loves “Christian morality itself, the
concept of truthfulness that was taken ever more rigorously” (GS §357) and which “finally forbids 
itself the lie entailed in the belief in God” (GM III §27) and makes the illusory nature of God seem an
unanswerable objection to his value.
27 Ephesians 2:10 KJV
28 Acts 17:28 KJV
29 GS §72
30 GS §68
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Or perhaps we grow tired of the effort involved in sustaining our creation, and while the
beloved does not ostensibly change, we become less and less able (or willing) to perform
the creative act that had previously transmuted them to gold in our eyes, and so we fall out
of  love.  As we shall  go on to see,  Nietzsche thinks that  both of  these problems have
occured in our relationship with the world that we try to think. We have become aware that
the "real" world of eternal truths is a fiction, but respond to this either with anger that the
world has deceived us, or with a resigned acceptance that there was never anything in the
world worth loving. These responses either occlude or devalue the creative aspect of our
thought. This is what Nietzsche wants to examine and reevaluate, in the hope that we
might develop a healthier relationship between thought and becoming in the future.
There is then an element of Pygmalion in all of us - we are all creators who fall in love with
our creations, by turning someone or something into the kind of being that we are able to
love.  In his unpublished notes from the 1880s31 Nietzsche writes of this transformative
quality  of  love  as  “the  genesis  of  art,”  this  “making  perfect,  seeing  as  perfect,  which
characterizes the cerebral system bursting with sexual energy”32 and which “lavishes upon
the object that inspires it  a magic … quite alien to the nature of that object.”33 Love is
inherently creative. It is not that creativity causes love, or grows out of love, rather that the
feeling of love is precisely this awareness of our own creativity - the sense that we have
extended ourselves out into the world beyond us, that we have changed it and increased
the ways in which we can act within and influence it. Love imbues the most ordinary things
with  significance  for  the  lover,  “the  smallest  chance  occurrences  transfigured,  life  a
succession of sublime things,” and it is my creative activity that achieves this incredible
transmutation  of  a  grey  provincial  town  into  a  city  of  gold,  a  name  into  a  magical
incantation, part of “the world become perfect, through ‘love’—"34
It is this understanding of love as creative that distinguishes Nietzsche from the Platonist,
for whom both love and thought are attempts to repair an omission and move us closer to
an ideal that stands apart from and pre-exists us, rather than the creation of something
31 Many from 1887, around the time Nietzsche was working on On the Genealogy of Morality and 
the final book of The Gay Science
32 WTP §805 (1883-1888)
33 WTP §806 (1883-1888)
34 WTP §806 (1883-1888)
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new. By taking up Plato's identification of the lover and the thinker, but then showing how
the lover is also an artist, Nietzsche is able to suggest that thinking, too, must involve this
process of creation. The link between thought, love, and art is developed throughout The
Gay Science as  Nietzsche  describes  the “realists”  who,  “all  too  similar  to  an artist  in
love” ... 
still carry around the valuations of things that originate in the passions and loves of 
former centuries! Your sobriety still contains a secret and inextirpable drunkenness! 
Your love of 'reality', for example - oh, that is an old, ancient 'love'! In every 
experience, in every sense impression there is a piece of this old love;35
The "realists"  who  believe  "that  the  world  really  is  the  way  it  appears"36 to  them are
mistakenly devaluing their own creative talents. They are in fact artists in their love - they
are the creators of the reality that has seduced them, their apparently sober thought driven
by the drunken creative desire that sends Alcibiades stumbling into the symposium. There
is no reality without the operation of love, the “human contribution” that shapes the world
we know into  something  we can  understand.  Along  with  this  idea  of  love  or  desiring
thought  as a constitutive force that  shapes our concepts,  Nietzsche also develops the
motif of woman-as-truth-as-beloved-object, that which needs to conceal its base origins,
dangerous and subtle, and whose fictional glamour we should respect and appreciate,37
until by the end of book four38 we find that the object of desire that the gay scientist has
started to love is changeable life, rather than eternal truth. This revelation is followed by
the death of Socrates, the “mocking, love-sick monster and pied piper of Athens,”39 who on
Plato’s account was unable in the end to resist the seduction of the supersensuous and
maintain the open, cheerful love of life that characterises the dialogues which “chatter”
before falling into aporetic silence. 
We need to "overcome even the Greeks"40 and move beyond the Platonic conception of
the world that views the world around us as an illusion,  and life as a "disease."41 For
35 GS §57
36 ibid.
37 GS §59-71
38 GS §339
39 GS §340
40 ibid.
41 ibid.
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Nietzsche the first stage is developing a different understanding of the activity of thought.
We need to recognise this  as a creative engagement with the world, rather than a futile
exercise in adequation. But along with this comes the need to reevaluate our sense of the
beloved. Platonic thought was driven by the sense of our inability to ever match up to that
which truly exists. Nietzsche's new understanding of thought faces the different problem
that it must transform that which it thinks in order for it to be thought at all. For Nietzsche,
we must abandon the illusory safety of an eternal truth that holds out the promise of a
"right" answer, however impossible this might be to attain. Instead we are forced to create
our thought. And as we shall see, our track record in this artistic endeavor has not been
overwhelmingly successful. First however we shall examine why Nietzsche thinks that the
creative aspect of thought as love must be viewed as a necessary survival strategy, rather
than a mark of our imperfection. 
Nietzsche's emphasis on the creative aspects of thought are based on his conception of
the world that we try to comprehend, which is radically different to the eternal truths or
Forms that motivate the Platonic thinker's search. Nietzsche's world, in contrast, is one of
continual becoming that emerges from the will to power. The will to power is Nietzsche’s
term  for  the  impulse  which  animates  everything  and  drives  it  to  become  something
different -  a constitutional restlessness which makes movement more comfortable than
stasis, which means that we cannot remain still, but instead strive towards “everything that
enhances people's feeling of power, will to power, power itself,” experiencing joy at “the
feeling that power is growing, that some resistance has been overcome.”42 It is the will to
power that animates the transformations that we enact upon it through the creativity of love
in thought. The desire of the Platonic lover is driven by a comparison with the beloved from
which the lover emerges aware of  their  own inadequacy.  Nietzsche’s  understanding of
love as will to power, however, “always presupposes a comparison (but not necessarily
with  others,  but  with  oneself  in  the  midst  of  a  state of  growth and without  one's  first
knowing in  how far  one is  making  comparisons).”43 The  impulse  towards  change  and
growth is something that comes from within the lover, and is an internal difference rather
than an external goal that the lover pursues. This movement of reaching out towards the
world that creates the beings we think, the objects we love, is what allows us to survive -
42 AC §2
43 WTP §917 (Nov. 1887-March 1888)
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the will to power as love, whether of truth or of beauty, is our “shaping will,” and the joy
that this produces is the most basic and “primeval” because “we can comprehend only a
world that we ourselves have made.”44 Thought is, as Plato indicated, a relationship to the
world driven by an intense need. But this need is not to match our thought to an eternal
world beyond. Instead thought is the generative need to transform this world. The creative
force  of  will  to  power  is  what  constitutes  our  ability  to  exist  in  a  world  that  we  are
continually creating.
The selective aspect of thought
The  way  in  which  thought  conceptually  transforms  the  world  for  us  is,  as  Nietzsche
stresses, an activity that creates for us “a world in which we are able to live — by positing
bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these
articles of faith no one could endure living!”45 The systems and concepts that shape my
experience are something that I am responsible for creating, the product of the evolution of
human  thought  in  the  interests  of  human  survival,  just  as  much  as  our  physical
surroundings reflect our impulse to transform the world in our favour. The thinker is not a
disinterested being indifferently contemplating a logical puzzle, but deeply self-interested.
But just as with love, this self-interest must be driven by the desire to add to something
already strong, rather than any plaintive Platonic lack, if it is to be productive:
The lack of personality always takes its revenge: a weakened, thin, extinguished 
personality, one that denies itself and its own existence, is no longer good for 
anything good - least of all for philosophy. 'Selflessness' has no value in heaven or 
on earth; all great problems demand great love, and only strong, round, secure 
minds who have a firm grip on themselves are capable of that.46
We cannot think selflessly or indifferently, as thought involves binding ourselves into the
world. “The things people call love” are for Nietzsche essentially greed, the need to take
more and more into ourselves. What we are trying to add to ourselves is not, however,
44 WTP §495. It is for this reason that, as Heidegger stresses, “every willing is a willing to be more. 
Power itself only is inasmuch as, and so long as, it remains a willing to be more power. … For only 
by means of a perpetual heightening can what is elevated be held aloft. Only a more powerful 
heightening can counter the tendency to sink back; simply holding onto the position already attained
will not do, because the inevitable consequence is ultimate exhaustion.” (Heidegger 1991: Vol I 60)
45 GS §121
46 GS §345
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something  that  had  formerly  been  part  of  us  that  we  have  lost,  a  missing  piece  of
ourselves  that  we  are  trying  to  reinstate,  but  something  new,  created  through  this
movement of love:
Our love of our neighbours - is it not a craving for new property? And likewise our 
love of knowledge, of truth, and altogether any craving for what is new? . . . The 
pleasure we take in ourselves tries to preserve itself by time and again changing 
something new into ourselves - that is simply what possession means. To grow 
tired of a possession is to grow tired of ourselves.47
As these two passages suggest, although thought may be an expression of the will  to
power,  which  requires  some kind  of  creative  transformation  if  we  are  to  successfully
inhabit it, this does not mean that the way this thought manifests itself always promotes a
healthy relationship with the world around us. As we shall see later in this chapter, the very
"articles of faith"48 such as causality, which may have originally promoted survival, now
threaten the extinction of creative thought in modern nihilism. But it is hard to identify the
point that a particular way of characterising the world becomes harmful, and even harder
to change, because it is not just the beloved that is shaped by the creative act of the lover,
but equally the lover who is changed:
And in any case, one lies well when one loves, about oneself and to oneself: one 
seems to oneself transfigured, stronger, richer, more perfect, one is more perfect— 
Here we discover art as an organic function: we discover it in the most angelic 
instinct, 'love'; we discover it as the greatest stimulus of life—art thus sublimely 
expedient even when it lies—
But we should do wrong if we stopped with its power to lie: it does more than merely
imagine; it even transposes values. And it is not only that it transposes the feeling of
values: the lover is more valuable, is stronger. In animals this condition produces 
new weapons, pigments, colors, and forms; above all, new movements, new 
rhythms, new love calls and seductions.49
The creative activity of loving changes not only the beloved, but also the lover. As I shape
the beloved into someone I am able to love, I am also refashioned into someone who finds
them loveable. The person I am a few years into a love affair is very different from the
person who began it - in the intervening time, I have become someone who feels a sense
47 GS §14
48 GS §121
49 WTP §808 (March-June 1888)
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of warmth and comfort when I think of Swindon, who (begrudgingly) admits that not all
country and western music is an abomination, or who feels a tingle of adrenaline at the
movement of someone's wrist as they stir their tea. These things were meaningless to the I
who had not loved,  unrecognisable as thoughts that  I  could think, before the adaptive
process of love gradually transformed me into this magician who can conjure fireworks
from the everyday. As we shall see however, this transformative aspect of love also carries
with it an inherent risk. Just as it imbues the everyday with magic, it also allows us to learn
to find enjoyment in that which was previously unendurable. The transformative aspect of
thought, as of love, can be oppressive or abusive as well as joyous.
We can see, therefore, that both the lover and the beloved are caught up in a dynamic
relationship,  in  which the beloved plays a role that  goes far  beyond that  of  a passive
object, challenging the agency of its apparent creator as the act of being in love transforms
them both.  Nietzsche  uses  music  to  explore  the  nature  of  this  mutual  transformation,
assigning the role of lover not to the artist but to the listener:
One must learn to love. — This happens to us in music: first one must learn to hear
a figure and melody at all, to detect and distinguish it, to isolate and delimit it as a
life in itself; then one needs effort and good will to stand it despite its strangeness . .
. Finally comes a moment when we are  used to it; when we expect it; when we
sense  that  we'd  miss  it  if  it  were  missing;  and  now it  continues  relentlessly  to
compel and enchant us until we have become its humble and enraptured lovers,
who no longer want anything better from the world than it  and it again. But this
happens to us not only in music: it is in just this way that we have learned to love
everything we now love . . . Love, too, must be learned.50
The process of  falling  in  love  is  something  that  we learn,  an  education  that  we take
ourselves through and that rebuilds us as we create our own image (Bild) of the beloved. A
person who I grow to love is like a melody that I only gradually learn to hear through its
repetition. But this creative endeavor has come about not through the efforts of any divine
composer, but the listener - they who do not think they are creating anything, and yet who
simultaneously create both the music and themselves.
The will  to power, as it expresses itself as both love and thought, is the need to make
ourselves  and  the  world  into  something  new.  But  this  development  of  new  relations
50 GS §334
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happens through sundering others. The first moment of the transformation that occurs as
we learn to love is the simultaneous detection and creation of the prospective beloved as
an identity - we “detect and distinguish” it when we “isolate and delimit it as a life in itself”.
This is what we have to do with anything which draws our attention - we cannot think about
any aspect of the world without first demarcating it and drawing out the boundaries which
will allow us to scope our thought.51 The remaining stages of the process of learning to
love described in  GS §334 encompass a whole range of attitudes towards the potential
beloved, from confusion and revulsion, through a more comfortable familiarity, all the way
to obsessive desire. In order to focus upon and think anything as a self-contained identity,
we first separate it from ourselves and from the other forces that surround it. In this act of
separation,  we destroy the differential  network of  relations that  shape it  -  the creative
movement of love rests on the initial destructive moment of isolation.
This moment of exclusion operates at all levels of how we constitute our relationship to the
world. Even before we get a chance to consciously think about something, our brain is
already prioritising areas on which to lavish attention, at the expense of other areas that
are ignored. To effectively construct a piece of writing, it is necessary at some point to
draw a line across the otherwise interminable chain of factors that impact upon it, and to
decide that certain information does not fit within the remit of the discussion. A wealth of
sensory  data,  of  memories  and  hopes,  form  and  tug  at  any  phenomenon,  extending
unstoppably  out  beyond  it,  and  we  must  cut  all  this  away  if  we  are  to  think  of  the
particularity of “the cat” to the exclusion of everything else - we set apart the things we
perceive  in  the  surrounding  environment  (the  bench,  the  bricks,  the  ivy),  but  we also
separate the cat from our thoughts of next door’s cat, of other cats we have owned, from
the habits of  the cat,  and the whole  historical  process of  domestication.  Whether at  a
preliminary unconscious stage of perception, or in the most consciously considered and
constructed argument, we are forced to exclude everything else if we are to shape and
contain  that  towards  which  we  are  directing  our  attention.  This  is  how we attempt  to
“possess” the new, beloved thought - by reducing an infinitely open system of relations to
51 Stern (2013) draws attention to this selective aspect of love outlined in GS §334, as too in GS 
§14 and GS §59 where not only the rest of the world, but aspects of the beloved themselves, must 
be ignored as part of the process of love.
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something closed and contained,52 so that we can concentrate on one small element of
this system, and shape it into something solid and identifiable: 
The entire apparatus of knowledge is an apparatus for abstraction and simplification
—directed not at knowledge but at taking possession of things: "end" and "means"
are as remote from its essential nature as are "concepts." With "end" and “means"
one takes possession of the process (one invents a process that can be grasped);
with "concepts," however, of the "things" that constitute the process.53
We separate identities from the world as we might tease fibres from the surrounding mass
of wool, isolating and twisting them together into separate threads, so that all things are
“entwined” and woven into the fabric of our world.54 The continual turning that spins the
exterior shell or boundary of the thread is the repetitive act of listening that allows us to
“learn to hear a figure and melody … as a life in itself,”55 which we then weave into a
structured  world  of  discrete  identities  that  touch  upon  and  regulate  each  other  as
strangers, as means and ends, causes and effects. As we shall  go on to explore, our
attempt  to  reconnect  these  discrete  identities  through  causality  intensifies  rather  than
corrects the sense of distance between thought and becoming that manifests in nihilism.
Nietzsche  recognises  the positive  nature  of  this  continual  process of  selection,  of  the
rejection of certain possible strands of enquiry in order to concentrate on others. We can
never possess a complete and total picture or comprehension of the world. Such a thing is
not  only  unattainable  like  Plato’s  beloved  object  of  the  ideal  Forms -  it  cannot  exist.
Instead,  our  knowledge  of  the  world  is  inherently  perspectival,  always  from  our  own
particular point of view. The necessity of selecting and excluding in order to create is a
theme that appears throughout Nietzsche’s work - from the active forgetting of  Untimely
Meditations, without which any action would be impossible, to the hammer of  Twilight of
52 See Cilliers, de Villiers and Roodt 2002 for a discussion of the Nietzschean conception of self as 
an open system of relations.
53 WTP §503 (1884)
54 Deleuze and Guattari mobilise the concept of striated space to describe this way of conceiving 
the world, in which “the striated is that which intertwines fixed and variable elements, produces an 
order and succession of distinct forms, and organizes horizontal melodic lines and vertical harmonic
planes.” In chapter five we shall touch on the alternative conception of “smooth” space which 
contrasts with this entwined model, and is instead “continuous variation, continuous development of
form; ... the fusion of harmony and melody in favor of the production of properly rhythmic values, the
pure act of the drawing of a diagonal across the vertical and the horizontal.” (ATP 528)
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the Idols, that not only tests, but which in order to create must “flash and cut and tear
things apart.”56 Like the sculptor who chips away the surrounding stone to make a form
emerge, the thoughts that we create require the destruction of their links with the world
that surrounds them.
The operation of human thought thus carries with it an inherent risk. We are driven to love,
to create meaning. But we do this by excluding the rich continual process of becoming
from which we drew this meaning in the first place. We are creators who forget that we
create.  Any  philosophical  system  that  challenges  our  everyday  experience  of  our
relationship with the world must account for how we can fail to understand something that
we do all the time, for why the simplest, most “obvious” explanation is not the correct one.
The formative role of selection in thought provides an answer - the act of thinking cuts
away its own ground, prioritising only what we need in order to act. We do not need to
understand the inner workings of a car in order to drive - even if we do, we do not have the
time to consciously call on this information when making the split-second decision to hit
the brakes. Thought operates by paring away anything that does not seem immediately
relevant, and with this it excludes any understanding of its own operation, and the pre-
conceptual sphere of becoming that it works upon.
On the face of it,  it  might not be clear why the way in which selection operates in our
thought is a problem. As a constitutive part of the “useful and species-preserving” error
that allows us to pretend that there are “things”57 in the world, why is it a matter for concern
that we exclude the importance of change and our role in it  from our understanding of
identity? The answer lies in the style of love or thought that this produces - a relationship
with the world that has become poisonous and embittered, rather than productive. As we
have seen, when we “isolate and delimit” an identity in thought, we separate it from its
surroundings. But what we cut away when we think something as an identity is not just an
excess of data that we cannot process, but the shifting relations that have shaped and are
still shaping it. This complex network of relations and dynamics is what Nietzsche calls will
to power, the forces that are both exterior, pressing into the thing from the outside, while at
the  same  time  bubbling  from  within  it.  In  this  movement  of  exclusion,  we  forget  the
56 Nietzsche, TI ‘The Hammer Speaks’
57 GS §110
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precarity of the thing's existence and our own role in bringing it into being. In separating it
from the rest of the world, from its future, and from its past, to consider it  solely in its
present existence, we do not just exclude a contingent selection of phenomena, but the
richly generative force of becoming itself. 
Crucial as it is, this process of selection therefore involves an irretrievable loss. When we
separate a particular thing from the world around it, we exclude all of the movement and
tensions that give rise to it. Like a fish that we have plucked from the sea, or a cowslip
from the roadside, the act of taking something up for our consideration conceptually cuts it
away from the context that has shaped it. We are unable to share our thoughts with the
world of becoming from which they emerged, as “the lover wants unconditional and sole
possession of the longed-for person; he wants a power over her soul as unconditional as
his power over her body; he wants to be the only beloved, to live and to rule in the other
soul  as  that  which  is  supreme and most  desirable.”58 The  lover’s  greed manifests  as
jealousy, which aims at “excluding the whole world from a precious good, from joy and
enjoyment; … at the impoverishment and deprivation of all the competitors and would like
to become the dragon guarding his golden hoard as the most inconsiderate and selfish of
all 'conquerors' and exploiters.”59 Nietzsche’s characterisation in The Gay Science of truth
as  a  woman  speaks  to  this  poignancy,  if  we  consider  the  genteel  new  bride  of  the
nineteenth century, torn from her family, shocked by a sexual ordeal for which she has
been deliberately left unprepared, at the hands of a loving-violent, too-close but unfamiliar
stranger.60 But he also describes the way this possessive act of love results in a beloved
who  will  ultimately  oppress  us  -  a  terrifying  zombie  bride  produced  by  our  “attempt
somehow to describe Heraclitean becoming and to abbreviate it into signs (so to speak, to
translate  and mummify it into a kind of illusory being),”61 to the extent that philosophers
“think they are doing a thing an honour when they dehistoricize it,  sub specie aeterni—
when  they  make  a  mummy  out  of  it.  All  that  philosophers  have  been  handling  for
58 GS §14
59 ibid.
60 See BGE §114
61 “als Versuch das Heraklitische Werden irgendwie zu beschreiben und in Zeichen abzukürzen (in 
eine Art von scheinbarem Sein gleichsam zu übersetzen und zu mumisiren)” 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1885,36[27] eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 
Juni–Juli 1885 (trans. Manuel Dries)
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thousands of years is conceptual mummies; nothing real has ever left their hands alive.”62
This is the tragedy that human thought enacts, the act of rape against that which it desires,
which attempts to protect the beloved by isolating it from everything that would nourish and
motivate it. 
But  it  is  only  against  and in  the  context  of  the  relationships  that  surround  it  that  the
existence of the thing makes any sense. When we cut it from these entanglements in order
to form our own particular conceptual relationship, we effectively starve it, kicking away the
supports that shore it  up, the forces that fill  and replenish it.63 Its brittle existence now
depends upon us, upon our thought. But the more we focus on something, the harder we
think about it, the odder and less contextual it becomes, like a word we have written too
many times that starts to look misspelled, meaningless, and hysterical. Like the premise of
a riddle, the world we create comes with the eerie sense that there is something we are
missing,  that  something has escaped us,  an excess that  we cannot  encompass.  This
excess is the process of becoming that is the raw material from which we draw, a process,
moreover, that is unrepresentable and unidentifiable, and which shapes the thought that
we develop through love and that we tear away from it. This selection, which cuts out the
continual  change  that  fuels  the  meanings  we develop,  is  an  integral  condition  of  our
thought - but one which itself occludes or covers over the preconceptual creative impulse
of which it is a part. Thought as selection undoes its own ground, its own operation as
creative love.
This awareness of an uncaptured excess and the accompanying sense of loss nags at our
relationship with the world. Despite our efforts, we can never completely possess it,64 and
our attempts to deal with this perceived failure and to salve the jealousy that arises from it
fail,  progressively  transforming  our  love  into  hate  and  simultaneously  rendering  us
powerless in the face of the beloved. This manifests as nihilism, the failure of our ability to
62 TI III ‘Reason in Philosophy’ §1
63 Newspapers used to run ‘spot the ball’ competitions, in which you could see a photo showing a 
group of footballers whose comedically inexplicable contortions, grimaces, and obsessive stares 
could only be given sense by the insertion of the missing football. Our way of thinking identity 
through a process of selection leaves the ball, but subtracts everything else. No wonder it feels odd.
64 Lost Highway’s Alice whispers to Pete: “You’ll never have me.” Albertine eludes Proust’s 
narrator.
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find any sense of value or meaning in the world. We are unable to perform the act of
transvaluation that simultaneously creates the world as meaningful,  and myself  as one
capable of bestowing or seeing this meaning - we are no longer able to love the world or to
fully realise our own capacity as its lover. 
Amor fati: the love of what is necessary
Nietzsche  believes  that  pushing  things  to  their  most  extreme conclusion  is  what  may
potentially allow us to move beyond them. God must die and our love for the transcendent
must fail, and fail catastrophically, if we are ever to switch tracks to a new way of thinking
the world.  Nietzsche’s  task in  The Gay Science  is  to  stage an intervention which  will
reconfigure our  relationship  with  the  future  and  offer  an  alternative  way  of  loving  or
affirming the world. The first three books of The Gay Science set out Nietzsche’s diagnosis
of  nihilism,  in  which we in  modernity  have become embittered through our  love for  a
shrunken world that cannot return it. We have been trapped in this tortuous relationship for
so long that we can no longer conceive of any other way of existence than as the jealous
and resentful lovers we have become. Book four offers the prospect of a divorce, that is at
the same time a reconciliation. It is dedicated to St Januarius or Janus, the double-faced
Roman god of simultaneous endings and beginnings, and signals the need to break with
our old ways of thinking our relationship with the world. Only through this will we ever be
able to comport ourselves towards the world in a more loving manner. Nietzsche opens
with a suggestion of what this new kind of love might look like, a reconfigured relationship
that is his “dearest wish” for the new year: 
I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is 
beautiful in them - thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: 
let that be my love from now on! I do not want to wage war against ugliness. I do 
not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let looking away be
my only negation! And, all in all and on the whole: some day I want only to be a 
Yes-sayer!65
Fate (“fati”), “what is necessary in things,” is the othered agent of change that we resented,
who implacably controlled the world which escaped us. It is Fate that Nietzsche thinks we
must learn to love if we are to escape nihilism.
65 GS §276
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If we misunderstand the creative incursion of thought into becoming, then the call to love
our fate sounds like a quasi-Stoic enterprise in which we reach acceptance of that which
we cannot change, to become an indiscriminate yes-man who looks away and refuses to
see anything but good in this best of all possible worlds. Understood in this manner, amor
fati sounds like a vastly ambitious kind of Stockholm syndrome in which, powerless against
the force of a world which threatens to crush us, our only means of survival is to deceive
ourselves into welcoming its blows instead.66 The idea of the impotent transforming their
own minds when they cannot change those of their oppressors is not an unusual theme for
Nietzsche;  he  goes  on  to  explore  this  idea  in  On  the  Genealogy  of  Morality as  the
transmutation of weakness into good, the desire to cause pain into guilt, and the will to
self-preservation into the life-annulling ascetic ideal.67 This Stoic interpretation of amor fati,
however, is one that Nietzsche expressly forbids in  The Gay Science, where “things are
not bad enough for us that they have to be bad for us in the Stoic style!”68 The subservient
and unrequited love of a Stoic amor fati  embodies a fatalism that Nietzsche finds deeply
troubling, where “man will stand before the future feeble, resigned and with hands clasped
because he is incapable of effecting any change in it.”69 
The love of Fate that Nietzsche wants is quite different from this - not a passive love, in
which we come to endure the blows along with the caresses of an implacable fate, but a
transformative love in which both the self and the world are changed, for it is in this fashion
that  “thus  will I  be  one  of  those  who  make things  beautiful.”70 The  key  to  this  is
66 See Stern (2013) for a more in-depth exploration of this reading of amor fati as a manifestation 
of Stockholm syndrome, dangerously close to the “love of stone walls and barred windows [that] is 
the last resort of someone who sees and has nothing else to love” (Adorno 2005:61), in which by 
“making things beautiful” we are engaging in no more than wishful thinking, effectively polishing, 
and learning to love, a turd. Stern recognises the relevance of GS §334 for the issue of how we 
might learn to love fate and identifies the question of by what right we falsify or make things 
beautiful as Nietzsche’s predominant concern throughout The Gay Science. We shall return to this 
question in chapter three, following my argument that the musical references in GS §334 (which 
Stern does not address) indicate the specifically rhythmical aspects of The Gay Science which are 
crucial for understanding Nietzsche’s problem with the way we currently love.
67 GM I §7, II §16 and III §13 respectively. Salome reads Nietzsche’s philosophy in precisely this 
manner, as the desperate attempt of a sick will to cure itself along the lines outlined in GM III with 
the new religion of eternal return (see Salome 2001: 28)
68 GS §326
69 HATH II ‘The Wanderer and his Shadow’ §61
70 GS §276 (my emphasis)
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understanding Nietzsche's statement that we need to learn "to see what is necessary in
things as what is beautiful in them." As we saw in GS §334, learning to love is a process
which  involves  several  stages  ranging  from confusion  and  revulsion,  through  a  more
comfortable familiarity, all the way to obsessive desire. The fatalistic or Stoic acceptance
of fate outlined above seems to be (were it ever achieved) very clearly located at the stage
where  we  can  stand fate  despite  its  strangeness,  rather  than  affirm  it.  This  Stoic
indifference to the world in fact fundamentally mischaracterises it as nothing more than a
“huge eternal glorification and universalization of Stoicism,”71 a world of apathy, rather than
the “new and indescribable beauty”72 that rewards love. As such, it must be considered
merely a precursor to the love of fate that Nietzsche demands. But despite the millennia
that  have  passed  since  the  Stoics  first  advocated  this  approach,  even  the  ability  to
patiently endure our fate remains elusive, and there are few signs of its transformation into
any kind of enchantment. In order to see what has stalled the process, to see why it is that
we have not yet learned to love fate after all these years, we need to return to the first
stage in which we initially delimit and shape the beloved. We must examine more closely
the nature of that we are trying to love - that which “is necessary in things.”
The issue here is the concept of necessity, which arises posterior to and as a result of the
initial selection or caesura that we perform upon the world. The delineation of phenomena
into  separate  stable  entities  involves  a  process  of  cutting  them  away  from  their
surroundings so that we may say “this: this is the cat,” an idea from which everything else -
the bench, the bricks, the ivy - is excluded. This act of unification through isolation is not
only spatial, but also temporal - we perceive the cat as something with a separate and
persistent existence apart from any actions, both her own and those of others (such as
myself) which led to her presence in my garden (from purring and feeding to the whole
historical process of domestication). With the grammatical separation of the doer (cat) from
the deed (purring), the focus is on the individual cat while the purring is incidental, and the
world of ceaseless flux becomes instead a series of distinct billiard balls or binary switches
which can be viewed independently of any movement or action they undertake. 
71 BGE §9
72 GS §334
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This division of the flow of becoming into discrete points or forms leaves us with a sense of
disconnection, and we introduce the idea of causality in an attempt to reconnect these
individual entities. The movement of isolation within creative love leaves us with the need
to account for the sense that there is more to the forms we perceive than we are able to
think. Becoming hints at a secret world to which we are not privy, the source of a richness
and beauty  in  the  world  that  we are  alas  unable  to  perceive.  We have cut  away the
changing world of becoming and effaced any awareness of this exclusion, including the
ways in which this feeds and drives the act of creation. We forget our own role as the co-
creator  who  draws  and shapes the forms we perceive  (both  our  own and that  of  the
beloved) from becoming, and in this fashion, we replace the complex feedback loop of the
process of learning to love with a stripped-down and restricted model of creativity based
on actors and causes, a world of doers who are also done-tos, rather than co-creators.
The forms we separate from the world of ceaseless flow are viewed independently of any
movement  within  them,  each  one  an  essential  core  or  substratum  which  remains
unchanged and untarnished by its interaction with others. But, as Nietzsche reminds us, 
there is no such substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind the deed, its effect and what
becomes of it; ‘the doer’ is invented as an afterthought, – the doing is everything.
Basically, the common people double a deed; when they see lightning, they make a
doing-a-deed out of it: they posit the same event, first as cause and then as its
effect.73
Given their absolute separation into discrete identities, we must now attempt to explain
how these things within the world are connected at all. The mysterious force of causality is
called upon to explain how the individual threads are woven together, how they can affect
one another, and how there can be any change in the world at all. But change in a causal
world  is  not  something that  happens because of  what  a thing  is,  that  constitutes and
creates it, but instead something that is done or happens to it, independently of anything
inherent to the thing itself. Any change that the thing itself does or perpetrates leaves it
unmoved, a lover unmoved by their beloved, a doer unphased by their deed. Nietzsche
makes this explicit in a long unpublished passage “Against determinism and teleology,” in
which he shows how the idea of causality is a function of the structure that arose with the
split into discrete forms:
73 GM I §13. See also WTP §548 (1885-1886)
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Only because we have introduced subjects, "doers," into things does it appear that
all events are the consequences of compulsion exerted upon subjects—exerted by
whom? again by a "doer." Cause and effect—a dangerous concept so long as one
thinks of something that causes and something upon which an effect is produced.74
The  notion  of  causality  bridges  the  gaps  that  come  with  understanding  the  world  as
discrete and solid things, divided equally firmly from both their actions and from the other
things upon which they impact. But smuggled along with the separation of a thing from its
actions we also get the notion of agency, for implicit in the self-contained nature of a thing
that is separated from the world is the belief that whatever is acting could act differently
and yet somehow remain the same, as if “there were an indifferent substratum behind the
strong  person  which  had  the  freedom to  manifest  strength  or  not.”75 This  substratum
becomes a neutral, impersonal switch, equally capable of standing at 1 or 0, of causing or
not causing a particular effect. And if, when the switch hits 1, we receive a shock, we may
understandably question whether our fate was avoidable, whether the switch had to flick,
or be flicked, in that direction.
Once the flow of becoming has been partitioned into a series of distinct points or relays by
“the seduction of language (and the fundamental errors of reason petrified within it), which
construes and misconstrues all actions as conditional upon an agency, a ‘subject,’”76 we
can start to turn a judicial eye upon the world. We ask whether events had to play out this
way,  and  whose  fault  it  was.  By  introducing  these  questions  of  necessity  and
responsibility, the separation of doer from deed appears to raise the possibility of free will -
that Adam might not have sinned. But the causal conception of the world, which twists and
separates everything into individual threads, occludes the complex process of co-creation
that informs everything, in which nothing is the effect or the responsibility of one agent
alone. Rather than asking about the world that informs the silversmith, that he draws upon
and is part of as the chalice is forged, we look for what made the silversmith do it - a subtle
difference, but one that looks behind, rather than around, the nominal author of the event,
for  a  shadowy  éminence  grise  rather  than  an  uncountable  number  of  co-creators.  In
discounting the possibility that the creative process can and always does travel in more
than one direction, and insisting that a godlike creator gifts life upon his creations and is
74 WTP §552 (Spring-Fall 1887)
75 GM I §13
76 ibid.
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changed not one iota in return, we set an impossible standard for creativity that debars
anything in the world from achieving it. Our awareness of the incomprehensible excess
that  generates  the  beings  we  perceive  means  that  there  is  always  something  else
responsible for their creation, for all our acts, while the occlusion of our own role in this
process forbids that this be us. 
The causal separation into doer and deed raises the issue of blame, of an agent who has
chosen and is responsible for the change they have caused. But this agent, ultimately, is
not  us.  By  separating  ourselves  so  completely  from becoming,  we  make  any  sign  of
change into an other, a feared monster, personified as Fate.77 The concept of Fate, the
goddess or goddesses who implacably control the direction of our lives, is the ultimate
agent  or substratum that absorbs the responsibility  for the decisions that  have passed
beyond our reach, the external force that weaves together the threads of our life,  who
wields the cue that send the balls skittering around the table. The sense of becoming that
we cannot encompass within the world that we have subdivided becomes a terrifying and
unlovable presence, responsible for the changes that afflict us, as that which happens to
us and cannot be denied. 
For Plato at the end of the  Republic, the three Fates as the daughters of Necessity are
responsible for overseeing a grand tombola that allows souls to pick the token that will
determine the material conditions of their next life. Once chosen, there is no going back - if
we find we have failed to adequately examine the small print and that our fate in our next
life is to devour our own children, then there is nothing that will change this future and
allow us to avoid that large and suspiciously delicious-looking pie. The Platonic image of
the tokens presents us with a double bind of a fate that is somehow our fault, even though
there is nothing that the “I” of my living memory could ever have done about it. All I can do
within this life is devote my attention to the study of the Good, in the hope that this will help
me to make a better choice next time. It is up to me to choose well, as “the fault lies not
with God, but with the soul that makes the choice”78 if I set myself on a course of depravity
– but the “I” that chooses is not of this world, but instead a small personal Adam visiting
original sin upon me from a lost garden of Eden. Within the confines of the physical world
77 Fatum - “that which has been spoken”
78 Plato, Republic X 317d
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and my own life, there is nothing I can do to affect this same life – it is only once I have
died that I can take my next turn.79 While I am alive, there are no choices that I can make
that will affect what happens to me in this life, only in the next. The events of the life I am
currently living are therefore determined entirely outside it, in the threads that make up a
universe spun by Necessity, duly stamped, ratified and made irreversible by the Fates.80
We spun our threads as the revolutions and repetitions of love bound and shaped them
into forms. Now we hand these threads over to the Fates to weave together - past, present
and future,81 everything that was entwined is also enchained - so firmly twisted and knotted
together that we cannot extract a single link, cannot take one moment in isolation without
all others rubbing and jostling upon it. 
The Fates show us the unlovable world of necessity - a world which seems to offer us not
the smallest crack into which we can insert some control and effect any change, in which
we have apparently lost the power to create, and therefore also to love. But Plato goes
further than this, and mounts a defensive manoeuvre that further distances us from the
world that seems to slip continually from our grasp. We decided that what we could not
have was not worth having anyway. The traces of transience and change that resisted us,
the excess that baffled our attempts to exclude it, were the signs that the beloved was not,
after all, all she should be. The constitutional act of forgetting has separated the world from
its  power  to create  itself,  separated us from our  role  in  this.  So instead we posit  the
existence of a rival - another lover-creator, like us, but better, richer, more powerful - it is to
him  that  she  whispers  all  her  secrets,  to  him  that  she  gives  up  everything  that  she
withholds from us. 
79 Thayer notes that "in the myth the operation of choice is portrayed not as related to specific 
actions, but as directed to a 'life' (bios), a network or pattern of contained and ensuing actions" and 
that "the life-pattern, once it is chosen, becomes the mortal career and destiny of the soul" (Thayer 
1988). As Annas points out, "the result of placing the afterlife judgement within a cycle of 
reincarnations has been to reveal them as part of a fated cycle of happenings within which it is hard 
for the individual to retain much sense of responsibility for his or her own life. Correspondingly, the 
moral role of the rewards and punishments changes. They loom not as something deserved, and 
thus with the power to make one rethink one's life now, but rather as an implacably allotted bonus 
or calamity that cannot be avoided" (Annas 1982).
80 Plato, Republic X 620d-621a
81 Plato, Republic X 616b-621d on “the three Fates, daughters of Necessity,” who weave, measure 
and cut the thread of life as it spins on the spindle-whorl of Necessity that is the universe.
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Plato signals an attempt to wrest back control of the world, by thinking (and in so doing
transferring our love to) an alternative to the runaway train that the Fates appeared to
control. For in the space outside the world, at a point where the Fates leave us to our own
devices,  we are offered the freedom to choose our  fate,  to  exert  our  control  over the
malignant controllers, by appealing to our knowledge of a higher authority - the eternal,
unchangeable, Good. With Plato we find the notion of a stable source for the changeable
world we perceived - the everlasting Forms that never dissolved, never lost their taste, but
could continue to sustain and nourish us indefinitely.  It  is  this which develops into the
second stage of the error which manifests as Christianity, the “Platonism for the ‘people,’”82
and it  offers a “new possibility  of willing” via the extreme certainty of faith,  which was
needed to counter a “sickening of the will”  that “had increased to an absurd level  and
bordered on desperation.”83 Having divorced ourselves from the possibility of participating
in the process of love that allowed us to generate a meaningful, beloved, and therefore
inhabitable, world, we stave off the threat of nihilism by outsourcing this creativity to the
figure of God in the eternal world beyond. 
Within the rigid division of the world into a chain of doers and deeds, any phenomenon
must be viewed not on its own terms, but in the light of a temporally prior cause. When we
look back and fail to perceive the source of the imperceptible excess that gives value to
the  world,  we  conclude  that  it  lies  not  in  the  world  at  all,  but  beyond  it.84 Our
misunderstanding  of  the  relationship  between thought  and becoming manifests  as  the
redirection of our love towards the transcendent, in response to the perceived betrayal of
the physical world that resists our advances. God is the Oedipal father figure we create,
and like all our creations, we love him too - more, in fact, than the world which has failed
us, denied us, cheated us of a meaning that we now see was only ever derived from her
other lover. We have separated ourselves from an awareness of the numerous factors that
82 BGE Preface
83 GS §347
84 Irigaray characterises this as a fluid excess that cannot be contained within the solid structural 
identities that we have created, that leaks through the gaps of our strict divisions and cannot be 
understood on these terms. This “uninterpreted” sense of a world that we cannot completely capture
“leads to giving the real back to God.” (Irigaray 1985:109) See Marsden (2002:130ff) on the 
parallels between Nietzsche's depiction of Dionysian lyricism and Irigaray's remarks on the 
liquification of frozen matter, raising the possibility of an artistic and affirmative reactivation of this 
sense of fluid excess.
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develop into a phenomenon, as we isolated it from them, and can think of the cause solely
in terms of the causa efficiens, he whose labour brings about the world that we perceive.85
It is this kind of cause for which we are continually searching, and this search leads to an
infinite chain in which each thing is nothing more than the effect of another prior cause,
until  we are forced to posit  the otherworldly  existence of  God,  the ultimate craftsman,
putting a full stop to this endless regress. We create God in our supposed image, deriving
“the entire concept from the subjective conviction that we are causes”86 and in doing so
deepen our sense of disengagement with our role when we engage with the world around
us. 
Plato and the Christian worldview that developed afterwards supplied an eternal heaven to
eclipse the transient world that no longer satisfied us, an eternal God who could nullify the
ephemeral nature of the creative act itself, and an eternal soul to distinguish us from the
rest of mortal existence. Christianity “granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his
smallness  and accidental  occurrence in  the  flux of  becoming and passing away”  and,
together with the system of morality which accompanied it, was “a means of preservation”
which  acted  as  “the  great  and  theoretical  antidote against  practical  nihilism.”87 The
movement of becoming is that which gives the sense that the world is getting away from
us, slipping from our conceptual grasp. The superiority of God, whom we create from our
awareness of this unconceptualisable generative excess, lies in his ability to ruthlesslessly
and efficiently encompass and negate it by triumphing over change, over death, and by
rendering it nugatory and meaningless within his larger comprehension. 
God, in our estimation, appeared both bigger than and prior to the continual becoming of
the  world.  It  did  not  matter  that  we  were  unable  to  perceive  the  whole  richness  of
becoming as a totality, because it did not ultimately matter - it did not change anything
essential. The shifting transience of the world around us could therefore be understood as
a surface effect, a trifling rearrangement that did nothing to challenge the unshakeable
85 As Heidegger writes, in a worldview that has occluded the co-creative aspect of love, “where 
everything that presences exhibits itself in the light of a cause–effect coherence, even God, for 
representational thinking, can … sink to the level of a cause, of causa efficiens." (Heidegger 
1993:331)
86 WTP §551 (March-June 1888)
87 WTP §4 (June 10, 1887)
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core of a God who contained within him all the possible combinations and permutations
that  were  merely  being  replayed  in  the  world.  God’s  response  to  the  changeful  and
beloved world was the condescension of  a master,  amused by threats of  a lover they
recognise as powerless, the growls of a lapdog, the tantrums of a small child. This was our
fantasy, a refuge from our own inability to control the world in which we found ourselves
and our failure to find our love returned. As one rejected by the beloved, we spurn her.
Like good little Freudians, we attempt to free ourselves from her apron strings by imitating
the Father, aloof from the transient world he so effortlessly overmasters. We who made
God in our image now try to remake ourselves as his shadows. We may appear weak,
made of the sickly flesh of the world we despise, but secretly we are just like him - we too,
are eternal, and one day we will come into our own, into our kingdom, with the death that
signals  our majority and our independence from the world we could not  possess.  But
attempting to place ourselves beyond the reach of the world does not regain our stake in it.
We  disguise,  rather  than  engage  with,  the  nihilistic  impotence  that  comes  with  the
separation of thought from the world of becoming from which it emerges. We are aware of
an excess to the world that we cannot encompass. And because we cannot create all as
meaningful or comprehensible within our idea of the beloved, we despair of our ability to
create  any meaning from the world. We conclude that the problem was not us, but the
world - we convince ourselves that the world that defies us is valueless, and redirect all our
creative powers of love outside the world, to the transcendent.
The notion of the transcendent upon which we fixate absorbs the creative powers that
were our own, that we partake in even as we create the concepts (God, Fate, eternity) that
appear  to  gainsay them.  At  the  same time,  it  reflects  our  own sense of  betrayal  and
alienation from the world, in which the excess we cannot encompass becomes viewed as
a disruptive and malignant force. The beloved that emerges from this jealous love is a
notion of the transcendent that stands beyond and in opposition to the world we perceive.88
If  we return  to  the model  of  love that  Plato  develops  in  the  Symposium,  we  find  the
priestess Diotima explaining our love of the unchanging otherworldly. She too develops the
ties between love and creativity, explaining that the ways we traditionally think of these
88 Thomson cites modern-day examples of the nihilism of transcendence, such as body 
dissatisfaction caused by comparison with images in the media, or the phenomenon of 'Avatar-
blues' in which the world seems worthless in comparison to the fictional world depicted in the film 
Avatar (Thomson 2011)
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(love is generally understood as sexual love, creativity as the artistic endeavors of poetry
and composition) are just one specific expression of a wider phenomenon89 that motivates
the human and animal  world  alike.90 All  instances of  love,  whether  sexual  or  not,  are
ultimately striving towards goodness - that which will make us happy. But as in the case of
the healthy man who wishes to remain healthy,  we do not just want  happiness in the
present - for Diotima, as for Socrates, any love is also implicitly the desire for the beloved
object in the future so that ultimately “the object of love is the  permanent possession of
goodness for oneself.”91 
We, however, are also mortal and changeable, lacking the stable perfection of the gods,92
and it is this lack that drives our creativity, just as it motivates our love. In and of ourselves,
we cannot  possess the beloved forever,  because we do not last forever.  But creativity
offers  us  a  chance to  extend ourselves  into  the future  -  whether  this  be via  physical
children,  our  reputation  or  (preferably)  the creation  of  thoughts  and ideas that  will  be
discussed a thousand years from now. It allows us to bridge the gap between our current
presence  and  the  absent  future.  Like  Nietzsche,  Diotima  thinks  that  “everything
instinctively values its own offspring,” but unlike Nietzsche she holds that “it is immortality
which makes this devotion, which is love, a universal feature.”93 Rather than the idea we
find in Nietzsche of a love that is inherently creative, that transforms lover and beloved as
it loves, for Plato our love and our creativity are driven by the desire ultimately to achieve
stasis. We are “in love with immortality”94 in an attempt to become what we are not, and
our  love  for  the  transcendent  beloved  that  we  have  created  from  our  sense  of  the
uncaptured, changeable excess of becoming is similarly a love for precisely what this is
not. It is a love that is designed to kill the beloved, that once again loves by separating
itself  from  everything  from  which  this  love  is  drawn.  The  beloved  reconceived  as
changeless immortality is attempting to address the irretrievable absence of the past and
the future, a desire that is ultimately fulfilled in the concept of eternity - that which exists
89 Plato, Symposium, 205b-d
90 Plato, Symposium, 207a-b
91 Plato, Symposium, 206a [my emphasis] 
92 Plato, Symposium, 207d
93 Plato, Symposium, 208b
94 Plato, Symposium, 208e
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outside time, containing only what is with no “was” or “will be.”95 The ultimate good, that
towards which our love strives, is eternity.
Eternity  counters  the  meaninglessness  of  nihilism  by  allowing  us  to  make  something
lovable or meaningful for ourselves, but only at the cost of any residual trace of worth in
the changeable  world around us.  Viewed in the reflected light  of  eternity,  the physical
world becomes ever more shadowy and inadequate in comparison, as we throw “drab,
cold, gray nets of concepts over the brightly colored whirlwind of the senses”96 and the
“Platonic slander of the senses”97 begins. We are able to create “a world in which we are
able to live”98 only by situating it  outside or beyond the transient world that resists our
efforts to encompass it, as the otherworldly afterlife or “backworld.” The self, on the other
hand, attempts to transcend the transience of the world by positing the presence of the
soul, which seems to gain the immortality it craves by participating in the eternity of God,
precisely by excluding everything that drew upon the sensual. The initial act of separation
of  thought  from the flow of  becoming manifests as the divide between self  and world
which, isolated from the process of co-creation that we see with love, instead requires the
beneficent figure of a common creator to provide any consistency between them. We rely
on the divine trace of God and a process of paternal association to reflect any shadow of
value back onto the world of the senses that he had created, and to guarantee any certain
knowledge of this impoverished world, from which we dissociate ourselves and yet which
continues  to  surround us.  The  eternal  backworld  of  heaven  and the  web  of  Christian
morality  which  promised  this  become  our  new  “real”  world,  to  the  detriment  of  the
"apparent" world of continually changing sensuous appearances.
The  powerful  focus  of  love and  meaning  that  humanity  finds  in  the  notion  of  eternity
conceals  the  wound  that  had  opened  between  thought  and  becoming,  deflecting  the
nihilism that threatened to overcome us. But as we pass through the early stages of this
history  of  an  error,  the  divide  between  what  we  see  as  the  self  and  the  world  that
surrounds it nonetheless remains a hidden irritation that we cannot leave in peace. The
95 Plato, Timaeus, 37e-38a
96 BGE §14
97 WTP §427 (Nov. 1887-March 1888)
98 GS §121
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early modern period, with its onslaught of scientific discoveries, seems to offer a way in
which the natural world could pull focus back from the transcendent, as the Enlightenment
project of grounding knowledge in the “rule of reason” finds its first guarantee of certainty
in the “sovereignty of the will”99 of the subject, Descartes’ thinking “I,” rather than God. But
although the turn away from God appears to redirect our attention to the physical world,
this  world for  us is  now hopelessly  partitioned into causally  linked points.  The subject
becomes the ultimate (and, for Nietzsche, most pernicious100) agent in this causal chain,
with the world as its object, modelled on the perceived unity and self-sufficiency of the
subject:
The subject:  this is  the term for our belief  in a unity underlying all  the different
impulses of the highest feeling of reality: we understand this belief as the effect of
one cause—we believe so firmly in our belief that for its sake we imagine "truth,"
"reality," "substantiality" in general. — "The subject" is the fiction that many similar
states in us are the effect  of  one substratum: but it  is  we who first  created the
"similarity" of these states; our adjusting them and making them similar is the fact,
not their similarity (—which ought rather to be denied—).101
The rationality of the subject offers a nominal challenge to a faith based on God, despite
being a more extreme manifestation of the desire for eternity that had produced God in the
first place.102 But the structural separation of the subject from the world around it gives any
knowledge based on human reason a precarious  status.  Descartes’  momentary doubt
about  God in the foundational  stages of  the  Meditations opens up the possibility  of  a
meaning and existence that is independent of God, but which only applies to the “I” of the
cogito.  The attempt  to extend this  to  anything beyond the realm of  our  own thoughts
reveals the gulf that has opened up between “I” and everything else, a divide which our
autonomy from God makes deeply problematic. In questioning the necessity of the God we
99 WTP §95 (Spring-Fall 1887)
100 Although as McNeill (2004) points out, it is not so much the unity of the subject that troubles 
Nietzsche as the concept of “a permanent, enduring subject that would maintain itself as such, as 
self-identical, across or throughout many different states of being.” It is this ossified conception of 
the self that Nietzsche views as the “accomplice” (as Deleuze puts it in DI 130) of the oppressive 
structures of nihilism.
101 WTP §485 (Spring-Fall 1887). In chapter three we shall return to the problem of causality as an 
anthopomophism which sees the world as a reflection of how we perceive ourselves.
102 Just as later in the case of Schopenhauer, in the final stages of the error that Nietzsche is trying
to redress, we “can see what it was that actually triumphed over the Christian god: Christian 
morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that was taken ever more rigorously” until it “in the end 
forbids itself the lie of faith in God.” (GS §357)
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had previously invested with so much meaning, the status of the world he guaranteed
becomes similarly dubious.103
Even after Descartes’  restoration of God later in the  Meditations,  the gap between the
disembodied thinking subject and the world has been brought to the surface as we begin
to question what sort of meaning this dubiously eternal God can provide. The shift from a
God who secures the existence of the self to a subject whose constitution indicates the
existence of God does nothing to repair the relationship between thought and the excess
of becoming that it is unable to encompass, nor to challenge the prioritisation of stable
eternity over transience and change. Our subsequent philosophical attempts to resolve the
estrangement  between  self  and  world  all  fail  adequately  to  address  this  hierarchical
distinction between the eternal and the ephemeral. They retain the “metaphysical faith” in
the absolute value of truth, “the Christian faith which was also Plato’s faith,”104 that locates
the immortal soul of the subject with God on one side, and the transient world on the other.
The more philosophers attempt to bridge this divide without  the aid of  an increasingly
absent  divine intervention,  the  wider  it  becomes.  As we reach the final  stages of  the
process by which our misunderstanding of the relationship between thought and becoming
descends into nihilism, Nietzsche describes how the existence of the eternal or “real” world
becomes more and more compromised and can no longer provide the physical world with
any meaning, until finally we lose both:
The real world—we have done away with it: what world was left? the apparent one,
perhaps?... But no! with the real world we have also done away with the apparent
one!105
The ultimate effect of the death of God is not the re-emergence of a transient and yet
meaningful  world of  appearances,  previously  eclipsed by the now discredited heavenly
world of eternity, nor the dissolution of the gap between self and world. Instead, it seems
that all sense of meaning whatsoever has disappeared, and that this gulf has deepened to
the extent that the world can no longer in any meaningful sense be perceived at all.
103 As Löwith puts it, "the peculiar result of Descartes's skeptical meditation is the basic ontological
distinction between man and world, according to the respective degree of certainty. Man is certain 
of himself as 'res cogitans;' everything else, the whole world outside of man, is in itself as 'res 
extensa' uncertain." (Löwith 1997: 139)
104 GS §344
105 TI ‘How the “real world” finally became a fable’
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The supreme values in whose service man should live . . . were erected over man
to strengthen their voice, as if  they were commands of God, as "reality," as the
"true" world, as a hope and future world. Now that the shabby origin of these values
is becoming clear, the universe seems to have lost value, seems "meaningless."106
This  is  the  “pessimistic  coloring”  which  “comes  necessarily  in  the  wake  of  the
Enlightenment”107 that Nietzsche diagnoses at the heart of nineteenth century thinking: the
absolute exhaustion of our ability to make sense of anything, in which 
we see that we cannot reach the sphere in which we have placed our values; but 
this does not by any means confer any value on that other sphere in which we live: 
on the contrary, we are weary because we have lost the main stimulus.108 
This stimulus is the phantom of eternity and the possibility of changeless perfection. With
the dissolution of this fantasy, there is now no truth or meaning to be found anywhere, be it
in the “supreme values” of God and Christian morality, the “apparent” world of the senses
or  the  rudderless  figure  of  man  trapped  between  them.  The  creative  effort  that  had
produced the beloved in the shape of God was a massive one, and our despair at the
failure of this relationship is correspondingly devastating.
Although we have been forced to abandon the illusion of eternity, we still do not recognise
the uncalculable nature of becoming. As subjects, we see the world as an object  for us,
but  an inherently  disappointing  one.  We do  not  view our  creative  efforts  to  transform
becoming into something we can think as a positive and necessary approach, but as an
act of misguided stupidity. The causal world we now inhabit seems to leave no space for
such creative transformations. Instead, we can only understand it as an ordered series in
which energy is merely shifted from one place to another,  from one billiard ball  to the
next.109 For Nietzsche, the arc of this creatively destructive love story spans the history of
106 WTP §7 (Nov. 1887-March 1888). As Nietzsche goes on to say, however, this "is only a 
transitional stage" which heralds the thought of eternal return that we shall go on to explore in the 
final section of this chapter.
107 WTP §91 (1885)
108 WTP §8 (1883-1888)
109 Heidegger describes this view of the world that informs our thinking in modernity as one 
enframed by an all-encompassing relationship with the world understood as technology - as that 
which is entirely present for us, ordered and calculable. With his notion of enframing, Heidegger 
recognises the difficulty of undoing or deconstructing the co-creative movement of the loving-
thinking relationship, even at the point where it seems to be working against itself, for "the 
challenging-enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing (bringing-forth) but also conceals
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Western metaphysics, from Plato’s misunderstanding of the beloved as the eternity that
we lack, to the resurgence of nihilism in modernity as the failure of this love.110 The result
of the breakdown of the relationship between thought and becoming is to destroy any faith
in the creativity of our thought. Becoming has been neutered, subdivided into a causal
chain, in which the future is no more than the completion of a process set in motion in the
past.111 A great deal of Nietzsche's efforts go towards showing how this has come about,
and attempting to get us to understand that the subdivision of becoming into cause and
effect is the result of the creative activity of thought. 
The segregation of doer and deed, subject and object, is of our own making, and once
“one has grasped that the ‘subject’ is not something that creates effects, but only a fiction,
much follows” as “belief  also disappears in effective things, in reciprocation, cause and
effect between those phenomena that we call things”112 and we are left with the conclusion
that “necessity is not a fact but an interpretation.”113 It is only in the space that we insert
between the subject  and its actions that  we find any room for  the distinction between
revealing itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, propriates" (Heidegger 1993:331).
The act of selection cuts away its own ground, allowing us to forget the act of co-creation, revealing 
or bringing-forth.
110 Heidegger agrees that it is only at the culmination of this process that we can begin to see it for 
what it is and therefore have the chance to redirect it. However, he identifies several trajectories 
within the larger overarching epoch of metaphysics in which we can see the same pattern of 
enframing at work, in which the way we shape meaning is and can only ever be in terms of a 
particular path or worldview (be it post-Socratic, Medieval scholastic, or modern – see Schürmann 
1987: 95ff). For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s reversal of the Platonic hierarchy represents the last gasp 
of metaphysics, with the will to power as the ultimate subject that imposes its own meaning on the 
world. Understood subjectively in this fashion, the will to power is that which drives the technological
understanding of being, that sees the world as something entirely for us, to be stored, regulated, 
and eventually used up. However understanding will to power as love, as the capacity not just to 
affect but more importantly to be affected and be open to respond to the surrounding world, brings 
the will to power much closer than Heidegger admits to that which he describes as presencing or 
physis, the framework of openness that makes any relationships within it possible. Schürmann’s 
approach of reading Heidegger “backward,” from the later works to the earlier, emphasises a more 
plural Heideggerian ontology in which “presencing then appears more Nietzschean, deprived of 
metaphysical principles.” (Schürmann 1987: 14)
111 Tillich describes this confusing sense of societal despair that comes with nihilism at the end of 
eras as a state in which time stops, we “cannot see anything new" (Tillich 2000: 11) and “no way 
out into the future appears.” (Tillich 2000: 54)
112 WTP §552 (Spring-Fall 1887)
113 ibid.
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chance and necessity. The highly efficient manner in which we create identity is born of
long years of practice, which blind us to the artificial nature of its operation. But if once we
grasp that our habitual unthinking manner of seeing the world as discrete entities is in fact
an act of extreme temerity that we impose on the fluid world “poured all around” 114 us, it is
impossible to conceive of these gaps remaining, and becoming flows back into the space
that causality had been required to bridge. For Nietzsche, necessity is a fiction, because
there is simply no room in the seamless web of being in which any relationship, including
the fallacious relationship between the cause and its necessary effect, can survive. 
So what, as aspiring lovers of that which is necessary in things, are we supposed to love,
when both necessity and the things in which it  inheres have no reality beyond that we
create? When the space for necessity is withdrawn, we are equally left with no room for
contingency - it is the distinction between chance and necessity which collapses, all things
following with equal certainty because there is no concrete place where we may say that
the “cause”  ends and the effect  begins.  Necessity  may be a fiction,  but  it  is  one that
embraces all things equally, and so if there is anything necessary in things, anything that
can be the object our love, it is: everything. This is the fate that we must learn to love, to
see,  and  by  doing  so  make  beautiful  -  the  inextricable  totality  of  becoming  in  all  its
movement, within which we as lovers are also engulfed. 
Our submersion within and utter entanglement with becoming, the world that is our fate,
must be recognised if we are not to fall into the abusive pattern of purely passive or Stoic
love described above. The distinction between self and world may be the most primary of
the identities we learned to form, but cannot be excluded from the all-embracing network
of becoming on this account - we are equally “a piece of fate,”115 that which is necessary,
and the movement of learning to love fate in its entirety therefore requires that “one has to
learn to love oneself”116 too. It is our inclusion and confusion with the beloved, our own
nascent ability to say “I  am fate”117 that envelops us within the sphere of that which is
114 PTAG §7
115 HATH II “The Wanderer and his Shadow” §61
116 TSZ III “On the Spirit of Gravity” §2
117 EH IV “Why I am a Destiny” [“Schicksal”]
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transformed and made beautiful by the act of love. Rather than a crushing adversary, fate
and the changes within it become a process in which we are actively complicit.
But this presents us with a problem. When we turn back to GS §334, which outlines the
stages by which all “love, too, must be learned,” we recall that the first movement of the
process of learning to love is to “isolate and delimit” the beloved. How are we to do this
with fate? How can we isolate absolutely everything when there can be nothing cut away
and excluded from it,  even ourselves,  when there can be no line  drawn between the
necessary  and  the  contingent  -  when  it  is  precisely  this  tendency  to  delimit  and  fix
substances within being that eventually led to our present nihilistic alienation? In order to
love fate or necessity without diminishing it and ourselves in the process, it seems that the
reverse is needed, that we must infinitely broaden what is included within our conception
of fate, rather than reducing it. What is "necessary" cannot be understood as the chain of
cause and effect, that is no more necessary than any of the other fictions we create. Nor
can the necessary  be opposed to  the accidental,  a  notion  which  is  meaningless  in  a
universe devoid of any divine plan.118 Instead, the love of what is necessary in  amor fati
expresses the need to affirm the generative force of becoming, and the role of thought in
transforming this.119 
This  entails  a  radically  different  mode  of  thought,  one  that  abandons  our  lingering
privileging of an impossible sense of eternity over the transience of becoming. Rather than
permanently excluding and hardening the barriers of what is and is not considered part of
the beloved identity, instead our selection should be a “looking away” that leaves space for
future revision, for the beloved to grow. With amor fati, we would cease to oppose our idea
of  the beloved identity  (especially  that  of  our  own identity120)  to  the rest  of  the world,
“waging war” on all that we exclude from it. Instead, with amor fati, Nietzsche calls upon us
to perform a temporary selection. We must abandon our addictive way of loving the world,
118 As Stern points out, "we can’t separate the world into what is necessary and what is accidental,
because ‘accidental’ only really makes sense in an anthropomorphized world—a world which 
intends certain things, gives certain commands, is an organism or a machine with a purpose" (Stern
2013). In chapter three we shall go on to explore GS §109 where Nietzsche brings out this idea.
119 As Groff states, this "inner necessity" is the "creation of the blind, purposeless play of forces 
that [Nietzsche] calls the will to power" (Groff 2003).
120 For as Nietzsche writes of the process of learning to love through selection and repetition, 
“even he who loves himself will have learned it this way – there is no other way.” (GS §334)
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and instead shape our beloved identities as the “brief habits” that Nietzsche loves with all
the  “faith  of  passion,  this  faith  in  eternity”121 but  that  are  yet  not eternal,  are  not  the
enduring habits that have sucked us into nihilism. Amor fati is the creation of these briefly
shining identities which incorporate and love the transience within them, through which the
world will  be made beautiful.  As one who understands the relationship  of  thought  and
becoming in this manner, one who loves fate will simultaneously have become something
different,  one who is  capable  of  effecting this  change.  But  as the patronage of  Janus
suggests, there must be an ending if we are to have this new kind of love. Nietzsche has
diagnosed the problem, and shown us an alternative way of being – but now he must work
out  how  to  get  there.  We  need  to  pervert  our  customary  method  of  devotion  as
eternalisation  so  that  everything,  including  transience,  can  be  affirmed.  This  is  what
Nietzsche introduces in GS §341 as the thought of eternal return.
The anthropological reading of eternal return as a test of affirmation
Amor fati is Nietzsche’s alternative to the model of love that Socrates speaks of in the
Symposium, which occludes the creative relationship between thought and becoming, and
led to the problem of nihilism that we suffer in modernity. The question is how we are to
alter  this  relationship,  given the initial  act  of  selection  that  is  a  necessary part  of  the
creativity of thought. In  The Gay Science  Nietzsche asks this “most delicate question of
all ... whether science is able to furnish goals of action after having proved that it can take
such goals away and annihilate them.”122 We saw this annihilation in the account of how
the nihilistic aspects of our love of gradually destroyed that which it adored. The task for
Nietzsche's new "gay" or joyous science is now to find a way for us to affirm this creativity.
The “experimenting” that this task involves begins here in  The Gay Science, and is no
easy task, for Nietzsche warns us that it  “might last for centuries.”123 The death of the
“love-sick” Socrates comes after Nietzsche's exploration of love and nihilism throughout
The Gay Science, and his cry that we must “overcome even the Greeks!”124 is followed by
his attempt to do this, with the thought of eternal return. 
121 GS §295
122 GS §7
123 ibid.
124 GS §340
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Nietzsche introduces this fundamental thought as “the heaviest weight”: 
The heaviest weight. - What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your 
loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it you 
will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing 
new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything 
unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same 
succession and sequence - even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, 
and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned 
over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!'125
How, asks Nietzsche, would you respond to the demon’s announcement, that we will be
forced to relive our lives over and over again exactly as we have already lived them? The
most likely response, Nietzsche thinks, is that “if this thought gained power over you, as
you are it would transform and possibly crush you; the question in each and every thing,
‘Do you want this again and innumerable times again?’ would lie on your actions as the
heaviest weight!”126 He does, however, suggest another possibility - that you might have
“once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: 'You are a
god, and never have I heard anything more divine.'”127 On the strength of such a moment,
we might greet the demon’s pronouncement not as a threat, but as a wonderful promise,
having  become so  “well  disposed  … to  yourself  and  to  life  to  long  for  nothing  more
fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal.”128 How do you feel about
yourself, and about your life, asks Nietzsche? Do you like it enough to want to live it all
over again - not in the fashion of Groundhog Day, in which you can tweak past mistakes
and choices, but precisely “this life as you now live it?” Do you affirm not only your own
existence, but also the whole past history of the world that has led to it, to the extent that
there could be nothing better, that you could want nothing more, than its eternal repetition?
This is Nietzsche’s first published introduction of the thought of eternal return, which leads
onto  the  figure  of  Zarathustra  who  is  introduced  in  the  next  aphorism  (GS §342).129
125 GS §341
126 ibid.
127 ibid.
128 ibid.
129 This is almost word for word the same as the opening aphorism of Nietzsche’s next published 
text, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and the implication seems clear that Nietzsche is leading us from 
The Gay Science into his next book with this teaser of what is coming next. Indeed some 
cosmological readers of eternal return such as Loeb view GS §341 as no more than a preview for 
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Nietzsche  calls  the  thought  of  eternal  return  the  "highest  attainable  formula  of
affirmation"130 and  writes  that  "the  ‘gaya  scienza’  ...  gives  a  hundred  indications  that
something incomparable is near; latterly it gives the opening of  Zarathustra itself, and in
the penultimate section of the fourth book it gives Zarathustra’s fundamental thought."131
This "fundamental thought" of eternal return is Nietzsche's prescription for how we are to
achieve the new type of love that he describes in amor fati.132 Perhaps of all Nietzsche’s
work, the thought of eternal return is that which most stridently demands interpretation,133
and the intitial force that Nietzsche expects this thought to have is one that emerges from
the preoccupations of the preceding books of  The Gay Science. We need to understand
the concerns that motivate Nietzsche's introduction of eternal return before we can make
sense of its later development in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I will therefore first concentrate
on  a  reading that  emerges  from  The  Gay  Science of  eternal  return  as  a  test  of
affirmation.134 As we shall see, this reading does not ultimately address the problematic
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, containing only a cut-down version of Nietzsche’s full theory (Loeb 2013). 
However as I am arguing throughout this work, GS §341 is much more than a preview – not only 
this aphorism, but the entire surrounding context of The Gay Science is essential for understanding 
what Nietzsche is trying to do with eternal return.
130 EH III 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody' §1
131 ibid.
132 A dissenting view is that of Domino who argues that the demon's challenge in GS §341 "does 
not suggest love as a possible response" (Domino 2012), or at least not that which we currently 
recognise as love, and that on this basis we should not read amor fati as something Nietzsche 
intended to emerge from eternal return. This criticism ignores the strange and futural kind of love 
that Nietzsche intends with amor fati (the whole point is that a new way of thinking will not follow our
current patterns of love). Domino also dismisses the cry of "da capo" that we find in BGE §56 as 
"without emotional inflection, as might be found in a score," suggesting that this would be a 
"retrogressive movement" concerned with the repetition of the past and present rather than a 
transformation into the future, trivialising the difference engendered by musical repetition that is, as I
will go on to argue, a major concern of The Gay Science.
133 As Bernd Magnus writes, “it is almost unique in the history of philosophy that so much 
confusion would prevail concerning a philosopher’s self-confessed principal idea. Consider how odd
it would be if, for example, we did not have the foggiest notion of what Plato meant by forms (eidos, 
idea) or why he was so enthusiastic. Or consider how peculiar it would be if we did not fathom what 
Kant meant by “a priori synthetic judgments” or his second Copernican revolution, and if we were in 
the dark about Aristotle’s ‘substance,’ Descartes’ cogito or Hegel’s Geist. The point, of course, is 
that Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence is in a quite peculiar position.” (Magnus 1978:xiii)
134 In the later chapters of the thesis I shall turn to other interpretations of eternal return – the 
cosmological reading, Stambaugh’s account of eternal return as a theory of time as “momentary,” 
and Deleuze’s mobilisation of eternal return as a selection ensuring the return of difference. There 
are however many other notable readings of eternal return that there is not sufficient space to 
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relationship between thought and becoming that we have explored in this chapter. It is the
failure of  this reading that  shall  prompt us to reexamine the nature of  the relationship
between thought and becoming along the rhythmical lines that Nietzsche suggests in The
Gay Science.  Only once we have more fully understood the problem that Nietzsche is
addressing with eternal return shall we then return in chapter four to explore the account of
eternal return in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
We have seen how in The Gay Science Nietzsche explores the problem of nihilism as one
in which we are unable to affirm the identities we have formed in the world around us. The
process by which our thought creates the idea of discrete things from the flow of becoming
involves an initial act of separation that cuts these forms off from their creative source. We
are unable to affirm the value of either the creativity of thought or the ideas that it shapes.
One common interpretation argues that Nietzsche intends eternal return to address this
problem by forcing upon us an extreme test of affirmation - that we should imbue all our
actions with the repetitive meaning they would acquire if they were to return eternally, and
ask, on this basis if we can affirm them. Nietzsche calls it “the heaviest thought” and the
engage with, such as that of Löwith. Löwith reads eternal return as that which operates, and can 
only operate, at the limits of “the most fundamental nihilism,” in which the death of God brings about
a crisis by removing all meaning from humanity, but in so doing opens up a space for a different 
relationship to the world. In this crisis, one is forced to finally “sacrifice God himself and all faith and 
out of cruelty against oneself ‘worship gravity, fate, the nothing’... the fate of the meaningless 
eternal recurrence.” (Löwith 1997:52) For Löwith, the thought of eternal return is the self-
overcoming of nihilism at these very limits, at once the “‘crisis’ of nihilism” in which “it is decided 
whether man still wants to be there at all” and at the same time the "unity of this schism between 
the human will to a goal and the goalless revolving of the world.” (Löwith 1997:63) Eternal return is 
itself nihilistic because it makes no efforts to disguise the meaningless nature of an existence that 
eternally repeats, that is not just meaningless but eternally meaningless. By affirming precisely this 
meaningless character to existence, humanity is in effect moving itself back into line with the world 
and can ground and align itself once again, but this time in nature rather than a non-existent 
otherworld. Löwith argues that Nietzsche believes it would be possible in this way to reintegrate the 
subject with its lost world and to “‘translate’ man ‘back’ into the nature of all things" by “putting the 
isolated human being back into the whole, just as accidental as it is necessary, of the creative life of
the world.” (Löwith 1997:117-9) However Löwith is alert to the tensions raised by this interpretation 
of eternal return as a nostalgic attempt to recover a lost state of alignment with being, when we 
consider the futural impulse that also runs throughout Nietzsche’s philosophy. On Löwith’s reading, 
eternal return is rather “the ‘most terrible’ idea and the greatest gravity’” for Nietzsche, not because 
it heralds the end of humanity in the prospect of the overman, but “because it contradicts his will to 
a future redemption." (Löwith 1997:121) By making eternal return into a turn back Löwith not only 
robs eternal return of any radically transformative potential, but in doing so dooms Nietzsche’s wider
project to failure.
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anthropological reading suggests that it is precisely as a thought that Nietzsche intends it
to have an effect.135 It should not be taken as a theory of how the world is, but rather as a
thought that challenges and rewires our existing ways of thinking, irrespective of how it
corresponds to reality. We should therefore prioritise the psychological consequences of
properly addressing this thought - not whether eternal return is true, but whether we wish it
were. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks the reader: what would you do, if a demon were
to  come  and  tell  you  that  time  operates  in  the  way  that  the  cosmological  reading
describes? This, for the psychological or “anthropological” reading of eternal return, is the
key point. Do we want the demon to be telling the truth - do we say that yes, if there were
a god, this is precisely how we would wish a god to act? Whether there ever is any god, or
any  demon,  to  tell  us  this,  and  whether  their  message  were  true,  is  immaterial.  The
reaction we have to the idea of eternal return is more important than whether it has any
basis in reality. It is the affirmative quality present in this reaction that would signal the
overturning of nihilistic patterns of thought. 
Those who affirm a state of eternal bliss or eternal damnation rather than the events of our
own lives are embracing the idea that the meaning of our earthly existence is ultimately to
be found outside it - that our actions in this life matter only insofar as they impact upon our
fate beyond it.  Even shorn of these divine trappings, however, anything that views our
actions as part of an ongoing goal is affirming not the action itself, but its role as a step
towards something else. In Plato's account of love, we found that he viewed all earthly
desire for good things or people ultimately as a step towards a greater eternal good. The
idea of eternal return however precludes any possibility of progress or goals - everything
will eventually repeat, over and over again. One who affirms the idea of eternal return is
affirming this world over any such eternal backworld, by saying that they are happy with
the meaning that each event has in and of itself, in the knowledge that it cannot lead to
anything else136. Using eternal return as a test of our ability to affirm our lives takes on the
135 See for example Soll, who states that its importance for Nietzsche is "to be located in what he 
took to be the psychological consequences" and "the human import of this world hypothesis" rather 
than its putative truth (Soll 1980).
136 Danto thinks that this is the most important "compensation" of the test of eternal return, "that 
the world must give the lie to any proposal that it had a goal, or purpose, or meaning, or end-state 
of any kind" (Danto 2005:193)
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flavour of a Kantian ethical imperative137 - do you act in such a way that you could will the
eternal repetition of this act? Eternal return in this way offers a way of adding meaning and
depth to our lives in the wake of the loss of God,138 but one that is based not on any value
outside the world, but on no more than the eternal repetition of our lives themselves.139
As a test of affirmation eternal return could indeed change us, not in the way we might
expect a “scientific” truth to change us, but more in the way that reading a work of fiction
may change us. It  does not matter whether the Vinteuil  Sonata is modelled on that by
Brahms, Franck, or Saint-Saëns, or if it has ever existed in any form outside the novel at
all.  We can still  read  Swann’s  Way and  wish  to  hear  the  piece  of  music  that  Proust
describes. It is this reaction upon which the anthropological reading focuses, asking us to
consider whether we would want to live in a universe of eternal return. As Nietzsche writes
of  eternal  return in  his  unpublished  notes,  "the  thought  and belief  is  a heavy weight"
because although "you say that  food,  location,  air,  and society  change and determine
you  ...  your  opinions  do  so even  more."  If,  as  Nietzsche  writes  "you  incorporate  this
thought of thoughts," the question in all things "is this such, that I will it countless times?"
would, he believes, transform us.140 Eternal damnation did not need to be real in order for
137 See for example Magnus (Magnus 1978:140ff) and Danto, who frames it in this fashion as "an 
imperative: So act (or so be) that you would be willing to act exactly the same way (or be exactly the
same thing an infinite number of times over... In existentialist terms, it is a plea for authenticity" 
(Danto 2005:194). Kaufmann however argues that those who affirm eternal return do so "out of the 
fullness of their delight in the moment. They do not deliberate how they should act to avoid 
unpleasant consequences— knowing all the while that whatever they are about to do has already 
been done by them an infinite number of times in the past" (Kaufmann 2013:322-3) and that as 
such eternal return should not be taken as any kind of method for weighing individual acts.
138 Löwith refers to this aspect of eternal return as "a 'counterweight' against the will to the nothing"
(Löwith 1997:56)
139 Magnus detects in this Nietzsche's attempt to appease the "kronophobia" of humanity, 
suggesting that "Nietzsche remained convinced that human beings could only rededicate 
themselves to the earth if traditional eternalistic predicates are attached to it" and that "the triumph 
of eros over logos could only be realized, Nietzsche thought, by an eternalistic countermyth" 
(Magnus 1978:190ff). We shall go on in chapter four to argue that the eternity Nietzsche is drawing 
upon with eternal return is neither a myth, nor to be conceived of in the traditional manner of eternity
as opposed to time.
140 "Der Gedanke und Glaube ist ein Schwergewicht, welches neben allen anderen Gewichten auf 
dich drückt und mehr als sie. Du sagst, daß Nahrung Ort Luft Gesellschaft dich wandeln und 
bestimmen? Nun, deine Meinungen thun es noch mehr, denn diese bestimmen dich zu dieser 
Nahrung Ort Luft Gesellschaft. — Wenn du dir den Gedanken der Gedanken einverleibst, so wird 
er dich verwandeln. Die Frage bei allem, was du thun willst: 'ist es so, daß ich es unzählige Male 
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the thought of it to change us, so why must the thought of eternal return be any different?
As with eternal damnation, the important question is what sort of person would want it to
be true. 
According to GS §341, the person who can affirm eternal return is more “well-disposed” to
themselves than we can be said to be as we are now. They would seem to have replaced
the Platonic model of love for the eternal as the eternally-lacking with that of the eternally-
returning.  Nihilism came about  because we selectively  narrowed the identities that  we
created to the point that becoming was completely excluded. So instead, Nietzsche asks
us  to  affirm  everything –  to  see  "what  is  necessary  in  things  as  what  is  beautiful  in
them,"141 and to "no longer want anything better from the world than it and it again."142 With
the anthropological reading, eternal return becomes a test or a status check for ourselves.
The  anthropological  reading  places  us  and  our  creative  powers  at  the  centre  of  this
universe, to the extent that it does not really matter what the universe does, or indeed how
often. However this does not strengthen, but rather undercuts the impact of the thought of
eternal return. Irrespective of how many times an event may repeat, I will experience it in
this  life  only  once.143 More  crucially,  however,  it  does  not  address  the  root  cause  of
nihilism. It tries to replace eternal significance which has been devalued with the depth of
repetition. But it does not promote any ability to affirm the particular forms that we have
created.  The problem of nihilism is that we lost faith in the world we perceived, because
we realised it was the product of our own creativity. As a test of affirmation, eternal return
does nothing to validate this - rather it asks us to affirm that which we either do not believe
to be true (at any rate in the form that the demon presents it), or that which if it is, renders
our affirmation meaningless. 
We need to refine our understanding of the process by which we create identities from
becoming, before we can affirm them. That "which is necessary," and that we must learn
to affirm in  amor fati, is not all  the other things or events that we must understand as
thun will?' ist das größte Schwergewicht." http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-
1881,11[143] eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühjahr–Herbst 1881
141 GS §276
142 GS §334
143 Soll argues for this reason that the only possible response to eternal return is indifference (Soll 
1980)
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necessarily connected to everything else in the world. It is also the process by which we
extract these from becoming. It is this which we must learn to understand as necessary,
rather than contingent, if we are to move beyond nihilistic thought. The problem that we
have not yet successfully addressed is the question of how we "isolate and delimit" these
forms in the first place. What is it in becoming that allows us to pick out a melody, in a
world that we now realise is devoid of any composer? We must therefore return once
again to examine the musical process of learning to love that Nietzsche describes in GS
§334. As with eternal return, repetition is key to the way we develop these identities. But
unlike the anthropological reading of eternal return, in which we must affirm the repetition
of precisely the same event, the process of learning to love is a very clearly transformative
kind of repetition. Eternal return seems to imply that we (or some version of ourselves)
experience the same thoughts and events again and again, but without any difference in
reaction to the events themselves. The repetition that we find in the process of learning to
love, however, is shown to gradually and incrementally transform our understanding of that
which we hear, drawing on the process of repetition and variation that is a driving force
within  music  itself,  to  produce  “new  movements,  new  rhythms,  new  love  calls  and
seductions.”144 Rhythm  is  the  term  we  use  to  describe  the  force  of  repetition  and
development within music, not just of individual beats, but of the repetition of a particular
melody or theme precisely as Nietzsche describes in  GS §334. In the next chapter we
shall therefore turn to Nietzsche's early work on rhythm, in order to understand more about
the rhythmic structure of the forms that are detected or created via this process of learning
to love, and their relationship to the flow of becoming from which they emerge.
144 WTP §808 (March-June 1888)
59
2. Development: Rhythm as the form of time
In the previous chapter I argued that we can understand the creative process by which we
think in terms of what Nietzsche describes as “learning to love,” a process in which we first
isolate  the  beloved  from everything  else,  and  then  continually  repeat  this  process  of
separation. We saw that the ways in which we have traditionally tried to conceptualise our
thought and the identities that it forms suffer from a tendency to canonise or eternalise this
initial moment of isolation. This leaves thought separated from the creative process that
gives rise to it, so that we then understand it as the independent “product” or object of this
process. Cut off from the movement of becoming, the thoughts or identities that we form
can only repeat what is already inside them, claustrophobically replaying their “contents”
within  the  wall  of  a  pre-existing  identity,  rather  than  repeating  the  active  moment  of
selection that shaped them. This is what Nietzsche calls nihilism, a state in which our
thought becomes separated from its own action within impermeable pockets of identity.
The failure of this attempt in the modern crisis of nihilism indicates the need for a different
way of thinking, one which reconceives the relationship between thought and becoming.
Eternal return is the intervention that Nietzsche introduces to try and provoke a new way of
thinking. However, when considered simply as a test of affirmation it does not function in
the manner  that  Nietzsche intends.  We need to change not  only  what the process of
learning  to  love  can  encompass,  broadened  out  in  amor  fati  to  include  all  that  is
necessary, but how we love, or think, the world. We therefore will pick up on the musical
and rhythmic cues of The Gay Science and examine the specifically rhythmical nature of
our thought, so that we may understand how it is that we currently learn to hear the world
as beloved through the process described in GS §334.
In this  chapter  we shall  explore  Nietzsche’s  early  unpublished work  on rhythm,  which
forms the background to the rhythmical process of thought that Nietzsche describes in GS
§334. Nietzsche's early work on rhythm seeks firstly to challenge the view that there is one
eternal kind of rhythm. His engagement with the rhythmic theory of Aristoxenus reveals an
ancient  sense of  rhythm based on temporal  proportions  rather  than on alternations  of
stress or accented beats. We shall explore the insights that emerge from Nietzsche's early
work on rhythm that lead him to conclude that rhythm is the form of time. We shall then
situate Nietzsche's evaluation of the relationship between rhythm and time in the context of
his understanding of the relationship between appearance and reality. We shall explore
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the tensions that appear in both the early rhythm notes and The Birth of Tragedy, and how
in both cases Nietzsche's attempt to show the effects of time on the privileged phenomena
of rhythm and tragedy leads to an account of their gradual degeneration. But we shall also
see  how  the  phenomenon  of  rhythm  resists  Nietzsche's  attempts  to  understand  this
process in terms of a widening of a metaphysical divide between time as it is in itself, and
our rhythmic perception of it.  In Nietzsche's early engagement with rhythm, we find an
attempt  to  explore  the  relationship  between  thought  and  that  which  it  thinks,  which
provides us with  competing ancient  and modern approaches to how we go about  the
process of selection and repetition that we explored in chapter one. In our attempts to
evaluate these alternative approaches to rhythm, we find that it is a capacity for fluidity,
multiplicity, and variation that marks the more promising way of thinking, rather than any
attempt to reproduce or represent that from which it emerges.
Nietzsche's early rhythmical theory of time
Nietzsche’s early notes on rhythm may not at first glance seem particularly connected with
his later work on transformation and affirmation, falling instead within the realm of his more
philological  than  philosophical  efforts.1 The  attempt  to  marry  even  the  more  overtly
philosophical early work with his later thought is problematic in any case, as Nietzsche’s
thought  during  this  period  is  marked  (by  his  own  admission)  by  an  undercurrent  of
dialectical thinking and Schopenhauerian metaphysics that he later explicitly rejects.2 But
despite its philological focus, the early work on rhythm broadens into an attempt to work
1 Most of these early notes on rhythm were made in 1869-71 and can be found in the Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe Section 2 Volume 3 (KGW 2.3). They include passages of Latin and ancient 
Greek, and (as Porter (2000: 130) plausibly suggests, probably because of this “formidable 
aspect,”) the majority of these notes have not been translated into English (with the exception of 
one paper 'On the Theory of Quantitative Rhythm' cited below as TQR). Translations of many key 
passages from the notes can however be found in Porter (2000), and I have drawn extensively on 
his detailed study of these notes. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own.
2 Nietzsche later writes that his first major philosophical undertaking, The Birth of Tragedy, 
published shortly after the rhythm notes in 1872, “smells offensively Hegelian,” and despite his 
claim that “only a few formulas are tainted with the cadaverous fragrance of Schopenhauer,” they 
are still an enduring presence throughout the work (Ecce Homo ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ §1). See 
Nabais (2006:41ff) for an account of Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche's early work and 
Nietzsche’s subsequent break with Schopenhauer with the publication of Human all too Human in 
1878.
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out  “the  entire  metrical  function  of  time,”3 introducing  currents  of  thought  which  recur
throughout Nietzsche’s working life4 and which will go on to inform his understanding of the
nihilistic  process  of  identity-formation  that  we  find  in  The Gay  Science.  Our  first  task
therefore is to engage with Nietzsche’s tentative early conclusions about rhythm and time,
before we can then bring this to bear on the problem of nihilism that emerges in his later
work, and use his early work on rhythm to refine our understanding of the relationship of
thought and becoming.
Nietzsche’s work on rhythm5 emerges from his efforts to understand how an audience of
classical  antiquity  might  have  heard  and  experienced  the  texts  that  he,  as  both  a
philologist  and a philosopher,  was attempting to engage with so many centuries later.
Throughout his life, Nietzsche was deeply critical of what he saw as a prevailing trend
within philology, which assumed that what we understand and experience as rhythmic has
not fundamentally changed since the time of ancient Greece.6 This ahistorical approach, in
which “our [modern] kind of rhythmic sense is set down as the only and ‘eternal’ kind, as
rhythm in itself,”7 unconsciously reads the texts of the past through the lens of the present,
understanding  and  judging  them on  its  terms.  Nietzsche's  insight,  which  he  develops
3 “Wichtig, daß in der Einleitung die ganze metrische Aufgabe der Zeit bezeichnet wird” (KGW 
2:3:308).
4 Porter’s (2000) thorough engagement with Nietzsche’s early notes on rhythm argues for their 
“indisputable” though unrecognised significance for his later work on the will to power as it 
manifests in man as a creative species, while drawing out the internal tensions within Nietzsche's 
account that point to the later substantial revisions which his thoughts on time will undergo. Miller’s 
(1999) reconstruction of Nietzsche’s rhythmic theory of time sees an essential continuity between 
his earlier and later work that persists beneath the metaphysical preoccupations of the late 1860s-
early 1870s, while Michon agrees that “Nietzsche’s late rhuthmology based on ‘will to power and 
‘eternal return’ cannot be correctly assessed if we do not reconnect it to his former studies.” (Michon
2016)
5 Nietzsche delivered two lecture courses on the subject of rhythm in antiquity during the period 
1869-71, and intended to develop these notes into a study elaborating both a “Philosophy” and a 
“Physiology” of rhythm (see Porter 2000:143 for a brief summary of Nietzsche’s plans to publish a 
theory of rhythm).
6 Nietzsche did not think that this lack of “historical sense” was unique to modernity. See GS §83 on
the transformative power of Roman “translations” which saw the poetry of different cultures as fair 
game for an imperialistic rewriting to reflect suitably Roman values.
7 “unsere Art rhythmischer Sinn als einzige und ‘ewige’ Art, als Rhythmik an sich, angesetzt 
worden” http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1886,688 eKGWB Letter to Carl Fuchs 
1886.
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throughout these notes, is that the ancient sense of rhythm differs dramatically from the
modern, and that to read ancient texts on the basis of the present is to misread and hence
misjudge them, effacing the past as we award our current values the status of eternity.
Nietzsche recognises that his main ambition,  which is "to make obvious to us the gap
between the Greeks and ourselves in their rhythmical enjoyment," erodes any faith in the
success of the philological enterprise without offering anything in its place except "less
enjoyment and apparently less understanding" which, as he admits, "are hardly enticing
promises!"8 His  main  polemic  throughout  the  early  notes  is  against  misunderstanding
ancient rhythm along modern lines, but the accompanying conclusion that our thought is
unavoidably  shaped  by  our  contemporary  sense  of  rhythm  questions  whether  any
understanding may be possible of rhythms other than our own. As I will go on to argue in
the following  chapters,  throughout  The Gay Science Nietzsche is  alert  to  the difficulty
involved in thinking beyond the human - of hearing a rhythm other than our own. It is this
self-closing aspect of the rhythm of thought that is disrupted by eternal return.
Nietzsche therefore turns from modern to classical texts on rhythmic theory, particularly
the surviving fragments of Aristoxenus’ Elementa Rhythmica. By doing so he hopes to see
what understanding of rhythm emerges from these if we lay aside (insofar as possible) our
modern preconceptions about the nature of rhythm. Aristoxenus was a pupil of Aristotle,
who was writing after the Socratic turn away from the classical Greek sense of tragedy that
Nietzsche recounts in The Birth of Tragedy9 and at a point where the ancient Greek sense
of rhythm had already given way to a more modern conception.10 Despite this, Nietzsche
finds Aristoxenus’ theories stimulating not only as an (if at times, critical) distillation of what
had come before, but also as an attempt by someone with both philosophical and practical
musical training to provide an explanation for rhythm and harmony as we experience these
phenomena,  rather  than  as  ciphers  for  a  mathematically  ordered  universe.11 What
emerges from Nietzsche’s engagement with Aristoxenus is a description of rhythm as a
8 TQR 235
9 See BT §12 onwards for Nietzsche’s account of how Euripides and Socrates mark a turning point 
in which tragedy became subservient to knowledge in Greek thought.
10 Porter (2000:156) points out that, as such, Aristoxenus may be guilty of precisely the kind of 
retrospective misreading of ancient rhythm that Nietzsche found in the philologists of his day. 
Despite this, I would argue that his account of rhythm and Nietzsche’s engagement with it provides 
us with a productive working model of the operation, as well as the effects, of rhythm, that we can 
draw upon in the following. 
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phenomenon  that  is  inherently  multiple,  but  that  we  come  to  perceive  as  a  unified
phenomenon via a rhythmical process, in which the difference of individual beats is heard
as repetitions  of  the same.  This  rhythmical  process of  identity  formation  is  crucial  for
understanding Nietzsche's later account of the descent of thought into nihilism, while at the
same time suggesting an alternative model of difference in becoming that we shall only
find more fully developed in the later work of Deleuze and Guattari.
Aristoxenus  is  concerned  with  the  details  of  how  we  come  to  hear  something  as
rhythmical, going into the minutiae of how rhythm as a phenomenon works. The surviving
fragments of his account begin by trying to pin down the nature of rhythm, before going on
to detail  a  range of  combinations  in  which particular  rhythms are created.  The first  of
Aristoxenus’ observations that particularly interests Nietzsche is 
that there are these two natures [physeis], that of rhythm and that of the 
rhythmizomenon [lit. 'that which is made rhythmic'], these being related to one 
another in the same way as are shape [schíma] and what is shaped 
[schimatizómenon].12
Aristoxenus’ account begins by stressing this difference between rhythm per se, and a
thing  or  phenomenon  that  is  rhythmic  (the  “rhythmizomenon”).  Rhythm  and
rhythmizomenon have different natures or ways of being, that at first appear similar to the
Aristotelian  distinction  between form (shape)  and matter  (what  is  shaped).13 A rhythm,
Aristoxenus  explains,  is  not  the  same  as  the  rhythmic  phenomenon  that  conveys  it,
whether  this  be a dance,  a piece of  music,  or  a verse,  all  of  which are comprised of
something  in  addition  to  the  rhythm (the  “matter”  of  movement,  sound,  and language
11 See Rowell (1979) and Barker (1989) for overviews of Aristoxenus’ life and thought, including his
determined rejection of Pythagoras’ account of music, and translations of the surviving fragments of
his Elementa Rhythmica Book II. See Marchetti (2009) for a more in depth biography of 
Aristoxenus, in particular his development of and deviations from Aristotelian doctrine in the 
Elemena Rhythmica. Gibson (2005) describes how Aristoxenus’ rhythmical theory was the first to 
concentrate on music, as opposed to viewing rhythm as an offshoot of language and rhetoric.
12 All quotations from Aristoxenus are taken from Barker (1989:185ff). Right at the start of his notes
on Greek rhythm Nietzsche hightlights the philosophical importance of Aristoxenus’ “distinction 
between rhythm and rhythmizomenon” (“Im philosoph. Sinne spricht Aristox. im ersten Buche der 
στοιχε α über den . Unterscheidung zwishchen υθμός und ρυθμιζόμευουῖα über den ῥ. Unterscheidung zwishchen ῥυθμός und ρυθμιζόμευου ῥ. Unterscheidung zwishchen ῥυθμός und ρυθμιζόμευου ῥ. Unterscheidung zwishchen ῥυθμός und ρυθμιζόμευου ” KGW 2.3:103).
13 See Marchetti (2009:86) for a discussion of Aristotle’s use of the phrase “tó rhythmizomenon kaí 
schimatizómenon” at Physics 245b9 in which rhythmizomenon and schimatizómenon are used 
synonymously to mean “a thing formed and shaped.”
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respectively).  And we cannot perceive a rhythm unless one of these  rhythmizomena  is
present for it to act upon - for there to be rhythm, there must be a sensible, audible or
tactile phenomenon that is made rhythmic. Rhythm here appears to occupy the role of
causa formalis, the shape or form into which material may be poured just as the form of a
statue can only manifest itself via the material of bronze or silver from which it is made.14
The same sequence of notes can appear as a waltz, a polka, or a death metal chorus, just
as we can fashion a lump of metal into a chalice, a ring, or a dagger. In each case, rhythm
is a way in which the music appears to us in its particularity.
But  on  closer  examination,  the  classification  of  the  relationship  between  rhythm  and
rhythmizomenon  differs  from  that of  form  and  matter,  as  becomes  apparent  as
Aristoxenus’ account continues. Material such as silver must always take on some kind of
form, but for  a  rhythmizomenon such as sound, as he explains,  rhythm is more of  an
optional extra.15 Rhythm requires the presence of a rhythmizomenon, but this dependency
does not extend the other way - it is quite possible to experience sound, language, and
movement without any sense of rhythm emerging from our engagement with them. These
rhythmizomena have  the  potential  to  be  made  rhythmic,  but  equally  can  appear
arrhythmically, or at least in such a way that we do not perceive any rhythm. Rhythm, then,
is  not  the universal  form of  the appearance of  a  rhythmizomenon such as sound,  but
instead a particular way in which it appears to us. This particular feature of rhythm, which
Aristoxenus introduces as the “first principle of knowledge concerned with rhythms,” is that
it “is to do with durations [chronoi, lit. ‘times'] and the perception of them.”16 Aristoxenus is
claiming that rhythm’s unique and distinguishing feature is an ability to bring time to our
attention.  This, for Nietzsche, is the important insight that the separation of rhythm from
thing-made-rhythmic makes possible, and why the Aristotelian classification into rhythm
and  rhythmizomenon is  of  such  interest  to  him.  Once  these  two  aspects  of  the
14 See Benveniste (1971:282ff) on the use of rhythmos to mean form from Democritus, through to 
Aristotle. Marchetti (2009:76ff) lists the various ways in which this connection developed in ancient 
Greek. 
15 As Marchetti puts it “The nature of rhythm . . . considered as a form, is not entirely parallel to 
shape [schíma] because it applies to a sequence of activities or events all of which have some form 
themselves.” (Marchetti 2009:87) As we shall go on to see, Nietzsche's account complicates the 
Aristoxenian distinction, as for Nietzsche any form can more accurately be understood as a rhythm, 
even if we do not perceive it as such.
16 Barker 1989:185
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phenomenon of rhythm are untangled, we are in a place to see what else emerges through
our perception of rhythm, and this key element is time. “Rhythm,” Aristoxenus writes, “is
not identical with any of the rhythmizomena: it is rather one of the things that dispose the
rhythmizomenon in  a  particular  way,  and  make  it  like  this  or  like  that  in  respect  of
durations.”17 Rhythm is one way in which sound can appear to us in the form of music, or
speech as poetry. But as “an ordering of time,”18 rhythm is also  the  way in which time
appears to us, and in which we become aware of different durations of time and their
relationship to each other.
Aristoxenus now goes on to explore precisely how this awareness of time emerges from
rhythm, and what it is that makes rhythm uniquely capable of producing it, arguing that it
comes about through the way that rhythm sets up a repeated pattern out of the different
durations that constitute it. We are exposed to different durations all the time, lengths of
time layering across each other in an infinite Gantt chart as disordered movements and
sounds  take  place  both  around  and  within  us.  “Rhythm,”  however,  as  Aristoxenus
specifies,  “arises when the division  of  the durations takes on an organisation  of  some
determinate  sort,”19 and  this  organised  division  determines  or  forms  its  identity  as  a
rhythm. The key point is the kind of perception of time that this produces in us. In an
everyday sense, the awareness of time usually has a negative connotation, the intense
awareness of time dragging or hanging upon us when we are bored, or of it rushing by too
quickly when we are enjoying ourselves. Psychological investigations into the perception
of time, on the other hand, often focus on how well our subjective personal idea of how
much  time  has  passed  matches  the  objective  and  impersonal  measurement  of  clock
time.20 Neither of these are what Aristoxenus means. A rhythmical awareness of time is
quite  the  reverse  of  boredom  -  the  drudgery  of  housework  undergoes  a  minor
transformation as the random movements of the vacuum cleaner align with the musical
beat. Neither does rhythm provide a heightened awareness of clock time, as we shall see
from Aristoxenus’ discussion of the nature of the durations that we are able to identify
through rhythm. 
17 ibid.
18 “ Ο υθμός στι χρόνων τ ξις” ʽΟ ῥυθμός ἐστι χρόνων τἁξις” ῥ. Unterscheidung zwishchen ῥυθμός und ρυθμιζόμευου ἐστι χρόνων τἁξις” ἁξις” (KGW 2.3: 104)
19 Barker 1989:186
20 See for example Eagleman (2008).
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When playing or listening to a piece of music,21 we can identify what Aristoxenus calls the
chronos protos or “primary duration” - the smallest distinguishable length of time found in
the  piece,  within  which  only  one  note  occurs.22 The  length  of  the  chronos  protos is
determined not only by the piece but also by the specificity of each particular performance.
If  you play a musical  instrument,  you may be familiar  with what  Aristoxenus calls  the
chronos protos in the context of practice technique. A musician attempting to learn a new
piece of  music  will  often find  the shortest  possible  duration within  a piece,  or  even a
section of a piece of music, and then break a complicated rhythm up into multiples of this
duration, playing it slowly until the relation of the various notes (in other words, the rhythm)
has  been  satisfactorily  established  in  the  player’s  mind  and  can  be  practiced  at
increasingly  faster  speeds to achieve the desired effect.  The  chronos protos therefore
bears no relation to any other piece of music, nor to the tempo of the piece which refers
out to a regulated clock time of beats per minute. The chronos protos is a purely internally
derived division of time that we imply from the rhythmic structure of the piece, whether
consciously  while  working  out  a  new  and  unfamiliar  rhythm,  or  unconsciously  when
performing  or  listening  to  it.  This  unusually  acute  perception  of  duration  is  what  we
experience as rhythmic, allowing us to tell the difference between (for example) poetry and
prose.  Aristoxenus  thus  identifies  the  essential  feature  of  rhythm  as  this  heightened
awareness of time, which does not defer to any objective standard beyond that of the
specific  rhythm itself.  An important  point  that  we can draw from this  is  the affirmative
relationship to time that rhythm therefore makes possible.  In chapter one we saw how
Nietzschean affirmation differs from the Platonic model of love based on lack. Rhythm is
how time becomes perceptible for us in a way that is not derived from lack, from its failure
to match either our desires or our regulative expectations of  clock time.  Our everyday
experience of time is, I would argue, primarily negative, in which we become aware of time
as either moving too slowly or rushing precipitously away from us. Rhythm, in contrast,
awakens a unique ability to affirm and take pleasure in the passage of time.
21 In the surviving fragments of the Elementa Rhythmica Aristoxenus is writing “specifically of the 
rhythm that is located in music,” but this is equally true of the other rhythmizomena as we can see 
from §11 where he is ”speaking of things moved in the way that the voice is moved in speaking and 
singing, and the body in making a gesture and dancing, and in being moved in the other 
movements of that sort.” (Barker 1989:185-6) 
22 “We shall then give the name 'primary duration' to the duration in which there can in no way be 
placed either two notes or two syllables or two gestures.” (Barker 1989:187)
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This awareness of time as pleasurable rather than oppressive or impassive is built upon a
multiple rather than unitary identity. While rhythm makes us aware of the chronos protos
as this single indivisible unit of time,23 it requires multiple chronoi (units of time) in order to
bring us to this awareness. One note or syllable does not allow us to establish a rhythm,
and  nor  therefore  can  it  establish  a  sense  of  time,  because  the  chronos  protos only
emerges  from  the  relation  and  contrast  between  two  or  more  distinct  durations.  For
Aristoxenus what produces this rhythmic awareness of time, “that by which we indicate the
rhythm, and make it known to perception,” is “a foot, either one foot or more than one.”24
The foot,  as  Aristoxenus defines  it,  is  a  collection  of  two or  more syllables  or  beats,
operating  very  much  like  a  bar  in  modern  music.25 The  key  feature  of  the  foot,  for
Aristoxenus, is the way in which it “cannot be constituted from just one duration . . . since a
single unit [semeion] does not make a division of time: for without a division of time a foot
is  not  thought  to  arise.”26 The  building  block  of  ancient  rhythm  is  therefore  not  the
indivisible chronos protos but the foot, an inherently multiple unit that must always contain
difference within  it.  For  Aristoxenus it  is  the foot,  the principle  feature of  which is  the
division of time, that creates the different durations and the relationship between them that
forms the structure of time.
Marchetti’s extrapolation of Aristoxenus’ theory of rhythm from the surviving fragments of
the  Elementa Rhythmica suggests that  the foot  operates in  Aristoxenus’  account  as a
“musical  function,  analogous  to  the  theory  of  melodic  functions  that  Aristoxenus  had
presented in his  Elements of Harmony.”27 Marchetti  refers here to Aristoxenus’ primary
concern with our  perception of  music,  the psychological  “function”28 or  role of  the foot
which is achieved when we recognise a rhythm as such.29 In addition to this, I suggest that
23 Porter (2000:131-2) draws out the parallels between Aristoxenus’ chronos protos and the 
atomism of Democritus, which Nietzsche was also working on around this time.
24 Barker 1989:187
25 The foot is now considered more properly part of the meter than the rhythm, but Aristoxenus 
follows Aristotle here in considering meter a “species” of rhythm (Marchetti 2009:80).
26 Barker 1989:187
27 Marchetti 2009:iii
28 Dynamis, which Barker translates as “character.”
29 Marchetti 2009:150. This is in contrast to the Pythagorean system of ratios, which allowed for 
rhythms and harmonies that were mathematically deduced rather than perceptible by the ear.
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we can also understand Aristoxenus’ rhythmical foot as something akin to a programming
function, a contained block of code that is repeated to produce different results. The foot,
like the bar in music, repeats not notes, but the act of division. It is the contrast between
the different  durations within  a foot,  and then the repetition of  this  act  of  division  into
different patterns and relationships in subsequent feet, that creates rhythm and allows us
to perceive time. This ability to divide time and to set two or more different durations of
time into a relationship with each other, a relationship that makes us aware of time, is the
defining  feature  of  rhythm  in  Aristoxenus’  account.  It  is  the  difference  between  a
rhythmizomenon made rhythmic or arrythmic. We can therefore clarify the effect of rhythm
as follows: to divide time, to repeat this division, and by doing so make us able to perceive
and affirm time.
Nietzsche takes this insight into the effect of rhythm on our perception of time and, in the
light of this, reformulates Aristoxenus’ assessment that the relationship between rhythm
and rhythmizomenon is akin to that of form and content. Rhythm, as we saw, may be a
way  that  sound,  speech,  or  movement  can  appear  to  us,  an  optional  form  that  the
rhythmizomenon  can  take,  but  what  it  always  does  in  addition  to  shaping  the
rhythmizomenon is to make time appear to us - this is how we detect the presence of
rhythm and know to categorise something as rhythmic. This additional capability to make
time appear to us suggests to Nietzsche that rhythm has an important and unique role.
The effect of the division of time that takes place in rhythm is to focus our attention not
upon  the  rhythmizomenon (the  language,  sound,  or  movement)  but  upon  time  itself,
leading  Nietzsche  to  claim  that  “rhythm  is  to  be  understood  as  something  utterly
fundamental,  ie,  as  the  most  primary  sensation  of  time,  as  the  form of  time  itself.”30
Language can appear to us as rhythmic or arrhythmic, as poetry or prose, but rhythm is
the most fundamental way that we become aware of the form of time, the way in which
time takes on an identity for us. Aristoxenus’ fragments therefore not only give Nietzsche a
contemporary account of the ancient Greek experience of rhythm as a phenomenon. They
also  provide  him  with  an  in-depth  investigation  into  how  rhythm  creates  time  as  a
30 “Dann wäre der Takt als etwas Fundamentales zu verstehen: d.h. die ursprünglichste 
Zeitempfindung, die Form der Zeit selbst.” http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-
1871,9[116] eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 1871 (my emphasis).
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perceptible identity for us, of how rhythm works with time and in so doing generates the
form of time. 
This is the theme of rhythmical appearance that Nietzsche starts to explore in the early
notes, which will re-emerge later in  The Gay Science. Drawing on Aristoxenus’ technical
exploration, Nietzsche’s early thoughts on the phenomenon of rhythm can provide us with
a much more detailed and functional model of the process of separation and repetition that
he describes in The Gay Science as learning to love, or thinking something as an identity.
One concern, which I shall return to later in this chapter, is that on the Aristoxenian model
the important effects of the rhythmic process are specific to time - nothing else requires
rhythm to be present,  including  the  rhythmizomena,  which are just  as happy to make
themselves known to us arrhythmically as rhythmically. I am arguing that Nietzsche takes
Aristoxenus’  account  of  the  mechanics  of  the  process through which  time takes on a
rhythmical identity, and extends this to apply to all identities that we form, in the process
imbuing identity with a fundamentally temporal character. In  The Gay Science Nietzsche
insists  that  the  process  of  repetition  by  which  our  initial  isolation  of  a  melody  is
consolidated into love “happens to us not only in music: it is in just this way that we have
learned to love  everything we now love,”31 but before we can use rhythm as a way to
understand this we need to see whether it is legitimate to extend this specifically rhythmic
process to cover all identities (in effect, whether Nietzsche thinks it is possible to separate
our perception of time from identity per se).
We also need to be alert to the tensions we have already indicated between the different
metaphysical positions held by Nietzsche in the periods 1869-71 when he made the early
notes on rhythm and 1882, when the first edition of The Gay Science was published. The
parallels  between Nietzsche’s  early notes on the rhythmical process of separation and
repetition which engenders the form of time, and his later description of the loving process
of separation and repetition that develops into identity, suggest that he is describing the
same  process.  He  even  chooses  melody,  a  rhythmizomenon that  has  been  made
rhythmic, to illustrate this process, highlighting the connection between the earlier and later
thoughts. But when Nietzsche in 1871 writes that rhythm is “the form of time itself,” how
does  he  understand  the  relationship  between  x and  form-or-appearance-of-x, and
31 GS §334, my emphasis.
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therefore  the  relationship  between  time  and  rhythm,  as  its  form?  This  is  the  more
fundamental  problem  to  which  I  shall  turn  first,  before  returning  to  see  if  this  also
addresses the question of whether we can use rhythm to understand identity per se, rather
than purely as the form of time. Understanding the nature of this relationship between
rhythm and the temporal identities that it  makes appear then opens up the question of
evaluation.  We shall  examine  the  conflicted  nature  of  Nietzsche's  assessment  of  this
relationship  in  his  early  work,  before  going  on  in  the  next  chapter  to  see  how  this
ambiguous  attitude  towards  rhythm persists  in  The Gay  Science,  to  ask  whether  the
relationship with time that rhythm provides is capable of generating the sort of thought that
Nietzsche ultimately wants to promote in order to overcome nihilism.
In the passages Nietzsche focuses on from Aristoxenus we can find some indication of
how Nietzsche at  this  point  understood the relationship between reality  and form as it
manifests as time and rhythm. Nietzsche cites a phrase from Aristoxenus which deals with
the nature of time and how this relates to the rhythmical activity that reveals it, in which he
notes that “chronoi are the sections of abstract time. When there need to be sections, it
must be divided or cut” because [quoting Aristoxenus almost directly] “time does not divide
itself, there must be something else which divides it.”32 A tension emerges here between
time itself, abstract and undifferentiated, and the chronoi  or sections of time that we are
able to perceive. Although we only become aware of time when it takes rhythmic form as a
series of different durations, Aristoxenus implies that this is not an action that time itself
performs, but a process of division that is visited upon it by something else other than time.
This “something else” is of course the  rhythmizomenon,  the other interested party that
appears via the phenomenon of rhythm:
32 “χρόνοι sind die Abschnitte der abstraketn Zeit. Wo Abschnitte vorhanden sein sollen, bedarf es 
eines διαιρ νῶν  oder τέμνων:  χρόνος α τοn ς α τοnν ο  τέμνει, τέρον δέ τινος δε  το  διαιρήσοντος ὁ χρόνος αὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὐ τέμνει, ἑτέρον δέ τινος δεῖ τοῦ διαιρήσοντος ὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὐ τέμνει, ἑτέρον δέ τινος δεῖ τοῦ διαιρήσοντος ὑτὸν οὐ τέμνει, ἑτέρον δέ τινος δεῖ τοῦ διαιρήσοντος ὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὐ τέμνει, ἑτέρον δέ τινος δεῖ τοῦ διαιρήσοντος ἑτέρον δέ τινος δεῖ τοῦ διαιρήσοντος ῖα über den ῥ. Unterscheidung zwishchen ῥυθμός und ρυθμιζόμευου ῦ διαιρήσοντος 
α τόν.ὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὐ τέμνει, ἑτέρον δέ τινος δεῖ τοῦ διαιρήσοντος ” (KGW 2.3:104)
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that which will be made rhythmic [to rhythmisthēsomenon] . . . cuts up time 
[chronos], since time does not cut itself up. . . but needs something else that will 
divide it. The rhythmizomenon must therefore be capable of being broken up into 
recognisable parts, by which it will divide time.33
The  rhythmizomenon,  the  phenomenon  that  is  made  rhythmic,  must  by  virtue  of  its
physical nature always be divisible, a restriction that would have been particularly apparent
to a musician working with the plucked, blown, or beaten instruments of Aristoxenus’ day,
on which no sound could be sustained for long. The rhythmizomenon is broken up as a
syllable ends, a moving limb reaches its maximum point of extension, or the vibrations of a
string die away. But time, Aristoxenus suggests, behaves differently and, if left to its own
devices, would continue unbroken in perpetuity. Time needs the intervention of rhythm via
the physical and therefore inherently limited ministrations of the rhythmizomena for its form
to appear to us. But it must do so as something broken up, as something that is other than
its true nature. It seems from Aristoxenus’ account that the very process of separation and
repetition that shapes time for us does so in a manner that hides something essential
about time.
There is therefore a tension latent in Aristoxenus’ account of rhythm, as we learn of a time
that does not divide itself, but that relies upon something else to wield the knife and carve
it into a perceptible form. As the appearance or form of time, rhythm for Aristoxenus is in
some sense opposed to time, acting in a manner contrary to time as it effects an uneasy
marriage between physical rhythmizomenon and immaterial time. Is this a distinction that
early Nietzsche maintains? Aristoxenus himself is unconcerned with whether rhythm is in
any sense “true” to time, or about casting moral judgement on any violence that rhythm
might  inflict  upon  the nature  of  time.  These  are  questions  which  quite  reasonably  lie
outside  the  province  of  musical  theory,  as  well  as  being  given  an  entirely  different
significance  by  the  subsequent  trajectory  of  western  philosophy,  and  its  struggles  to
address the perceived gap between appearance and reality. For Nietzsche on the other
hand this issue is of pressing concern, particularly during the period 1869-71 in which he
carries out the work on rhythm. During this time Nietzsche is struggling to formulate a
33 Barker 1989:186. The tantalising full quote is that “since time does not cut itself up, as we said 
earlier, but needs something else that will divide it.” Perhaps his earlier explanation, now lost, 
explains more about why time does not cut itself up. On the other hand, the purpose of the 
Elementa Rhythmica is to examine the nature of rhythm, rather than the nature of time, so perhaps 
not.
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response  to  the  metaphysical  division  of  appearance  and  reality  that  he  finds  in
Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation.34 This is the context that shapes
Nietzsche’s thoughts on the relationship between appearance and reality during the early
rhythm notes,  and  so  we  need  to  look  briefly  at  Nietzsche’s  varying  sympathies  with
Schopenhauer in order to judge not only how closely Nietzsche maintains the Aristoxenian
opposition of time and rhythm, but also to see whether this relationship is something we
can affirm.
The metaphysical division of appearance and reality
Schopenhauer’s view of the relationship between appearance and reality draws upon the
Kantian distinction between the noumenal or thing in itself, which is being as it actually is
independent of our gaze, and the phenomenal world, which is structured in such a manner
that we are able to perceive it. But unlike Kant, who thinks that the noumenal realm is
necessarily closed off to human knowledge, Schopenhauer argues that there is something
we can say about the thing in itself or, as he calls it, the will. Seeing as “the will as thing-in-
itself is quite different from its phenomenon, and is entirely free from all the forms of the
phenomenon into which it first passes when it appears” then the will  in itself must also
exist without time and space, and “consequently [without] plurality as well,  which exists
and has become possible only through them.”35 Unlike the world of representation, the will
in  itself  is  undifferentiated  either  spatially  or  temporally,  and  so  can  include  neither
difference,  nor the spatio-temporal  structures that  populate the phenomenal  world with
distinct  identities.  This  means that  for  Schopenhauer  the thing-in-itself,  the reality  that
grounds all appearance, differs from this multifaceted appearance in being fundamentally
indivisible and one: 
34 See Swift (2005:43ff) for an account of Nietzsche’s engagement with Schopenhauer during the 
formative period of the 1860s. 
35 Schopenhauer WWR I §23
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The thing-in-itself, as such, is free from all forms of knowledge, even the most 
universal, namely that of being object for the subject; in other words, it is something 
entirely different from the representation. Now if this thing-in-itself, as I believe I 
have sufficiently proved and made clear, is the will, then, considered as such and 
apart from its phenomenon, it lies outside time and space, and accordingly knows 
no plurality, and consequently is one. Yet, as has been said already, it is not one as
an individual or a concept is, but as something to which the condition of the 
possibility of plurality, that is, the principium individuationis, is foreign. Therefore, 
the plurality of things in space and time that together are the objectivity of the will, 
does not concern the will, which, in spite of such plurality, remains indivisible.36
Space  and  time  together  are  the  conditions  of  plurality  or  principium  individuationis
(principles of individuation). By tying space and time to the structure of the phenomenal
world, Schopenhauer concludes that we must also exclude any features of this world that
rely upon them, such as causality,  objectivity,  and our own deep-seated experience of
subjectivity. The thing in itself is not, cannot be divided - it is one. But this means that all
we experience of ourselves as subjects is essentially untrue. The process of individuation
and separation into unique identities that makes us and the world who and what we are -
this is the one thing Schopenhauer thinks we can definitely establish is not true of the real
world or thing-in-itself that lies beneath it. For Kant, establishing the divide between the
phenomenal and noumenal is a positive move, allowing us a degree of certainty about the
phenomenal world that appeared to us, while putting an end to fruitless speculation about
the noumenal realm in itself that we can never know. But for Schopenhauer, the realisation
not just that existence may not be as it appears, but that it cannot be as it shows itself to
us,  is  proof  of  its  essential  duplicity,  and  the  principium  individuationis wherein  this
deception lies is the root of the suffering that we experience in the world. The “veil  of
Maya” that makes us perceive the world as separate forms is an illusion, producing only
pain  in  the  phenomenal  world  that  is  continually  attempting  but  hopelessly  unable  to
adequately represent the “true” world of the will.
For Schopenhauer, time is a constitutional part of the principium individuationis, that which
brings  about  the  divisions  we  find  in  the  deceptive  world  of  appearance.  But  for
Aristoxenus, it is not time that performs this division, but rather time itself that is divided by
rhythm. We find parallels between Schopenhauer’s conception of the will and Aristoxenus’
intimations about time that Nietzsche would surely have had in mind as he examined the
36 Schopenhauer WWR I §25
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problem of rhythm. As something that in itself is undivided, but that we can only register
once it has been broken up by the physical plurality of the world, the relationship between
time and rhythm in Aristoxenus’ account mirrors that of Schopenhauer’s conception of the
split  between will  and representation.  Understood on these lines,  rhythm takes on the
divisive role of the  principium individuationis,  bringing about the dissolution of time into
multiple perceptible durations just  as time,  in  Schopenhauer’s  account,  is a means by
which  the  will  is  forced  into  plurality  in  the  world  of  appearance.  If  we  examine  the
relationship  between  rhythm  and  time  with  a  Schopenhauerian  suspicion  of  the
metaphysical  divide  between appearance  and reality,  rhythm takes on the  role  of  the
assailant that cuts up and destroys the true nature of time. This negative interpretation of
the relationship between time and rhythm  will  prejudice our attitude towards rhythm as
long  as  we understand  rhythm or  form as  opposed  to  that  which  appears  through  it.
Nietzsche  at  this  point  is  struggling  to  work  out  his  own attitude to the nature of  the
Schopenhauerian  split  between  the  world  as  representation  and  the  will  in  itself.  We
therefore  find  an  ambivalence  in  Nietzsche's  attitude  to  rhythm.  Within  his  early
Schopenhauerian metaphysical framework, rhythm is a form that hides something about
the nature of that which it is supposed to reveal. As I shall argue in the next chapter, this
initial suspicion of rhythm is something that colours Nietzsche's later thoughts on rhythm.
As we shall later see, this suspicion can only be overcome when the rhythmic relationship
between thought and becoming is affirmed via the revised theory of time that we find with
eternal return.
Although Nietzsche’s work on Aristoxenus develops into the insight that rhythm is the form
of time, the nature of this temporal-rhythmic relationship is neither his nor Aristoxenus’
primary concern. For Aristoxenus it is simply a matter of trying to pin down what is specific
to rhythm before undertaking a more detailed examination of particular rhythmic patterns,
while  for  Nietzsche  the  need  to  explore  "the  whole  metrical  function  of  time"37 is  a
byproduct of his attempt to understand the ancient Greek sense of rhythm. We must look
elsewhere  to  find  a  more  systematic  account  of  the  nature  of  form  and  reality,  and
specifically what the implications are of his assertion that rhythm is the form of time. The
Birth of Tragedy contains Nietzsche’s most explicit engagement during this period with the
37 "Wichtig, daß in der Einleitung die ganze metrische Aufgabe der Zeit bezeichnet wird." (KGW 
2:3:308)
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perceived discrepancy between form or appearance and reality, so I will turn to The Birth
of Tragedy next in order to see whether we can bring this to bear upon the relationship
between time and rhythm that we find in Nietzsche's work on Aristoxenus.
The Birth of  Tragedy was published shortly after  the notes on Aristoxenus and Greek
rhythm, and the mentions of Dionysus, Apollo, and Socrates indicate that the notes may
originally  have  been  intended  to  form part  of  its  argument.38 In  The Birth  of  Tragedy
Nietzsche once again takes up the theme of historical sense that he argues is lacking in
modern approaches to ancient rhythm, and explores the implications of the differences
between ancient and modern sensibilities. In The Birth of Tragedy he argues that there is
an important difference between ancient and modern tragedy, and that we cannot hope to
understand ancient Greek culture from a modern perspective while this difference remains
unacknowledged, “for as long as we have no answer to the question, 'What is Dionysiac?',
the Greeks will remain as utterly unknown and unimaginable as they have always been.”39
The Dionysian impulse that  Nietzsche thinks we have lost  in  modernity was a striving
towards de-individuation that ran throughout ancient tragedy, which allowed the spectator
to  temporarily  exceed  the  boundaries  of  their  own  identity  -  to  experience  their  own
annihilation in the death of the tragic hero, a mixture of horror and “blissful ecstasy which
arises from the innermost ground of man, indeed of nature itself, whenever this breakdown
of  the  principium  individuationis occurs”,  providing  “a  glimpse  of  the  essence  of  the
Dionysiac.”40 The pleasure afforded by ancient tragedy was its unique capacity to harness
the principium individuationis in order to temporarily still its own effects, creating a tragic
form that paradoxically allowed us a glimpse of the formlessness of the will. Nietzsche’s
argument  is  that  in  feeling  this  temporary  dissolution  of  the  self,  the  ancient  tragic
audience came as close as is possible to experiencing the undifferentiated “oneness” that
underlies the world of beings, as “under the mystical, jubilant shout of Dionysos the spell of
individuation is broken, and the path to the Mothers of Being, to the innermost core of
things, is laid open.”41 Nietzsche cites Beethoven’s Ode to Joy as a rare instance in which
we in modernity can experience this Dionysian force:
38 See Porter (2000:334)
39 BT ‘An attempt at self-criticism’ §3
40 BT §1
41 BT §16
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Now, hearing this gospel of universal harmony, each person feels himself to be not 
simply united, reconciled or merged with his neighbour, but quite literally one with 
him, as if the veil of maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it flutter 
before the mysterious primordial unity (das Ur-Eine).42 
For Nietzsche, this is the ancient Dionysian power of tragedy, to temporarily break down
the individual forms of identity that bind and separate self from world, and to put us in
touch with the originary, undifferentiated world instead as “in the Dionysiac dithyramb man
is stimulated to the highest intensification of his symbolic powers; something that he has
never felt before urgently demands to be expressed: the destruction of the veil of maya,
one-ness as the genius of humankind, indeed of nature itself.”43
This conception of an undivided but inaccessible reality is where Nietzsche comes closest
to Schopenhauer’s will in itself. The argument of  The Birth of Tragedy is built upon “the
metaphysical  assumption  that  that  which  truly  exists,  the  eternally  suffering  and
contradictory, primordial unity”44 lies beyond the world of appearance. But even here in
The Birth of Tragedy,  the apportioning of responsibility  for this process of individuation
differs  from  Schopenhauer’s  pessimistic  description  of  a  unified  will  torn  apart  into
suffering plurality. Instead Nietzsche suggests that the real world “simultaneously needs,
for  its  constant  release  and  redemption,  the  ecstatic  vision,  intensely  pleasurable
semblance” and that “our empirical existence, and indeed that of the world in general,” is
“a  representation  (Vorstellung)  generated  at  each  moment  by  the  primordial  unity.”45
Despite the Schopenhauerian language and metaphysical divide between appearance and
reality that runs throughout The Birth of Tragedy, the tone and character of this division is
42 BT §1
43 BT §2. Miller (1999), in contrast, emphasises Nietzsche's criticism of Schopenhauer, noting that 
"the Dionysian cannot be understood as a 'reality' that lies 'behind' the dream as appearance" but 
rather as implying "a radicalization of individuation." (Miller 1999:26) However I am arguing that we 
cannot ignore Nietzsche's repeated references to an "innermost ground" of "primordial unity" that 
the Dionysian power of tragedy reduplicates. The question of how to think multiplicity in becoming 
(as that which rhythm operates on or, perhaps better, modulates through) is one to which we shall 
return throughout the rest of this thesis. It is therefore important to recognise (as Nietzsche himself 
did) the extent to which Nietzsche at this point in his career is still prone to being sucked back into 
the "One" of an originary primacy of ancient over modern, a tendency we shall see in his account of 
the degeneration of the ancient sense of rhythm, even as the phenomenon of rhythm itself acts to 
disrupt this narrative.
44 BT §4
45 ibid.
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therefore very different to the way in which Schopenhauer presents it.46 For Schopenhauer
the way in which the will divides itself is a painful movement, denying its own nature, a
continual tearing apart that we, as the tattered products of this process, cannot help but
feel  as  an irreconcilable  loss.  But  for  Nietzsche,  the  true  world  may not  originally  be
divided,  but  it  craves the appearance of  division  and individuation,  and generates this
itself. 
Nietzsche thought that ancient tragedy briefly tore aside the veil of Maya. Schopenhauer
too accords tragedy a privileged role, but (as Nietzsche later, and rather ruefully, points
out47) for very different reasons. Schopenhauer thinks that tragedy gives us “a significant
hint as to the nature of the world and of existence” because “it is the antagonism of the will
with itself which is here most completely unfolded at the highest grade of its objectivity,
and which comes into fearful prominence.”48 The character of the phenomenal world that
tragedy reveals is “the unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind, the
triumph of wickedness, the scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just
and the innocent,”49 all of which are the results of the will turning against itself in its divided
form. It is this fundamental antagonism of the will that lies at the heart of being that
becomes visible in the suffering of mankind which is produced partly by chance and
error; and these stand forth as the rulers of the world, personified as fate through 
their insidiousness which appears almost like purpose and intention. In part it 
proceeds from mankind itself through the self-mortifying efforts of will on the part of 
individuals, through the wickedness and perversity of most. It is one and the same 
will, living and appearing in them all, whose phenomena fight with one another and 
tear one another to pieces.50
For Schopenhauer the best we can hope for is resignation - that, having realised that the
phenomenal world is an illusion, we draw back from it insofar as possible, abandoning the
struggles  of  our  own  subjectivity.  Life,  or  the  impulse  towards  individuation  and
46 Nietzsche writes of the Birth of Tragedy in 1886 that “I now regret very much that I did not yet 
have the courage (or immodesty?) at that time to permit myself a language of my very own for such 
personal views and acts of daring, labouring instead to express strange and new evaluations in 
Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulations, things which fundamentally ran counter to both the 
spirit and taste of Kant and Schopenhauer.” (BT ‘An Attempt at Self-Criticism’ §6)
47 BT ‘An Attempt at Self-Criticism’ §6
48 Schopenhauer WWR I §51 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid.
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appearance, brings nothing but pain. But for Nietzsche, the impulse to individuation can
also  have  a  joyful  character,  redeeming  the  eternal  suffering  of  the  will  when  it  is
presented through ancient tragedy. By its very nature, the unindividuated will  would be
impossible to feel in its raw state,  lacking both the formed identities that  structure our
experience and the self who is able to experience them. The ancient power of tragedy was
to harness the artistic impulse towards individuation that Nietzsche calls the "Apolline," in
order to create forms that allowed a paradoxical experience of formlessness. This took
place via a dialectical process in which the audience’s identification with the multiplicity of
the  chorus  interrupted  the  sense  of  their  own  subjectivity,  and  their  individuality  is
“surrendered by entering into another nature.”51 This loss of individuality was then given
form via the action of the drama, before the final death of the tragic hero completed the
dissolution of self that the audience experienced. The forms enacted on stage do not deny
the single nature of the will, but affirm it, for “as the objectification of a Dionysiac state, the
vision  represents  not  Apolline  release  and  redemption  in  semblance,  but  rather  the
breaking-asunder of the individual and its becoming one with the primal being itself. Thus
drama is the Apolline embodiment of Dionysiac insights and effects.”52 The success of
ancient tragedy rested on this complex tension between the Dionysian striving towards
primal  oneness,  and  the  Apolline  impulse  towards  form  that  allowed  the  audience
temporarily to partake of this. In contrast, then, to the Schopenhauerian story of primal
unity befouled by the deceitful individuation of the veil of Maya, in  The Birth of Tragedy
there emerges the idea that what we might consider as reality is the struggle  between
these two movements, rather than to be found on one side or the other. The strength of
ancient tragedy lay not in providing a rare glimpse into a Dionysian truth, but in playing out
for us the tension between Dionysian unity, and Apolline multiplicity, that is the true nature
of being.
In  The Birth of Tragedy we therefore find a tension in how Nietzsche understands the
relationship between appearance and reality. At times, his yearning for a lost and possibly
irrecuperable Dionysian unity seems to clearly privilege this as “better.” At others, it is the
tension between the Dionysian and the Apolline that is the fundamental state of being, and
the truth that tragedy attempts to represent. This uneasy vacillation between two objects of
51 BT §8
52 ibid.
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adequation, in which tragedy is judged on how well it expresses either the Dionysian itself
or a process of which the Dionysian is just a part, is also a feature of the rhythm notes, as
we shall see when Nietzsche grapples with the role of time and force in the change from
ancient to modern rhythm. In  The Birth of Tragedy itself, Nietzsche clearly identifies the
Apolline side of tragedy with rhythm,53 as he describes the birth of Greek tragedy as a
confrontation between an older, more ordered kind of music with the new and disruptive
barbarian force of the Dionysian that revolutionised the ancient Greek sense of what music
could be:
Although it seems that music was already familiar to the Greeks as an Apolline art, 
they only knew it, strictly speaking, in the form of a wave-like rhythm with an image-
making power which they developed to represent Apolline states.54
Rhythm is here accorded the power of producing images or forms, not just of time, but in
general. It is the rhythmic element of music which represents the Apolline striving towards
and creation of individual identities, and which 
keeps at a distance, as something un-Apolline, the very element which defines the 
character of Dionysiac music (and thus of music generally): the power of its sound 
to shake us to our very foundations, the unified stream of melody and the quite 
incomparable world of harmony.55
Nietzsche is struggling here to choose his line on the status of rhythm, as indeed he is
throughout  The  Birth  of  Tragedy on  the  question  of  the  divide  between  reality  and
appearance. Rhythm, and the Apolline, are on the one hand presented as a necessary
part of the reality which tragedy represents, which is conceived as a struggle in which the
impulse towards individuation is just as necessary as the unitary oneness of the Dionysian.
But at the same time Apolline rhythm is also subordinated to the Dionysian which is held to
be  the  essence  “of  music  generally”  -  the  unified  Dionysian  “stream  of  melody”  and
“incomparable”  harmony  appears  to  make  the  struggle  with  the  Apolline  an  unequal
contest. 
53 See Porter (2000:162) who also goes on to contrast the historical struggle of the Dionysian 
described in The Birth of Tragedy with the changing sense of Greek rhythm. As we shall find in 
chapter three, this identification continues into The Gay Science where Apollo in GS §84 is 
identified as the "god of rhythm." 
54 BT §2
55 ibid.
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Nietzsche ostensibly presents the individuating power of rhythm in The Birth of Tragedy as
something that opens up new possibilities of tragic affirmation rather than an unequivocal
fall  from  undifferentiated  grace.  Yet  all  the  force  of  Nietzsche’s  prose  goes  towards
promoting not  Apolline  rhythm,  but  the Dionysian  as the lost  but  possibly  soon-to-be-
regained force of true tragedy. The idea that the world is in need of the redemption that
tragedy offers56 is  part  of  the metaphysical  Schopenhauerian hangover in  The Birth of
Tragedy,  in  which  time  is  an  inescapable  factor  which  weighs  against  any  worldly
phenomenon and makes it less capable of adequately representing the true world of the
will beneath. As long as we conceive the temporal and rhythmic process that gives rise to
forms as something different to reality, we are still faced with the problem of judging its
outcome based on how close it comes to the reality it is trying to represent. As we shall
see in both  The Birth of Tragedy, but also in the rhythm notes, the effects of time are
traumatic for any identity conceived on the basis of this dualistic model.  Both of these
projects  seek to establish  the effects  of  millennia  of  time on identity  by exploring  the
differences between the sense of  tragedy and of  rhythm respectively  that  operated in
ancient Greece and in 19th century Germany. So we shall now return to Nietzsche’s notes
on rhythm, where his exploration of the contrast between ancient and modern senses of
rhythm becomes a case study in the deletorius effects of time on identity where rhythm
itself appears responsible for its descent into the impoverished sense of rhythm Nietzsche
thinks we find in modernity.
Time and force in rhythm
When he examines the Aristoxenus fragments and compares the rhythms they describe to
those of his day, the main difference Nietzsche uncovers is between the perception of time
involved  in  ancient  and  modern rhythm.  Aristoxenus’  account  talks  solely  of  temporal
differences, of rhythm created by contrasts between the different durations within a foot,
56 The trope of redemption remains in Nietzsche’s later work, as does the issue of whether 
redemption can be squared with affirmation. This comes to a head in the thought of eternal return, 
which tries to redeem our attitude to time and the past. Nietzsche does, however, firmly reject 
Schopenhauer’s idea of redemption as one in which “the will were to finally redeem itself and willing
became not-willing,” which Zarathustra calls “this fable song of madness! 
Away from these fable songs I steered you when I taught you: ‘The will is a creator.’” (TSZ II ‘On 
Redemption’). See Siemens (2001) on the tension between Zarathustra's call for redemption, and 
Nietzsche's characterisation in the later 1880s (such as GM I §10 and §15, GS §370) of redemptive 
impulses as symptomatic of lack.
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and patterns of long and short notes or syllables.57 This, however, is not what we find with
modern rhythm. What we consider to be “rhythmic” in modern English and German poetry
is the pattern in which the stress or accent falls on various syllables within a line, as the
sounds are  produced with  varying  degrees of  force.  The rhythm is  therefore  primarily
driven by the contrast between stressed or unstressed syllables,58 rather than the temporal
difference of long and short syllables. This is the fundamental difference that Nietzsche
posits between the ancient and modern sense of rhythm - it is not just that ancient verse
employed different rhythms and different patterns of contrast, it is that what is contrasted
and what the rhythm is therefore constructed from differs.59 Modern rhythm is  built  on
contrasts of force, whereas ancient rhythm emerges from different amounts of time.60 
It is hard to appreciate the vast difference between these two senses of rhythm when one
of them must be speculatively reconstructed rather than heard. We can, however, grasp
the difference to some extent if we consider the difficulty modern readers have when trying
to read Greek verse without inadvertently imposing a modern accented rhythm upon it.61
Another  way  to  appreciate  the  contrast  is  the  near-impossibility  of  wrangling  modern
English or German into an ancient unstressed rhythmic form such as dactylic hexameter.
57 See for example the first line of Homer’s Iliad for the “tuuum-tum-tum tuuum-tum-tum tuum-tuum 
tuuum-tum-tum tuuum-tum-tum tuum-tum” of dactylic hexameter: “Mēnĭn ă|eīdĕ thĕ|ā Pē|lēĭă|deō 
Ăchĭ|lēos”. Professor Stephen Daitz’ reading of the start of the Iliad with a reconstructed ancient 
sense of rhythm can be heard here: https://www.rhapsodes.fll.vt.edu/audiofiles/Ilias1.mp3. 
Nietzsche, together with commentators focusing on classical metrics, refer to this temporal rhythm 
as “quantitative,” because it rests on different quantities of time within the "purely quantitative beat 
of the measure" (TQR 235). I have chosen to refer to it as "temporal rhythm" to avoid confusion with
quantitative theories of rhythm and harmony, such as those of the Pythagoreans, which were 
rejected by Aristoxenus (see Barker 1989:124ff).
58 e.g. the “ti-tum ti-tum ti-tum ti-tum ti-tum” of iambic pentameter, “Shall I compare thee to a 
summer’s day?” 
59 Porter (2000:143ff) gives an account of the “strangely personified” and “increasingly 
melodramatic” quasi-genealogy we find in the rhythm notes of the descent from temporal rhythm, 
through “Latin vocalism” into the “anemically modern” sense of accented rhythm we have today. 
60 Stärkewechselwelle rather than Zeitwechselwelle, which Porter translates as the “rhythmic 
alternation of strengths” rather than of times. (KGW 2:3:308)
61 See Scott (1994:143-4) who writes that “most native-English speakers read Homer in something 
closer to 3/4 than 4/4 time, in effect transforming Homer's quantitative meter into a stress-based 
one” and goes on to note that “even if someone were to master all known aspects of Homer's verse,
he would be highly unlikely to reproduce orally those verses exactly the way they were read in 
ancient Greece. And if he did get it right, who could tell?”
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The rhythms of  speech in  most  modern romance languages  are built  on variations  in
stress and intonation, and attempts to restructure poetry in these languages along ancient
lines sounds forced, clunky, and distinctly  unrhythmical.62 For Nietzsche, our inability to
feel a sense of temporal rhythm goes beyond the question of how a poetic work should be
read aloud or translated. A persistent preoccupation of Nietzsche’s work is not just the
recognition  of  multiple  versions  or  perspectives  on  ideas  that  had  previously  been
considered universal (that there is more than one Good, one Truth, or indeed one sense of
Rhythm). Having discerned this plurality, the task then becomes to evaluate the different
perspectives, to ask what must have been the case in order for a particular view to take
hold.63 It is not just that we cannot accurately reproduce the rhythms of ancient Greece, it
is  that  our  inability  to  experience  them as  properly  rhythmical  reveals  a  fundamental
difference between the way that classical and modern thought are structured.
We could think about the effects of these different senses of rhythm as akin to the way that
a particular language informs not just the vocal cords of a native speaker and their ability
to produce certain sounds, but also their ability to hear these sounds and detect subtle
differences in intonation, attuned as they are to these from birth. Similarly, the language
we  speak  and  think  in  affects  the  kind  of  thoughts  we  are  most  likely  to  think.  The
difference between accented and temporal rhythm, for Nietzsche,  operates at  an even
more fundamental level, as it articulates not just which particular sounds can be heard or
which particular thoughts can be conceived, but the criteria for the divisions and repetitions
which constitute the rhythmical process of appearance.  Nietzsche’s examination of the
ancient sense of rhythm leads him not just to the conclusion that it was very different to the
modern  sense  of  rhythm we  have  today,  but  that  in  order  for  the  ancient  Greeks  to
experience these works as rhythmic, they must have had a very different relationship with
time.
62 Such attempts to use dactylic hexameter in English have been notoriously unsuccessful, 
described by one anonymous reviewer as “a lumbering rhythm, not inaptly compared, by some 
author, to the noise of pumpkins rolling on a barn-floor.” (anonymous review of Derby’s translation 
of the Iliad, cited by Scott 1994:139)
63 As Deleuze writes, “any given concept, feeling or belief will be treated as symptoms of a will that 
wills something. What does the one that says this, that thinks or feels that, will? It is a matter of 
showing that he could not say, think or feel this particular thing if he did not have a particular will, 
particular forces, a particular way of being.” (NP 72-3)
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Nietzsche's reading of Aristoxenus leads him to the conclusion that the Greeks were able
to hear rhythms constructed through temporal differences alone,  to perceive time as a
determinate form through nothing more than time itself, divided and repeated. For modern
accented rhythm, however, he thinks that this intense relationship with time is muddied by
the  increased  prominence  of  the  apparently  atemporal  aspect  of  force,  as  temporal
differences fade into the background. In Nietzsche's early notes, the effect of the centuries
that passed between Aristoxenus and Nietzsche, and the way that each heard rhythm,
reflects the nihilistic exclusion of change from identity. As we shall see with the rise of
accented rhythm, time for Nietzsche has gradually effaced itself from the phenomenon that
was most properly its own. Modern rhythm is therefore emblematic of the degeneration of
our understanding of identity, of the subtle musical forms that we no longer have the skill
to hear, and the fluid identities that we no longer have the capacity to think. 
The critical philological argument that Nietzsche is preparing in these early notes is that
the  modern  sense  of  accented  rhythm  is  poorly  qualified  to  understand  the  ancient
temporal rhythms that are so different from it. However what also emerges from the notes
is the sense that modern rhythm is not just different to, but also inherently worse than the
older sense of rhythm. Nietzsche is saying that in modernity our former "strong feeling for
time” does not just change, but “zerfallt" - disintegrates or decays.64 Rhythm, as the form of
time, seems to differ in nature to time itself, and modern rhythm intensifies this difference,
separating itself even further from its true nature. If rhythm per se already performs some
kind of transformative act (whether violent or consensual) upon time, then modern rhythm
is even more guilty of this as it divides time without reference to time itself. Modern rhythm
is  still  a  temporal  phenomenon,  in  that  it  requires  time  to  perform  the  divisions  and
repetitions  that  are  a  part  of  the  rhythmical  process.  But  it  bases  these  divisions  on
something other than time, and has therefore become a form imposed by something other
than than which is formed. The simplicity and elegance that Nietzsche perceived in ancient
temporal rhythm has been lost. Rather than the form of time being generated from the
superposition of times alone, this is replaced by a different dynamic in which the identity-
forming process is driven by the need for another element - force. 
64 “es zerfällt allmählich das starke Zeitgefühl” (KGW 2:3:307)
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This pessimistic assessment of the contrast between ancient and modern values follows
the same trajectory as the polemic of The Birth of Tragedy, which describes the shift away
from the ancient sense of tragedy in terms of a definite degeneration. Nietzsche’s account
of ancient tragedy includes a positive role for the rhythmical individuating tendencies of the
world of appearance, in which the Apolline form that rhythm provides works in a complex
tension with the Dionysian drive that reconnects us with the oneness of reality.  But as
Nietzsche argues in The Birth of Tragedy, later tragedy abandons this balance in favour of
a solely Apolline art, which excises the irrational and mysterious Dionysian elements in
favour of  pure knowledge and form. No longer sustained by the Dionysian power  that
transcends boundaries,  The Birth of Tragedy diagnoses modern tragedy as suffering the
same fate as all nihilistic identity. The artistic forms modern tragedy creates are no longer
animated by the transformative force of  the Dionysian.  Lacking the Dionysian impetus
which pushes them beyond the boundaries of the self, the audience can only watch, rather
than feel, the dissolution of the hero played out before them. Modern tragedy provides only
counterfeit effects, rather than the intimate and unique connection to a primal truth that
early Nietzsche views as the purpose of ancient tragedy.
Both the early rhythm notes and The Birth of Tragedy become a diagnosis of degeneration,
which arises through the uneasy mix of Schopenhauerian metaphysics and genealogical
critique that they contain. These early projects are driven by Nietzsche’s determination to
stress the temporal nature of phenomena such as tragedy and rhythm, to consider them
as ever-changing and evolving. But as long as these phenomena are viewed as historical
instantiations  of  an  underlying  undivided  sense  of  becoming  as  a  continuum,  their
individuation is taken to imply imperfection, in which various iterations draw closer to or
move further from the ground or base state that they represent. Nietzsche is arguing that
we should  not  judge the past  in  terms of  the present,  but  in  both cases the result  of
establishing this difference seems to be that we must judge the present as worse than the
past. In both instances the effect of time is negative, as the passing years make tragedy
and rhythm less adequate representations of that which is supposed to appear through
them. Nietzsche concludes that the form of time that we experience as accented rhythm
today is an impoverished, bastardised form, rather than the "truer" purely temporal rhythm
of the ancient Greeks. As we will see in the story that emerges from the rhythm notes, our
rhythmic understanding of  time is not  just  a victim of  the degeneration of  thought  into
nihilism. The rhythmic process by which we come to perceive different beats as repetitions
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of the same drives not only the creativity of thought, but also the nihilistic process that
closes off this same creativity.
The main thrust  of  Nietzsche’s  criticism is  that  modern rhythm effaces that  which it  is
supposed to make manifest, so that we lose the privileged awareness of time that ancient
rhythm  provided  with  its  combination  of  long  and  short  durations.  Modern  rhythm  is
constructed instead of strong and weak beats, ruled by the ictus, the single beat of every
foot or musical bar that receives the most emphasis. The way in which the ictus gradually
takes over rhythm is the process that drives and corrupts identity-formation throughout the
history of modern thought. The key to ancient rhythm, as we saw with Aristoxenus, lies in
the multiplicity of durations within each foot65 - a foot cannot be comprised of the chronos
protos alone, whether this smaller sub-division is found within the foot itself or elsewhere
within  the  rhythm.66 But  although  modern  rhythm  is  still  built  on  this  multiplicity,  the
increasing prominence of the ictus changes the way in which we hear and experience it.
The emphasis shifts from a complex structure of different durations, to a hierarchy in which
the ictus contains all the force of the foot, and the other beats are subordinate to it. Pick a
piece of music with a strong beat -  perhaps Elvis’  Love me Tender -  and try counting
along. The four beats to the bar sound not as “one - two - three - four”, but as “ONE (two,
three, four)” as they resolve themselves into the  ictus and its subsidiaries (“LOVE (me
tender), LOVE (me true)..”). The key element or meaning of the foot is all in the ictus, while
the rest of the foot is relegated to a subservient role modifying the primary sense provided
by the ictus. The force of the ictus drives across that Elvis wants us, first and foremost, to
love him, while the details of how we do this are absorbed into secondary properties of
what this love might entail.67 Multiplicity has become subsumed within a singular identity.
This is what Nietzsche describes as taking place when rhythm weakens its connection to
time and our  temporal  sense becomes correspondingly  impoverished -  identity  per  se
becomes less temporal, and becomes divorced from the multiplicity that animates it.
65 My use of ‘foot’ also includes the musical bar throughout the rest of this section.
66 A musical bar for example may contain nothing but a semi-breve (a single note held for four 
beats), but will be heard in conjunction with shorter notes elsewhere in the piece, and the chonos 
protos of the rhythm is identified from these.
67 The way in which the ictus makes rhythm subservient to linguistic meaning is another of the 
accusations Nietzsche levels against modern accented rhythm in these notes. I have chosen not to 
concentrate on this linguistic aspect of the ictus because I wish to retain the broader sense of 
rhythm that we find in music and movement as well as poetry. See Porter (2000:144ff).
86
As Nietzsche presents it, the shift from temporal to accented rhythm is symptomatic of the
shift towards an increasingly nihilistic way of thought, in which the walls thrown up around
identity  prevent  the  flow of  multiple  nuances  across  these  borders,  and  instead  draw
everything within them. The ictus exerts a gravitational pull over the multiplicity of rhythm
just as it draws the foot to the ground in the steps of a dance. Nietzsche traces the effects
of  this  gravitational  pull  as  it  occurred  in  ancient  Greek  speech,  which  is  one  of  the
rhythmizomena, the physical phenomena that rhythm needs in order to give form to time.
Ancient Greek was a melodic language, conveying meaning through a complex balance of
three musical aspects - duration (time), volume (force or stress), and pitch (higher or lower
tones). Physically, however, you need more breath or force in order to produce a higher
pitch,68 so pitch and stress over time became conflated, each pitch accent becoming also a
stress  accent  by  default.  Alone  and  outnumbered  in  this  struggle,  temporality  is
overmatched and squeezed aside by the combined strength of pitch and force. But just as
differences in duration fade into the background in comparison to pitch and force, so too
do the nuances of pitch itself - it is the higher pitches that are stressed, while lower pitches
drop out altogether, and “a variation of stressed and unstressed syllables takes the place
of high- and low-pitched syllables.”69 This is how the complex network of temporal relations
in ancient rhythm shifts into the binary simplicity of modern accented rhythm. Rather than
a  whole  range  of  possible  durations  supported  by  subtle  differences  in  pitch,  rhythm
becomes a binary alternation between two states - stressed/unstressed, on/off, yes/no, as
“the feeling pulsates in the rhythmic alternation between strong and weak” and temporal
rhythmic  variations  are  relegated  to  “secondary”  status.70 The  ictus or  stress  accent
appears here as a jealous thief of meaning that prefigures the divine heaven or backworld
of the later Nietzsche’s work,71 “a violent afterlife” in which “the spiritual life of the word is
68 A phenomenon familiar to anyone who has learned to play a woodwind or brass instrument - as 
a beginner, it is very difficult to separate out volume from pitch, and the greater force needed to 
produce a higher note makes it easier to play it loudly. Developing the control required to play a 
high note quietly is much more difficult.
69 "ein Wechsel von betonten und nicht betonten Silben tritt an Stelle von hoch und tiefbetonten 
Silben." (KGW 2:3:308)
70 “das Gefühl pulsirt im rhythmischen Wechsel von stark und schwach . . . Hieran schließt sich der
Zeitrhythmus: der aber jetzt sekundär ist u. nirgends mehr scharf ist.” (KGW 2:3:338)
71 TI ‘How the “true world” finally became a fable’
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now concentrated in the accented syllable.”72 Just as all meaning will later be sucked from
the living, temporal earth by the dead but eternal backworld, the rhythm or “spiritual life” of
language becomes focussed on the presence or absence of the  ictus alone, rather than
emerging from multiple quantities of time.
Nietzsche's account broadens the application of rhythm as form beyond that of time alone,
even as it confirms the nihilistic patterns of identity-creation that we identified in the first
chapter. The criticism Nietzsche levels at modern accented rhythm is that it is based on
differences in force, rather than time, and that time is therefore unable to appear to us with
its former clarity, leaving us with a temporal sense that is so impoverished that ancient
rhythms  are  completely  lost  to  us.  But  when  Nietzsche  attempts  to  explain  how  this
transformation occurred, we find that he cannot maintain the strict division between force
and time that this hierarchy rests upon.73 As we have seen, the ictus symbolises all that is
wrong for Nietzsche about modern rhythm, and modern thought. The prominence of the
ictus seems to sideline the other beats and tensions both between and within the foot,
occluding the inherent multiplicity of rhythm as a phenomenon. As such, it expresses the
eternalising  tendency  that  he  detects  within  the  trajectory  of  nihilistic  thought,  which
attempts to exclude difference from identity. But despite his attempts to envisage an older
sense of rhythm without an ictus, Nietzsche is unable to consistently exclude the ictus from
his discussions of temporal rhythm. When discussing the pauses and subtle shifts that
occur within temporal rhythm, he indicates that the ictus, although "not as necessary" as it
is in accented rhythm, may still occur within temporal rhythm nonetheless.74 The force of
the ictus, however problematic, is not alien to rhythm and nor, therefore, to the temporal
identity that emerges through the rhythmic process. 
72 "Jetzt tritt der Accent und der Ictus ein, gleichsam ein gewaltsames Fortleben des Wortes. Das 
seelische Leben des Wortes concentrirt sich jetzt in der Accentsilbe." (KGW 2:3:307)
73 As Porter concludes, what is needed instead of the strict division of rhythmic senses into those 
of time and force is instead “something like a concept of ‘time-strength’” because “the division of 
time into quantities is itself an instance of force.” (Porter 2000:151-2) We will go on to explore the 
interpenetration of force and time in the concept of "momentary" time in chapter four.
74 "Die Zeitrhythmik muß nach kurzen Strecken einmal aufathmen. Es scheint daß wenn, wie in 
unserer Musik der Ictus hinzugenommen wird, dies nicht so nöthig ist" (KGW 2:3:337). See Porter 
(2000:159) for other suggestions of the presence of a temporal ictus within Nietzsche's notes. 
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The  reviled  ictus that  comes  to  prominence  in  accented  rhythm  grows  out  of  and  is
produced by temporal rhythm - when listening to a piece of music, however much force the
ictus is given, we only become aware of and are able to identify it  as the  ictus once we
have heard it repeat. We find this blurring of the division between time and force when
Nietzsche asks in his notes whether “Zeitleben,”75 the purely temporal identity established
by ancient rhythm, is the more originary, prior to the Tonleben or force-based identity that
emerges  through  modern  accented  rhythm,  and  concludes  that  “at  the  oldest  point,”
rhythm is the “struggle between  Zeit- and  Tonleben (side by side).”76 However much he
may have been tempted to read the relationship between time and rhythm in terms of
reality  and  appearance,  the  nature  of  rhythm  as  a  phenomenon  speaks  against  this
metaphysical  evaluation,  which  attempts  to  judge  the  “better”  rhythm in  terms of  how
closely  or  purely  it  represents  time.  Force  cannot  be  viewed  as  a  recent  usurper,  a
physical interloper that intrudes upon the hallowed province of time, but as an integral part
of rhythm. As Nietzsche realises, the rhythmic division and repetition of durations always
involves "the formative force of temporal proportions."77 Rhythm is this “formative force”
just as much as it is the “temporal proportions” - more, with the phenomenon of rhythm we
have to understand that the temporal proportions are the formative force. Understood as
the  activity  of  time  and  force  combined,  rhythm  is  the  form  not  just  of  time,  but  of
phenomena per se.
The function  of  rhythm as a  shaping  force can be seen in  the irrational  rhythms that
Aristoxenus includes within his list of the building blocks or functions of Greek rhythm.78
75 Literally “life of time”
76 “ist nun das Zeitleben das ursprûngliche? Einmal war das Tonleben freier, dann wird es durch 
das Zeitleben eingeengt und fast ûberwunden, schließlich siegt es wieder. Zuältest Kampf 
zwischen Zeit- und Tonleben (nebeneinander).” (KGW 2:3:308)
77 “der gestaltenden Kraft der Zeitproportionen” (KGW 2:3:330)
78 “Each of the feet is defined either by some ratio [logos], or by an irrationality [alogia] of a kind 
that will be intermediate between two ratios familiar to perception. What we are saying can be made
clear in the following way, if two feet are taken, one of which has its up-beat equal to its down-beat, 
each of these being of two units, while the other has a down-beat of two units and an up-beat half 
that size, and if a third foot is taken beside these, having a basis [i.e., 'down-beat'] equal, once 
again, to both the others, but an arsis [i.e., 'up-beat'] with a magnitude intermediate between those 
of the other arseis. For such a foot will have an up-beat that is irrational [alogos] with respect to the 
down-beat. The irrationality will be between two ratios that are familiar to perception, the equal and 
the duple. This foot is called the irrational choreios.” (Barker 1989:188)
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Some feet  are composed of  durations which translate neatly  into ratios -  a  dactyl,  for
example, has one long syllable followed by two short syllables, dividing into a neat ratio of
1:2  (one  long  syllable  =  two  short).  Other  feet,  however,  create  “irrational”  rhythms,
containing  durations  which  we  cannot  encompass  as  a  neat  subdivision  of  the  rest.
Nonetheless,  we  still  hear  these  as  part  of  the  rhythm.  Nietzsche  declares  that  the
irrationality of rhythm goes even deeper than this - no spoken instance of a dactyl actually
has the strict 1:2 ratio that we hear, as the short syllables are never the exact length of
either half of the long syllable, or each other.79 As Porter points out, “the only equivalence
that can exist between a long syllable and two short syllables is accordingly rhythmic—
which is to say, thanks to a rhythmic convention”80 i.e. a rhythmic sense, whether it be
temporal or accented. 
For  Nietzsche,  then,  rather  than  Aristoxenus'  distinction  between  rhythms  that  are
inherently rational or irrational, we find a distinction between those which we do or do not
perceive as rational.  Every rhythm is  irrational,  for  no beat  can precisely  reproduce a
previous beat,  or an exact  fraction of it.  With some rhythms, however,  the process by
which we smooth out the differences between one beat and another that seems to repeat
it  leaves a trace within the rhythm itself.  With the temporal rhythms of ancient Greece
Nietzsche  suggests  that  the  vacillation  of  these  subtle  differences  often  remains
perceptible, in such a way that the listener could equally interpret a phrase as a variation in
tempo, as part of a wider emergent rhythmic pattern, or as a modulation to another rhythm
entirely. All of these could be derived from the irrationality upon which rhythmic perception
is  built,  all  co-present  as  possibilities  within  the  same rhythm.81 The  virtue  of  ancient
rhythm for Nietzsche is this subtle manifestation of different rhythms or senses of time
within it. It is this pluriferation of temporalities, and the tendency to promote rather than
discourage the ability to shift between them, that we can take forward as the desirable
feature of ancient rhythm, after any attempt at metaphysical adequation to a purer sense
79 “The facts of feeling, which grasp a dactyl (-^^) as a logos isos [as ‘rational’], have nothing to do 
with the mathematical description of the way the dactyl comes out when spoken” ("Mit jener 
mathematischen Bezeichnung, wie man den Daktylus spricht, hat die Gefühlsthatsache nichts zu 
thun, die ihn als λόγος σος ἴσος begreift." KGW 2:3:278-9 - Porter’s translation - Porter 2000:153)
80 Porter 2000:153
81 Nietzsche writes that "every irrational length is evidence of a rhythmic change!" ("Jede irrationale
Länge ist ein Beweis für eine rhythm. Metabole!" KGW 2:3:252)
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of time has been discounted by the continual co-presence of force and time throughout
both the temporal and the accented senses of rhythm. 
Rhythm, then, is what allows us to see repetition as the repetition  of the same - to perceive
subtly different durations as repetitions of the “same” duration.82 As we saw in The Birth of
Tragedy,  Nietzsche’s  conception  of  the  relationship  between  form or  appearance  and
reality attempts to disrupt the hierarchical divide between them, reframing the rhythmic
Apolline  impulse  towards  appearance  as  something  that  could  be  affirmed  when
expressed as ancient tragedy, which uses it to give form to the precarious vulnerability of
identity. But the nature of tragedy as a representation of reality, even if this be conceived
as  the  continual  tension  between  Dionysian  and  Apolline  rather  than  an  undivided
Dionysian Will, always leaves appearance in second place. In Nietzsche's account of the
transition from temporal to accented rhythm we can also trace the ascendancy of a more
singular, less "faithful" rhythmical perception of multiplicity, but the phenomenon of rhythm
resists any attempts to interpret this as a fall from a metaphysical state of originary grace.
The temporal rhythm that Aristoxenus describes is older than our modern accented sense
of rhythm, but it in its turn developed from a sense of rhythm in which force and time were
both  at  play.  Nietzsche’s  attempt  to  divide  ancient  and  modern  rhythm  into  two
irreconcilable camps, focused on time and force respectively, disintegrates when he tries
to explain how one became the other, and has to acknowledge the co-presence of time
and  force  in  both  types  of  rhythm.  This  bleed  between  time  and  force  means  that,
whatever the faults of modern accented rhythm, it can no longer be charged with failing to
adequately represent the “true” nature of time. Rather, the problem is that it conceals the
irrationality on which rhythm is built,  seducing us with an easy, regular beat instead of
revealing the transformational process of shaping and forming that is at work in all rhythm. 
The notebooks on rhythm end with a note that expresses this broadening of Nietzsche’s
understanding  of  rhythm,  from  a  purely  temporal  phenomenon  to  a  process  which
inextricably involves both force and time as the generation of the sensory world around us:
82 How this takes place is not something Nietzsche explores, beyond determining the role of the 
ictus within rhythm as the locus of this process. We shall return to the question of how rhythm 
engenders repetition in chapter five, with Deleuze's account of the three syntheses of time. 
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Rhythm is an attempt at individuation. In order for there to be rhythm, there must be
multiplicity and becoming. Here we find the addiction to beauty as the motive for 
individuation. Rhythm is the form of becoming, at any rate the form of the world of 
appearances.83
Rhythm is explicitly presented here as the process of individuation or identity-formation,
the form of not just time, but of the temporal “world of appearance” in its entirety. The
“image-making power” that Nietzsche attributes to rhythm in  The Birth of Tragedy is not
here merely  something “developed to  represent Apolline  states,”84 namely the Apolline
impulse towards individuation. Rhythm is this identity-forming force, multiple and temporal,
“the form of  the world of  appearance” -  it  is  how appearance appears.  Rhythm is not
something  that  divides  up  the  undivided,  whether  this  be  the  undivided  time  of
Aristoxenus, or the Schopenhauerian will in itself. Instead, it emerges from "multiplicity and
becoming." As the art of Apollo it is (as we saw in The Birth of Tragedy) that which gives
form to  this  becoming  and  allows  us  to  experience  it,  but  not  as  something  alien  to
becoming - rather, as something that expresses the multiplicity inherent in becoming itself.
Abandoning any pretence to a pure reality, however, does not restore the status of modern
rhythm in Nietzsche’s eyes. The disdain for modern German culture that runs throughout
The  Birth  of  Tragedy only  deepens  in  the  later  works  once  Wagner  has  been  firmly
rejected as its potential saviour, but the reasons behind Nietzsche’s valuation shift.  The
Birth of Tragedy operates within a metaphysical model of an otherworldly, unbroken will
that  takes  form for  us  through  the  Apolline  impulse  towards  individuation,  and  which
modern tragedy cannot  adequately  represent.  The rhythm notes similarly  paint  ancient
temporal sense of rhythm as a better, purer form of time. But Nietzsche’s later thought
abandons the vestiges of this dichotomy between an unknowable true world and a world of
appearance that must attempt the impossible task of matching it.  Here, the criticism of
modernity is not that  it  fails  to match up to a hidden reality,  but that  the creative and
transformational possibilities of thought have been narrowed into a predictable and regular
83 "Der Rhythmus ist ein Versuch zur Individuation. Damit Rhythmus da sein könne, muß Vielheit 
und Werden da sein. Hier Zeigt sich die Sucht zum Schönen als Motiv der Individuation. Rhythmus 
ist die Form des Verdens, überhapt die Form der Ersheinungswelt." (KGW 2:3:338) Porter draws 
out the links between this passage and Nietzsche’s later work, suggests that it may even be a later 
annotation. (Porter 2000:341)
84 BT §2 (my emphasis)
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“tick-tock.”85 It is this aspect of thought that Nietzsche is working against in his later work,
as  he  attempts  to  develop  a  kind  of  thought  that  retains  a  sense  of  difference  and
multiplicity in the rhythmic forms that we create.
Nietzsche's early work on rhythm thus reveals an ambiguity at the heart of the process by
which we think the identities we perceive in the world around us. As a process, rhythm has
at  its root  a fundamental  difference,  yet  is  also the means by which this difference is
subsumed into the identity  of  a regular,  repeating  beat.  The transformation of  ancient
temporal rhythm into modern accented rhythm expresses this solidification of identity, as
the nihilistic force of the  ictus draws the multiplicity of beats into its orbit. But even this
ability  to  move  from one  sense  of  rhythm to  another  is  itself  a  demonstration  of  the
temporal  fluidity  of  rhythm and the ability  of  our  thought  to  reframe itself.  In  the next
chapter we shall see how this ambiguity of rhythmic thought in Nietzsche's early work is at
play  in  The Gay Science, as he struggles  to develop a new kind of  thought  that  can
escape the nihilistic pull of the ictus.
85 “das Tiktak unsrer Reim-Poeten ist auf die Dauer fürchterlich” 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1886,688 eKGWB Letter to Carl Fuchs 1886
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3. Modulation: Rhythm as the seduction of the future
As we saw in chapter one, eternal return is the solution that Nietzsche proposes to the
problem of modern nihilism, intended to let us break our current pattern of nihlistic thought,
and  develop  a  new kind  of  thought  in  its  place. Following  the exploration  of  how we
rhythmically form identities in Nietzsche's early notes, we can now see that it is specifically
a  rhythmic  problem that Nietzsche is trying to address and a  rhythmic  pattern that he is
trying to disrupt with eternal return. We will revisit the account of the existing relationship
between  thought  and  becoming  that  emerged  from  The  Gay  Science  in  the  light  of
Nietzsche's earlier understanding of the rhythmic nature of thought. We will look at how
Nietzsche's conception of becoming has changed by the time of The Gay Science. We will
then once again  explore both the positive-artistic  and negative-nihilistic  aspects of  our
current  way of  thinking that  we encountered in  chapter  one,  but  this  time noting  how
rhythm is the driving force behind both of them. Nietzsche suggests that the potentially
transformative aspects of rhythm are in tension with a powerful capacity to elide difference,
in  particular  with  respect  to  the  future.  These  undesirable  rhythmic  attributes  are  the
principal difficulties that Nietzsche thinks must be overcome if we are to reconceive the
relationship between becoming and thought. Identifying these problems with rhythm, which
as we have seen Nietzsche understands as "the form of time,"1 will then allow us to situate
eternal return in context as Nietzsche's attempt to disrupt our existing rhythmic relationship
with time by introducing eternal return as a new rhythm. We can then move on in the next
chapter to explore how Nietzsche intends eternal return to prompt a new relationship with
time that will resist the effects of nihilism, and gauge the extent to which this solves the
rhythmic tensions that we have identified within Nietzsche's work.
The rhythmic wavebeat of becoming
We saw in the previous chapter how in the 1870s Nietzsche struggles to articulate the
relationship  between  the  world  of  forms  or  appearances,  and  what  he  at  this  point
understands as the separate "reality" from which this world of appearances emerges. At
1 http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1871,9[116] eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 
1871
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times he seems particularly drawn to a Schopenhauerian metaphysics that conceives of a
reality  or  will  that  underlies  appearance  as  a  primordial  unity  that  precedes  not  only
individuation,  but also multiplicity.  However Nietzsche also stresses the "contradictory"2
nature  of  this  supposed  unity,  coming  to  understand  reality  as  the  continual  tension
between Dionysian and Apolline forces rather than an undivided Dionysian Will. Yet even
when working with a conception of reality that craves and is complicit in the individuation
that  emerges from it,  during  the period when the rhythm notebooks and  The Birth  of
Tragedy were composed, Nietzsche still retains the sense that these individuated forms
are a deviation from the formless ground of becoming, however necessary this deviation
might be for life. This hierarchy becomes apparent in his evaluation of the shifting nature of
tragedy,  in  which  the “better”  kind  of  tragic  presentation  or  appearance  is  that  which
represents the pre-individuated formless state of reality as closely as possible. 
When he writes at  the end of  the early  rhythm notebooks that  rhythm “is  the form of
becoming, at any rate the  form of the world of appearances,”3 we can read Nietzsche’s
uncertainty in this formulation. In  The Birth of Tragedy, the world of appearances  is the
realm of becoming - the "continual Becoming in time, space, and causality"4 that is the
false reality we inhabit everyday. Here in the rhythm notes, however, the phrase "at any
rate" suggests that Nietzsche means something different by "the form of becoming" to the
way in  which we perceive beings within  "the  world  of  appearances."  Becoming is  not
conceived here as restricted to the world  of  appearance alone,  but  as a process that
extends beyond it into the imperceptible realm beneath.5 But does rhythm also bridge this
2 BT §4
3 KGW 2:3:338
4 BT §4
5 Swift uses a thorough account of Nietzsche's early writings, especially the 1867 Fragment of a 
Critique of the Schopenhauerian Philosophy, to argue that the Schopenhauerian belief in the will in 
itself that Nietzsche displays in The Birth of Tragedy was an anomaly, at odds with his earlier, as 
well as his later, philosophy which privileged the primacy of becoming. Swift identifies this impulse 
as far back as Nietzsche's dissertation draft on Kant, where Nietzsche agrees with Heraclitus that 
"there is no thing of which we may say, 'it is.' He rejects Being. He knows only Becoming, the 
flowing. He considers belief in something persistent as error and foolishness." (Swift 2005:12)
Miller (1999) also highlights the continuity in Nietzsche's earlier and later understanding of reality as
"absolute becoming," citing a note from the same period as the early rhythm notes in which 
Nietzsche develops this thought of "life as a constant convulsion that projects appearances and 
takes pleasure in doing so. The atom as a contentless point, pure appearance, becoming in every 
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divide?  Rhythm,  Nietzsche  seems  clear,  is  definitely the  form  of  "the  world  of
appearances," but only possibly the “form of becoming” - he is unsure how far to extend
this individuating power of rhythm. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche understands reality
as  a  totally  different  realm  to  the  “world  of  appearances,”  forever  separated  by  the
Schopenhauerian veil of Maia. As we saw in the previous chapter, Schopenhauer believes
that multiplicity places us at odds with the nature of the will and is the cause of our misery
in the world, but Nietzsche's tentative injection of rhythm into the concept of becoming
signals his move away from this divide between appearance and reality. By considering
the  possibility  that  rhythm  is  in  some  way  common  to  both  the  perceptible  world  of
individuated beings, and becoming as a process that is not entirely contained within this
world, Nietzsche starts to dissolve this division. As Nietzsche's study of Aristoxenus makes
clear, rhythm is an inherently plural phenomenon, always constructed of multiple beats. If
rhythm is to be found within becoming, we must ascribe multiplicity to becoming just as to
being. 
Throughout the 1870s Nietzsche develops the more Heraclitean conception of becoming
that we encountered in chapter one, in which becoming is conceived as the reality of the
world, rather than opposed to it. In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,6 Nietzsche
stages an encounter between Anaximander and Heraclitus, characters which play out for
us the change in Nietzsche's own thinking from the metaphysics of The Birth of Tragedy.7
In Nietzsche's text, Anaximander struggles with the problem of how multiplicity can emerge
from "the eternal one."8 Anaximander's response is that of Schopenhauer, as he concludes
from "the self-contradictory,  self-consuming and negating  character  of  the many"9 that
becoming  is  evidently  at  fault,  and  the process  of  individuation  is  a  terrible  accident.
smallest moment, never being." (Miller's translation) "Das Leben als ein fortwährender, 
Erscheinungen projicirender und dies mit Lust thuender Krampf. Das Atom als Punkt, inhaltslos, 
rein Erscheinung, in jedem kleinsten Momente werdend, nie seiend." 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1870,7[204] eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 
1870-April 1871
6 An incomplete manuscript that Nietzsche was working on in 1873. 
7 Small notes that "Nietzsche sees Anaximander as the key figure for all subsequent philosophy, in 
that he introduces the dichotomy between two realms, of being and becoming, and poses the 
problem of the relation between them," (Small 2010:18) and provides an account of the conception 
of "absolute becoming" that emerges in Nietzsche's throught from PTAG onwards (Small 2010:17ff).
8 PTAG §4
9 ibid.
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Nietzsche  sees  that  the  outcome  of  this  separation  of  becoming  and  being  is  that
becoming is turned into a culpable and "moral phenomenon. It is not justified, but expiates
itself forever through its passing."10 But here, instead of the attempt to redeem becoming
through tragedy that we find in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche gives us the response of
Heraclitus.  In contrast  to Anaximander,  Heraclitus "denied the duality  of  totally  diverse
worlds"11 that  we  found  in  both  Anaximander,  Schopenhauer,  and  in  Nietzsche's  own
metaphysics of  The Birth of  Tragedy,  and instead Nietzsche writes that  Heraclitus "no
longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one."12 For Heraclitus there is
no division between a metaphysically true or real world of being, and the physical but false
world of becoming.
By abandoning the division between being and becoming, Heraclitus does away with the
transcendent concept of being altogether, leaving us with a world in which only becoming
remains. There is no eternal one, no primordial unity. In these sections of  Philosophy in
the Tragic  Age of  the Greeks,  the contrasting metaphysical  positions  on becoming as
either opposed to reality, or as this reality in its entirety, make their competing claims on
Nietzsche's thought. The winner who emerges is Heraclitus:
Louder than Anaximander, Heraclitus proclaimed: "I see nothing other than 
becoming. Be not deceived. It is the fault of your myopia, not of the nature of things,
if you believe you see land somewhere in the ocean of coming-to-be and passing 
away."13
It is beings, the islands of identity that we perceive around us, that are illusory, a product of
the way we see things rather than any inherent property of reality. Rhythm is a primary
feature of the world as becoming that we find in Nietzsche's account of Heraclitus, in which
he describes becoming as "this everlasting wavebeat and rhythm of things."14 Rhythm is
now confirmed as the "form of becoming," as well as the form of the world appearances.
10 ibid.
11 PTAG §5
12 ibid.
13 ibid.
14 Ibid. The image of the wavebeat recalls the “wave-like” rhythm of the ancient Greeks in The Birth
of Tragedy, assocated with the representation of “Apolline states” (BT §2). In PTAG we see that the 
Dionysian realm of becoming, which Nietzsche had previously contrasted with the Apolline realm of 
forms, is also suffused with this wavelike rhythm. Nietzsche now considers it a feature of becoming 
and the world of appearances alike.
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But the extension of rhythm as a common feature of both becoming and appearance does
not  thereby  save  the  world  of  appearance  with  its  rhythmic  forms  from  Heraclitus’
disapprobation. Heraclitus reverses Anaximander's moral assessment - it is now we, as
those who impose the appearance of being upon the world of becoming, who are at fault.
The continually flowing rhythm that is the province of the ocean of becoming is concealed
and disguised by the land that we erroneously perceive within it: 
For this one world which he retained—supported by eternal unwritten laws, flowing 
upward and downward in brazen rhythmic beat—nowhere shows a tarrying, an 
indestructibility, a bulwark in the stream.15
The rhythm of becoming, in the Heraclitean account, does not tarry - it is not responsible
for the accretion of land which forms the blockages or identities that we think we see in the
flow of becoming. These are the creation of our myopic thought alone.
Heraclitus' solution to the problem of how the eternal one becomes many, in fact raises
another problem of  what  causes our myopia.  How is  the continuous flow of  becoming
initially broken up and held by our thought as discrete identities? As we saw in chapter
one, in  The Gay Science Nietzsche develops the idea of thought as love to describe the
way we create perceptible identities from the Heraclitean stream of becoming, in which
"first one must  learn to hear a figure and melody at all,  to detect and distinguish it,  to
isolate and delimit it as a life in itself."16 But our account of thought as love did nothing to
answer the question of how we delimit  these identities in the first  place.  Following our
examination of rhythm in Nietzsche's early notes, we identified a fundamentally rhythmic
structure to the way we form identities. It now seems that becoming, too, has a rhythmic
structure,  in  Heraclitus'  image  of  becoming  as  the  ocean  continually  shifting  with  the
movement of the waves. These two manifestations of rhythm seem utterly opposed, as the
accented rhythm which repetitively drives home the identity of a beat, and the temporal
rhythm whose continual flow makes it impossible to pin down to any concrete position. And
yet,  as  we  found in  Nietzsche's  account  of  the  rise  of  the  ictus within  ancient  Greek
rhythm, the two senses of rhythm as divided identity and rhythm as flow both arise from
the same source - the irrationality at the heart of rhythm. Nietzsche's exploration of rhythm
in  the  early  notes  was  unable  to  resolve  this  tension.  We  will  now  turn  to  his  later
15 ibid.
16 GS §334
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mobilisation of rhythm in  The Gay Science, to see how this constitutive ambiguity at the
heart of rhythm is expressed in the tensions between creative and nihilistic thought.17
Rhythm as a creative force
Nietzsche's engagement with the positive aspects of rhythm in The Gay Science is through
the crucial role it plays within artistic or creative thinking, that we explored in chapter one
as the creative aspects of the artist-lover. The "gay science" of Nietzsche's title refers not
only to the joyful, affirmative body of knowledge that Nietzsche wants to counter nihilistic
thought, but more specifically to the "gai saber" of the troubadours of medieval southern
Europe who invented "love as passion" in "the knightly poetry of Provence."18 Art from the
outset  is  clearly  positioned  as  something  that  holds  the  key  to  the  positive  kind  of
knowledge that Nietzsche is aiming towards. As we explored in chapter one,  The Gay
Science begins by focusing on thought understood via different manifestations of love.
Throughout this, Nietzsche draws out the links between love and art, stressing that the
deception and self-deception involved in love, whether of a woman, of science, or “the
truth,” is a work of artistic production, in which the lover becomes the artist. In book two of
The Gay Science the emphasis shifts from GS §62 on “Love” to GS §63 on “The woman in
music,” where the warm, rainy winds produce the impulse towards both love (whether the
religious  love of  piety or  a more secular  female love)  and music.  This  musical  thread
becomes more prominent throughout the following aphorisms, from the different tempos of
thought invoked in GS §76, through the celebration of the gaities of Southern music,19 and
17 Eldridge (2018) highlights the continual conflict over the role of rhythm at play throughout 
Nietzsche's career, noting that "for Nietzsche, then, the phenomenon of rhythm itself is complex 
enough that questions about it cannot be resolved into single positions" and that the "tensions in his
work are shaped by the quandaries inherent to rhythm" in its dual "qualities as form or flow." 
Eldridge percieves this conflict as lying between rhythm's power as either culturally or 
physiologically situated, whereas I am arguing that these tensions extend to the relation Nietzsche 
perceived between rhythm, specifically rhythmic thought, and becoming.
18 BGE §260 (although the appellation "gai saber" or the Occitan form "gaya scienza" that 
Nietzsche uses on the title page of The Gay Science primarily derives from a society formed to 
revive and promote the troubadour poetry that had been popular a hundred years earlier. As with 
Aristoxenus who was writing at a point when the decline of temporal rhythm had already begun to 
take effect, Nietzsche seems drawn to the untimely proponents of prior artforms).
19 GS §77
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the un-Wagnerian privileging of sound over the lyrics in opera,20 leading up to §84, ‘On the
origin of poetry,’ which we shall focus on in the next section. 
As  we saw in  the previous  chapters,  what  we think  of  as  identities  are formed via  a
rhythmic process that allows us to perceive flashes of difference as repetitive instantiations
of the same thing, and that develops through the process of learning to love that Nietzsche
describes in  GS §334. This is the case with  all  identities – but we do not experience all
identities as rhythmic. The nihilistic problem that Nietzsche is trying to solve is that we are
not sufficiently skilled to be able to perceive the world in this rhythmic fashion. If we are to
reconfigure our relationship with becoming and learn how to think all identities as temporal
– as rhythms - we should first examine those phenomena which already allow us to do
this. I do not look at a brick, and see a rhythm. I might, possibly, perceive the life of a
person  or  the  passage  of  seasons  as  a  rhythm.  However  the  phenomena  that  we
experience most concretely as rhythm are found in art - in music, poetry, or dance, the
three rhythmizomena that Aristoxenus identified as phenomena made rhythmic ie as those
that  work  not  only  with  sound,  language,  or  movement,  but  which  are  also  built  from
different durations of time. The identities that we experience most strongly  as rhythms,
then,  are those that  highlight  the rhythmic process that  allows us to perceive time as
multiple, working via repetition to produce difference. By holding blocks of time up before
us, rhythms allow us to affirm the passage of time as something divided, retaining this
generative difference as part of their identity. 
Nietzsche makes the connection between rhythm and perception of time in his account of
the degeneration of the ancient Greeks’ privileged temporal sense of rhythm, which he
attributes to the melodic nature of the ancient Greek language, which conveyed meaning
through differences in the duration and pitch of syllables, rather than differences in stress.
This sense of rhythm meant that the ancient Greeks had a heightened awareness of time.
Towards  the  end  of  the  notebooks  however  Nietzsche  broadens  this  connection  with
temporal awareness to the sphere of art, rather than rhythm alone, noting that “every word
becomes artistic when pronounced. On hearing we perceive it as a group of times.”21 The
20 GS §80
21 "Jedes Wort wird zugleich künstlerisch beim Aussprechen und Hören als Gruppe von Zeiten 
percipirt" (KGW 2:3:338)
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suggestion  here  seems  to  be  that  this  perception  of  groups  of  times  is  a  defining
characteristic not only of rhythm, but of art per se. Nietzsche establishes rhythmic temporal
perception as a driving force of art, especially sonorous temporal perception,22 suggesting
that “the need for language is simultaneously the first manifestation of art.”23 
Art,  as the “cult  of  the untrue,” is the “counterforce”24 to our obsession with truth. This
"good will to appearance"25 is what allows us to affirm meaning as transient and created,
rather than immutable and eternal. It is this playful and artistic celebration of illusion that
allows us to transform the world into something we can love:
We do not always keep our eyes from rounding off, from finishing off the poem; and 
then it is no longer eternal imperfection that we carry across the river of becoming - 
we then feel that we are carrying a goddess, and are proud and childish in 
performing this service. As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable to 
us, and art furnishes us with the eye and hand and above all the good conscience 
to be able to make such a phenomenon of ourselves.26
The artistic ability to make the world beautiful is the positive role rhythm plays within our
current capacities to think. “Rounding off" or "finishing off the poem” is a key aspect of the
22 Here it is specifically language "when pronounced" that becomes artistic, sonorous rather than 
linguistic. Blondel insists on the importance of sonority for Nietzsche, and how thoughout his work: 
"he listens, to the point that it almost is or becomes imperceptible, provokes and almost creates this
sound, resonance or even sonority; one immediately sees the contrast with a visual conception of 
philosophy, which must first be imposed before we then observe and inspect it, in which ontology 
compels epistemology. To interpret is to create. Moreover, while the visible is necessarily present, 
sound is perceptible at a distance, signifying its source or origin in absentia. I will go a little further: 
is it not that, for Nietzsche, contrary to the theories and banal facts that hold true for the plebian 
which is nearby and next, listening is one of the forms of the love of distance?" ("il écoute, au point 
qu´il fait presque être, fait advenir l´imperceptible, provoque et crée presque le son ou la 
résonnance ou même la sonorité: on saisit immédiatement le contraste avec une conception 
visuelle du philosopher où faut d´abord que l´être s´impose avant qu´on le regarde et l´inspecte, où 
l´ontologique force le gnoséologique. Interpréter, c´est créer. Il s´y ajoute que, tandis que le visible 
est nécessairement présence, le son est perceptible au lointain, il signifie sa source ou son 
émetteur in absentia. J´irai un peu plus loin: ne serait-ce pas que, pour Nietzsche, au contraire de 
la théorie et de l´évidence qui valent pour le proche et le prochain, le plébéien, l´écoute est une des
formes de l´amour du lointain?" Blondel 1985). Blondel here highlights the creative role of the 
listener (over the observer), a listener who partakes of the "love of distance," forced to interpret a 
sound whose origin is always unclear.
23 “So ist die Noth der Sprache zugleich die erste künstlerische Manifestation.” (KGW 2:3:338)
24 GS §107
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
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rhythmic process of identity-formation that we explored in chapter two. This ability to round
off and fill in the gaps allows us to build on the preceding rhythm by smoothing out the
irregularities and differences between beats, incorporating any minor dissonances so that
on an everyday level we become one of those who "knows how to improvise life" and is
"ready at any moment to incorporate into the thematic order the most accidental note to
which the stroke of a finger or a mood drives them, breathing a beautiful meaning and a
soul into an accident."27 
The ability to create beauty via a rhythmic process of "rounding off" is something we are
already capable of,  but  Nietzsche's  suggestion here is that  it  is  this  specific  aspect  of
thought that should be encouraged and developed in order to counter nihilism. Nihilism
occurred because we lost faith in the identities in the world around us, because their status
as  a  product  of  our  own creation  became apparent.  We need  instead  to  understand
identities the same way we understand works of art - as something that does not hide its
own  rhythmically  created  nature,  but  rather  highlights  it.  When  Nietzsche  praises  the
“masklike elements in the melodies and cadenzas, in the leaps and gaieties of the rhythm
of these [Southern] operas,”28 it is this celebration of their created status that is favourably
contrasted with the German composers who are ashamed of and seek to hide the essence
of their art. When appreciating a work of art, we are held in the tension of the rhythmic
process of learning to love, but in a way that allows us to recognise the artifice within art as
something to celebrate, rather than decry. This recognition of the created nature of art
does not mean that we are not absorbed in it, or that we do not find it meaningful. Nihilistic
thought conceives of appearance as a "dead mask"29 that covers the true nature of reality,
but  with  art  we  are  able  to  "delight  in  the  mask,"  revelling  in  an  affirmative  "good
conscience in everything mask-like!"30 The work of art takes us up and absorbs us, but in a
way that can encompass its created nature, going "so far in its self-mockery that it makes
me feel that here there is appearance and a will-o'-the-wisp and a dance of spirits and
nothing else."31 We absorb and ignore the irregularities that would seem to disrupt this
27 GS §303
28 GS §77
29 GS §50
30 GS §77
31 GS §50
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experience - the words on the page, the greasepaint, the pressure of the headphones in
our  ears -  just  as we smooth the irregularity  of  repetition  into identity.  But  unlike  with
nihilistic thought, with art we do this willingly - for "that is the difference, that is the beautiful
unnaturalness for  the sake of  which one goes to the opera."32 Art  shows us a way to
recognise and celebrate the extent to which the things we perceive in the world are a
deviation  from the formless world of  becoming,  to  enjoy all  the advantages of  identity
precisely because we retain the knowledge of its artifice, accepting that x is true while at
the same time knowing it to be a fiction.
The rhythmic binding of identities that allows us to round off the differences within them is
one  of  the  “species-preserving…  articles  of  faith”33 that  means  that  "existence  is  still
bearable to us" - it is only "as an aesthetic phenomenon"34 that we can create a world that
resists nihilism. “We need all exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish, and blissful
art”35 to create a world in which we are able to survive, utilising the rhythmic propensitiy to
reshape reality, to see the irregular as regular and beautiful, as a necessary and coherent
rhythm. For Nietzsche our relationship with the work of art in which we "float and play
above it"36 is a way of thinking that retains or re-engages the child’s sense of seriousness
in play. The key elements to playful and artistic thinking for Nietzsche are mobility and
lightness, the ability to switch in a second from an absorbing and epic fight in which the
dinosaurs  storm  the  medieval  castle  to  the  question  of  what  is  for  tea  tonight.  For
Nietzsche we do not extend this playful approach to knowledge far enough - as adults we
take on the concrete skills we have learned, running our play shops and opposing our
thumbs like little pros, but we lose the sense that posting blocks through a hole or mapping
the human genome is a gay science - a game, at once joyful and serious.37 We must
32 GS §80
33 GS §110
34 GS §107
35 ibid.
36 ibid.
37 As we shall go on to see in the next chapter, the overman is the figure whose transformation of 
thought taps into this lost skill. Stambaugh notes that Nietzsche's "insight is that if God is dead, 
what we are 'left with' is not just the inevitable, unchangeable 'givenness' of what we think of as 
daily living. In other words, the real is not the given," but precisely what is not given, but 
transformed and created by human activity. "For this reason, for Nietzsche it is the artist who most 
closely approaches the overman, for precisely he can never regard what is given as what is real." 
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develop  these  inherently  artistic  talents  if  we  are  able  to  hold  onto  this  kind  of
transformative thinking as adults. We need to understand the world “as a work of art that
gives  birth  to  itself,”38 embracing  the  sense  of  the  artwork,  and  hence  the  world,  as
engaging and meaningful in a way that we are able to "float" or hover above. This is the
awareness of the world that we need to have if we are to think non-nihilistically, in a way
that allows us to find identities meaningful without any recourse to eternity, and can in this
way avoid being drawn into a jealous spiral which excludes everything else, including most
importantly their created nature. The unique capability of art is to continually strive against
our tendency to fall into solid and secure identities, by instead holding their created nature
before us as something we can affirm and take delight in. 
Nietzsche knows what he wants the new type of artistic love or affirmation to achieve. He
wants brief habits, rather than an obsessive millenia-long spiral of addiction, he wants a
type of thought that recognises our creative role in the creation of its “objects” but that
does not in so doing lay entire claim to them, that recognises their difference as well as our
entanglement  within  them.  But  although  Nietzsche  recognises  the  constitutive  role  of
rhythm within art as the process of making-perfect by rounding off, he also identifies a
darker side to rhythm. Here the problem is not that the creativity of rhythm deviates from
the continuum of becoming, as we find at points within The Birth of Tragedy, but is instead
due to the self-reinforcing tendency of the ictus that led to the degeneration into modern
accented  rhythm. This  negative  aspect  of  rhythm  seems  to  work  directly  against
Nietzsche's goal of a thought that can create playful rather than addictive identities, that is
aware of their created nature and can take them up or discard them at will. In this nihilistic
aspect of rhythm, the tensions we find within Nietzsche's earlier work on rhythm rise to the
surface.  Having  explored  the way in  which  rhythm provides the motor  that  drives  the
positive artistic aspects of our thought, we must now turn to the other side of the coin, and
see how Nietzsche in The Gay Science implicates rhythm in the development of nihilism.
(Stambaugh 1994:72-3) 
38 WTP §796 (1885-1886)
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Rhythm as seduction
In  GS §84 Nietzsche undertakes an investigation into "the origin of poetry." Up until this
point of The Gay Science, Nietzsche’s engagement with art has generally emphasised its
positive and creative aspect. But in GS §84 a more worrisome side of rhythm emerges as
he performs a genealogical critique of where this artistic desire comes from, attempting to
explain  why rhythm holds  such force for  us.  In  the previous section,  we identified  the
crucial role that rhythm performs in making-perfect or rounding off the identities we create.
Nietzsche here takes a rather different tone. He is very clear, however, that the origin of art
was  a  useful  one.  As  the  driving  force  of  identity  formation,  rhythmic  thought  is
instrumental in creating a world in which we are able to live. Nietzsche’s issue is with how
rhythmic thought achieves this, and with the specific relationship with the future that fuels
this enterprise. His investigation into the original "purpose" of rhythm starts by addressing
the argument that art has no purpose, and that we should view it as an irrational excess
that,  like  morality,  elevates humanity  from its  base preoccupation with survival.  These
"lovers of what is fantastic in humans" offer art, and poetry in particular, as evidence that
we are not solely motivated by utility, but that instead we are capable of something higher
than merely  scratching out  an existence.  Art,  according to the anti-utilitarian  view that
opens this aphorism, makes everything more complicated and elaborate than it needs to
be, and its impracticality is precisely what elevates it above other activities. 
But Nietzsche the genealogical diagnostician has no truck with this position. Just because
we cannot immediately see the point of something now, does not mean that it was forever
thus. Just as morality in its various incarnations has at points in our history been absolutely
necessary  for  our  survival,39 so  too,  argues  Nietzsche,  was  art.  Poetry  is  not  “wildly
beautiful irrationality”40 as the anti-utilitarian argument that Nietzsche presents here claims.
As we have seen, while rhythm is built from difference, from the irrational and irregular
beat,  rhythm is the process by which we shape irregularity as a unified regular whole,
rounding it off as a coherent work. During the first part of The Gay Science art is offered as
39 See GM II §16 for how bad conscience turned man into “a spectacle too subtle, too wonderful, 
too paradoxical to be allowed to be played senselessly unobserved on some ridiculous planet... as 
though man were not an end but just a path, an episode, a bridge, a great promise...” and GM III 
§13 on how “this ascetic priest, this apparent enemy of life, this negating one, – he actually belongs 
to the really great conserving and yes-creating forces of life...”
40 GS §84
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a corrective to reason not because it is antithetical to the rational obsession with truth that
led  to  nihilism,  but  because  it  is  a  more self-aware  manifestation  of  the  same fictive
impulse that motivates reason. But here Nietzsche suggests that this rhythmic process of
rounding-off is not just artistic, but superstitious:
In those ancient times that called poetry into being, one really did aim at utility, and 
a very great utility at that; back then, when one let rhythm penetrate speech - that 
rhythmic force that reorganizes all the atoms of a sentence, bids one to select one's
words and gives thoughts a new colour and makes them darker, stranger, more 
distant: a superstitious utility, of course!41 
Nietzsche identifies this sense of rhythm that penetrates speech, as we saw earlier in the
chapter, as the first impulse towards art as a way of perceiving groups of times. This is
how rhythm “reorganizes all the atoms of a sentence” - it does so in such a way as to
make us aware of the temporal blocks from which speech is built. But why does Nietzsche
call this specifically temporal activity that rhythm performs a superstitious utility? He goes
on to explain:
Rhythm was supposed to make a human request impress the gods more deeply 
after it was noticed that humans remember a verse better than ordinary speech; 
one also thought one could make oneself audible over greater distances with the 
rhythmic tick-tock; the rhythmic prayer seemed to get closer to the ears of the 
gods.42 
Rhythm, as the anti-utilitarians suggested, may not be the most straightforward way to
convey meaning. It does, however, repay the extra trouble we expend on it by fixing this
meaning more firmly in our minds. The meanings rhythm sets up for us have an enlarged
existence, extending further over not just space as the sound carries further, but also time,
as the rhymed mnemonic stays in our heads for longer. 
Rhythm  is  a  powerful  tool  of  creation  that  allows  us  to  give  our  thoughts  greater
perdurance, reaching further, lasting longer. But as such rhythm is also an instrument of
persuasion  and  seduction.  And  the  persuasive  nature  of  the  fiction  it  promotes  is  no
guarantee that it is good for us. Nietzsche’s reference to the “rhythmic tick-tock” in GS §84
should alert us to this, as elsewhere he writes pejoratively of the unimaginative regularity
41 ibid.
42 ibid.
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of modern rhythm as a “dreadful tick-tock.”43 Listening to and recognising a rhythm is a
learned behaviour, that we become more proficient in the more we do it, that reshapes our
ways of thinking and hearing to better attune to it. We noted in the first two chapters that
the force of both identity-formation and of how we perceive rhythm is cumulative, building
over many repetitions or beats. It  intensifies and becomes more effective the more we
think it,  just  as a piece of  music  gains strength the more we listen to it.  This is what
happens in the process of learning to love, as we fall deeper and deeper in love with the
identity we create, until we "no longer want anything better from the world than it and it
again."44 But this,  as we saw, leads to nihilism - to endless repetition that  starves the
identity,  rendering  it  meaningless.45 While  rhythm  is  inherently  multiple,  requiring  the
persistence  of  different  blocks  of  time  or  beats,  the  repetitive  way  this  multiplicity
individuates as rhythm is what gives rise to the ictus. As Nietzsche diagnosed in the case
of modern German music, this ictus-identity threatens to overwhelm the multiple rhythmic
identity that it emerges from. And the gravitational power of the ictus, as it draws the rest
of the bar or foot into its orbit, takes effect at an inter- as well as an intra-rhythmic level.
Rhythms exert this power over one another, as Nietzsche suspects when he examines the
effects of one rhythm on another, when "two interacting rhythms determine each other in
such a way that the more extensive rhythm divides the narrower one," such as in the case
of  military  music,  when  "the  rhythmic  movements  of  the  pulse,  etc.  (of  the  gait,)  are
reorganised by marching music, just as the pulse matches itself to the step." Nietzsche
43 In a letter from 1886 Nietzsche compares the “dreadful tick-tock” of modern rhythm (“das Tiktak 
unsrer Reim-Poeten ist auf die Dauer fürchterlich” http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-
1886,688 eKGWB Letter to Carl Fuchs 1886) to the richer rhythm of antique meter. This negative 
characterisation of rhythm as a “tick-tock” occurs several times in Nietzsche’s thought throughout 
the 1880s. In the opening poems of The Gay Science he stresses how the nature within him “balks 
at ticking laws and ticking clocks,” while in TSZ II ‘On the Virtuous’ Zarathustra mocks those who 
“are like run of the mill clocks that have been wound up: they go tick-tock and want to have their tic 
called virtue,” prizing as virtuous the observation of the customs that, as Nietzsche shows in On the
Genealogy of Morality, are indeed no more than the nervous tics and anxious flinches that have 
been beaten into humanity over time. These smaller human beings do not provide the kind of praise
that Zarathustra values or the kind of music to which his foot responds, “to such a beat and tick-tock
it wants neither to dance nor to stand still.” (TSZ III ‘On Virtue that Makes Small’). “Rhythmic tick-
tock” is Nietzsche’s way of describing our tendency to unthinkingly fall in with a beat and, as we 
shall go on to see, he thinks this internal “ticking clock” is a mark of human thinking that we need to 
overcome.
44 GS §334
45 We find this in the phenomenon of "semantic satiation" that occurs when we hear a repeated 
word or phrase so often that it becomes meaningless.
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describes the effect of one rhythm on another, such as the multiple rhythms of our bodies
as a "direct attack," in which "everything suddenly moves according to a new law" as the
old rhythms are determined or bound by the new.46 When running to music, the tendency
is to gradually fall in step with the beat, to attune the rhythm of our footsteps to the rhythm
of the music we hear. We perceive an initial resonance between the different repetitions
(our steps, and the beat of the music), and the effect of the rhythmic impulse to round off
or  make perfect  is  to  smooth  over the  difference  between them,  and  encompass the
irregularity  into  a  regular  single  beat,  to  “yield”  and “join  in”  with  a  dominant  force of
rhythmical identity:
46 "Ich vermuthe, daß die sinnliche Kraft des Rhythmus darin liegt, daß zwei aufeinander wirkende 
Rhythmen sich in der Weise bestimmen, daß der umfassende den engeren eintheilt. Die 
rhythmischen Bewegungen des Pulses etc. (des Ganges,) werden durch eine Marschmusik 
ahrscheinlich neu gegliedert, wie dem Schritt sich der Pulsschlag akkommodirt... Und da der ganze 
Leib eine Unzahl von Rhythmen enthält, so wird durch jeden Rhythmus wirklich ein direkter Angriff 
auf den Leib gemacht. Alles bewegt sich plötzlich nach einem neuen Gesetz: nicht zwar so, daß die
alten nicht mehr herrschen, sondern daß sie bestimmt werden. Die physiologische Begründung und
Erklärung des Rhythmus (und seiner Macht.)" (KGW 2:3:322). Miller (1999) highlights the 
importance of the notion of binding in Nietzsche's conception of the force of rhythm in his early 
notes, where the word Bändigung (rather than bestimmen) signifies a "momentary capture" of 
becoming, rather than "a conclusive tying down or irreversible domestication." Miller does not 
however cite GS §84, in which, as I argue, Nietzsche deploys the notion of rhythm as binding with 
the more sinister connotation of entrapment and control.
See also GS §99 “What happens when people of a higher culture and barbarians come into contact:
the lower culture usually takes on the vices, weaknesses, and excesses of the higher culture, on 
which basis it feels a certain attraction to that culture.”
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Above all, one wanted to take advantage of that elemental overpowering force that 
humans experience in themselves when listening to music: rhythm is a compulsion; 
it engenders an unconquerable desire to yield, to join in; not only the stride of the 
feet but also the soul itself gives in to the beat - probably also, one inferred, the 
souls of the gods! By means of rhythm one thus tried to compel them and to 
exercise a power over them: one cast poetry around them like a magical snare.47
This is the potentially dark side of rhythm, the unifying or homogenizing effect of the ictus
that is necessary to produce any semblance of form or identity in the world for us, but
which also threatens to occlude the difference of  anything that  is out  of  step with the
prevailing beat. This seductive, imperialising power is the first warning note of a dangerous
aspect of rhythm that Nietzsche highlights in this aphorism.48 In his quest for brief habits,
the seductive power of rhythm alone is reason to be suspicious of it. 
But there is another warning note that emerges from this aphorism, which is the reason we
have faith in its seductive power as something that does not only affect us. We thought
that rhythm could also seduce the world beyond us, because the world was composed of
gods - of beings like ourselves. Recognising the powerful effect that rhythm has on our
own  human  behaviour,  Nietzsche  claims  that  we  assumed  in  ancient  times  that  the
anthropomorphic  gods who ran the world  were equally  susceptible  to  it.  The utility  of
rhythm, which brought  it  into speech as the first  instantiation of  art,  was the illusion it
provided  of  control  over  the  world  outside  us.  The  bounding  power  of  the  ictus  was
something we felt  so powerfully  that  we heard in  it  a  common pulse that  ran beyond
humanity and into the wider universe. Speaking in verse was then not just an exercise in
artistically  shaping our  own words,  but  a way of  extending our  influence  to the world
around us - with a lullaby we thought that we could calm not just our children, but the ears
of the gods and the sea that they controlled. Rhythm was a “magical snare” that we cast
47 GS §84 Eldridge cites this passage, and writes that here Nietzsche "firmly locates rhythmic 
efficacy in the body" (Eldridge 2008). While Nietzsche does highlight the physiological power of 
rhythm (in addition to its cultural and historical dimensions, as Eldridge recognises), I am arguing 
that the physiological power of our organic perspective is something Nietzsche cautions us to 
question, as we shall go on to see in GS §109. As Marsden puts it, "the body ‘as such’ is not to be 
regarded as a given. If the body is as much a constellation of the rhythm of things as the items in its
perceptual horizon, then its status as a form of the same is as illusory as the things it surveys." 
(Marsden 2002:25)
48 A point raised by Rossdale (2015) who notes Nietzsche’s caution against the rhythmic appeal of 
herd mentality when considering the transformative possibilities of the figure of the dancer in 
Nietzsche’s work.
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around the world to induce it to fall into step with our desires, a force which  seemed to
extend through every action, for in something as simple as “bailing water, for instance, or
rowing, the song is a bewitchment of the demons believed to be at work here; it makes
them compliant, unfree, and a tool of humans.”49 The artistic and creative force of art that
we explored earlier in this chapter seems to be corrupted at its source, originally mobilised
as a tool of oppression rather than transformation. 
De-deifying the universe
Nietzsche's glimpse into the dark workshop where the ancient power of rhythm first drew
strength shows us a world of  sympathetic magic,  based on a misunderstanding of the
world filled with spirits, gods, and demons. But in the wake of the death of God, we have
surely been freed of such superstition. Book three of The Gay Science, however, opens by
warning us that the shadow of God may continue to appear for millennia, long after God
himself is dead and our belief in him destroyed.50 In GS §109 Nietzsche shows how far this
nihilistic shadow extends, revealing areas of our thought that are coloured by the memory
of God and the illusion of a universe just as sentient as that which we saw in  GS  §84.
These  are  ways  in  which  Nietzsche  thinks  we  misconstrue  the  Heraclitean  cosmos,
highlighting  how our  myopic  human thought  introduces  those bulwarks  and  "things  in
whose definiteness and endurance narrow human minds, like animal minds, believe," but
which  "have  no  real  existence."51 These  errors  of  thought  arise  because  we
anthropomorphise  the  cosmos,  attibuting  to  it  the  same  kind  of  motivations  that  we
perceive in our own actions. These are the shadows of God that we must defeat before we
can develop a kind of thought that retains difference in becoming, rather than collapsing it
into a mirror of ourselves.
Throughout  GS §109, Nietzsche enumerates a long list of the ways our tendency to see
the universe on our own terms is expressed in thought. Perhaps the most obvious of these
are the remnants of the feeling that the universe is against us, and that the events which
49 GS §84
50 GS §108. Nietzsche was continually at pains to search out these pervasive aspects of the 
shadow of the Christian God, from the English moralists who think they can hold onto Christian 
morality without God (TI ‘Skirmishes of an Untimely Man’ §6) to GM III §§23-4 on science and the 
will to truth as the latest manifestations of the ascetic ideal.
51 PTAG §5
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beset us are due to the whims of the cruel gods, in which “thinking that the world is a living
being,” leads to “attributing to it heartlessness or unreason or their opposites.”52 We give
the universe human motivations, but the "dead" inorganic world, as Nietzsche points out, is
neither at war with life, nor opposed to it - the organic is merely an extremely rare variant
of the inorganic. The cosmos is neither cruel nor irrational in its intent, it is not out to get
us. Instead, Nietzsche stresses, the cosmos is utterly unlike us, in that it has no intent at
all.  This superstition persists, even though we no longer attribute a divine motivation to
natural  events.  We  may  have  realised  that  the  lightning  does  not  flash  because  we
angered Zeus, but we have yet to grasp that the lightning does not "flash" at all. As we
saw in chapter one, the lightning is nothing more than the flash - there is no separate
agent who thinks the world would be improved with a bit more energy released into the
atmosphere, and in the ardent hope of realising this future, decides to flash. This is what
Nietzsche means when he calls upon us to “beware even of believing that the universe is a
machine; it is certainly not constructed to one end, and the word 'machine' pays it far too
high an honour.”53 The universe does not have any goal in mind, it does not try to produce
anything, be this the pain when I stub my toe on a coffee table, a flash of lightning, or the
final heat death of the universe - we, as human thinkers, are the ones who see everything
in terms of success or failure, a mindset that ultimately results in the nihilistic failure of the
world to live up to our impossible expectations. And, as Nietzsche writes, in cosmological
terms we are very much in the minority here:
Judged from the vantage point of our reason, the unsuccessful attempts are by far 
the rule; the exceptions are not the secret aim, and the whole musical mechanism 
repeats eternally its tune, which must never be called a melody - and ultimately 
even the phrase 'unsuccessful attempt' is already an anthropomorphism bearing a 
reproach.54
If we are to move beyond all-too-human, nihilistic thought, we must stop reproaching the
universe for no longer hinting at a divine plan for humanity. The universe is not a machine,
which Nietzsche understands to mean that it was not constructed with a definite end in
mind. Whatever its future may be, this future is not a purpose conceived on the basis of a
52 GS §109
53 ibid.
54 ibid. The unsuccessful "attempts" that Nietzsche speaks of here are Würfe, throws of the dice 
(Würfel), in contrast to the versuch or experiment that he uses to describe the rhythmic "attempt at 
individuation" in the early notes.
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present  or  past  intention.  Instead  Nietzsche  describes  the  universe  as  a  musical
mechanism, eternally repeating its tune, “which must never be called a melody.”55 The
difference  that  Nietzsche  is  trying  to  convey  between  a  melody  and  a  tune  isn’t
immediately obvious, but I would argue mirrors that which he draws between a machine
(goal-oriented  activity)  and a mechanism (non-goal-oriented activity).  A  melody travels
towards a resolution, just as a machine in Nietzschean terms is designed to do or produce
something. In his discussion of the origins of rhythm in  GS §84 Nietzsche suggests that
“etymologically,  melos means a tranquillizer, not because it is itself tranquil, but because
its effect makes one tranquil.”56 Melody, according to Nietzsche, is a machine designed
with  a  specific  goal  in  mind  -  to  sate  and  calm  us,  to  bring  us  to  a  state  of  restful
contentment,  resolving  to  the  tonic  and  releasing  the  tension  that  it  has  set  up.  The
musical box in contrast eternally repeats its tune, and will play and play for as long as the
clockwork  takes  to  wind  down.  The  process  of  thinking,  of  learning  to  love,  involves
delimiting a melody from the chaotic noise of becoming. But the initial moment in which we
“recognise” this melody is not the recognition of any pre-existing coherent identity with
intentions and goals. It is the creation of this from the endless, purposeless tune that is the
rhythm of becoming. The cosmos provides no resolution, no ending (whether happy or
sad), whatever we might project onto it. If we are to move beyond nihilistic thought, we
must not only find a way to abandon our resentment at its perceived malevolence, but also
reconcile ourselves to its very real indifference. 
But even after we have supposedly discarded this view with the death of the creator-god,
we are still  alarmingly  parochial  in our understanding of  the universe,  extrapolating  its
overall nature from the tiny portion of existence that we can perceive. The seasons go in
cycles? The moon revolves around the rock we inhabit, which in turn revolves around the
sun? Well of course, this must by how everything behaves! No, says Nietzsche. We must
also rid ourselves of the habit “of assuming in general and everywhere anything as elegant
as the cyclical movements of our neighbouring stars,” and “of saying that there are laws in
55 ibid. “und das ganze Spielwerk wiederholt ewig seine Weise, die nie eine Melodie heissen darf” 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-109
56 GS §84. It is worth noting that no other source (either contemporary or modern) supports 
Nietzsche’s theory about the origin of melos, which remains uncertain. Irrespective of the etymology
of melos, the point here is that Nietzsche in The Gay Science views melody as teleological 
phenomenon in which, as we shall see, our current rhythmical thinking is complicit.
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nature.”57 The order of eternal cycles is a rare anomaly, the “exception of exceptions”58 just
like the life that observes it, while “the total character of the world, by contrast, is for all
eternity chaos, not in the sense of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, organization,
form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called.”59
Rhythm, which as we explored in chapter two is according to Nietzsche an "ordering of
time,"60 and which provides the rounding-off  mechanism that gives form and beauty to
imperfection, must be located here as an aesthetic anthropomorphism  par excellence -
and not one that we have outgrown with the death of God, but one of which we must still
beware. The rhythmic wavebeat may be what seethes within the Heraclitean becoming of
the universe, but the rhythmic ordering that creates form within it covers it over, and makes
it appear not as the fluid difference of becoming, but as something fundamentally the same
as the thinking subjects that we perceive ourselves to be. 
Nietzsche describes these anthropomorphisms as explicitly aesthetic in nature. It is not
only  the lover who is blind,  but also the artist  who suffers from myopia in Nietzsche’s
account, seeing form and beauty where there is none. In GS §109 then, it seems that not
only our moral, but also our aesthetic judgments are anthropomorphic impositions on the
universe. Art may be a healthier, more creative way of thought than our old love of truth,
but  they  are  both  ultimately  human ways  of  misunderstanding  the  universe  in  human
terms. The problem is that we do not recognise our implicit judgments of the universe for
the  creations  of  human  perspective  that  they  are.  We see  ourselves  reflected  in  the
universe, but fail to realise that this is because it is a universe that we have created. And
so rather than treating them as fictions, we instead believe the universe to operate along
human lines, anthropomorphising and collapsing the world into our own point of view.
Nietzsche has warned us to beware of understanding the cosmos as having the sense of
agency or purpose that we attribute to ourselves, and of being composed of the laws and
regular, rhythmic cycles that we perceive in our own organic lives as well as our immediate
57 GS §109. Our assumptions about this kind of logical order to the universe is evidence of the 
"hyperbolic naiveté of man: positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things." 
(WTP §12 (Nov. 1887-March 1888))
58 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 KGW 2.3: 104
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cosmological surroundings. These are the “shadows of God” that currently “darken us,”61
and which keep us bound in nihilistic thought. This absence of any goal or recognisable
pattern inherent  in  the cosmos requires that  we rethink our understanding of concepts
such as creativity and novelty, if we are to achieve a better relationship of thought with
becoming:
Let us beware of thinking that the world eternally creates new things. There are no 
eternally enduring substances; matter is as much of an error as the god of the 
Eleatics. But when will we be done with our caution and care? When will all these 
shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have completely de-deified 
nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, 
newly redeemed nature?62
The “naturalisation” of humanity that Nietzsche will  go on to term  amor fati  involves an
understanding of the difference of becoming, shorn of the “deification” that sees it as the
mirror of ourselves. Adequately grasping this de-deified universe means understanding the
process by which becoming becomes in a manner that does not view this as the product of
any kind of intention. This is what leads Nietzsche to warn us of the danges of “thinking
that the world eternally creates new things.”63 As he makes clear in an unpublished note
from 1885, our current understanding of the way things change involves agency:
The world, even if it is no longer a god, is still supposed to be capable of the divine 
power of creation, the power of infinite transformations; it is supposed to 
consciously prevent itself from returning to any of its old forms;64
The  de-deified  universe  possesses  no  such  divine  power  of  infinite  creativity.  The
wavebeat of becoming is not an artist, but a “work of art” that does not intentionally create
but rather “gives birth to itself.” The continual change of becoming does not arise through
61 GS §109
62 ibid.
63 Which seems on the face of it a confusing statement, as Hatab points out that "given Nietzsche’s
promotion of creativity, one would think that a repetition scheme would not be his preference. Why 
not a model of eternal novelty, where time neither begins nor ends and issues forth ever new 
conditions, never to be transcended, transformed, reformed, completed, or annihilated? Would not 
eternal novelty be the more Nietzschean choice over the seeming constriction of eternal repetition?"
(Hatab 2008:156) As we shall go on to see in the following chapter, the “eternal novelty” that 
Nietzsche warns us of here should be contrasted with that which is “eternally the same” - the 
repeating moment of the generative force of becoming (eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 1881 
see ch 4 note 64)
64 WTP §1062 (1885)
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an act  of  conscious creation  in  which "the world  intentionally  avoids  a goal  and even
knows artifices for keeping itself from entering into a circular course,"65 but from another
source. As we shall go on to see in the following chapter, this source is the nature of force
in the will to power, which emerges as the moment.
Nietzsche traces the ripples of the shadow of God over the aphorisms that follow GS §109,
clarifying that we should not understand this lack of a divine eternal agent of novelty in
becoming as determinism. As we saw in chapter one with Nietzsche's unpublished note
“Against  determinism  and  teleology,”66 determinism  is  an  equally  human  way  of
understanding the world. Determinism requires cause and effect, a mechanism that is one
of the unproven “articles of faith”67 that shore up the everyday worldview. In our everyday
behaviour, 
We are operating only with things that do not exist - with lines, surfaces, bodies, 
atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces. How is explanation to be at all possible 
when we first turn everything into a picture - our picture! It is enough to view science
as an attempt to humanize things as faithfully as possible; we learn to describe 
ourselves more and more precisely as we describe things and their succession.68
All of our so-called objective knowledge, argues Nietzsche, is describing the universe as a
copy  of  ourselves  that  we  have  created,  a  relationship  with  becoming  that  has
“humanised” it and turned it into a self-portrait. This is how our belief in cause and effect
operates, as an externalisation of my consciousness of myself, as a separate entity with
the desire to affect another:
65 ibid.
66 WTP §552 (Spring-Fall 1887)
67 GS §121 
68 GS §112 
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...originally man believed, wherever he saw something happen, that a will had to be 
the cause and that beings with a personal will had to be operating in the 
background - the concept of mechanics was quite foreign to him. But since man 
believed for immense periods of time only in persons (and not in substances, 
forces, things, etc.), the faith in cause and effect has become for him the 
fundamental faith that he uses everywhere something happens - still today 
instinctively and as an atavism of the oldest origin.69
Cause and effect is the fiction of a world comprised of discrete entities, locked together in
a chain in which of one thing inevitably causes another. Nietzsche describes instead what
becoming is like “in truth,” without our life-preserving fictions: a continuum:
Cause and effect: there is probably never such a duality; in truth a continuum faces 
us, from which we isolate a few pieces, just as we always perceive a movement 
only as isolated points, i.e. do not really see, but infer … An intellect that saw cause
and effect as a continuum, not, as we do, as arbitrary division and dismemberment -
that saw the stream of the event - would reject the concept of cause and effect and 
deny all determinedness.70
Nietzsche  understands  becoming  as  a  continuum,  as  a  fluid  stream  of  movement.
Nietzsche’s goal is to find a way to conceive this continuum of becoming in a manner that
is less anthropomorphic, and that does not read into it the ghostly presence of subject and
object in cause and effect. This, as we saw in the first chapter, is one of the deep-seated
symptoms of nihilism that Nietzsche diagnoses. 
"We have forsaken the land," writes Nietzsche, "and gone to sea!"71 In our quest for truth,
we  have  undone  the  foundations  of  the  identities  we  had  erected  within  this  fluid
continuum of becoming, and left ourselves homesick for the land that we have destroyed.
We need to learn to navigate the world that remains to us, to naturalise ourselves in this
de-deified  nature.  The  question  is  how  we  are  able  to  perform  this  process  of
naturalisation, not with organic, physical nature, but with becoming. It was the separation
of our thought from the generative difference within becoming that led to nihilism, and it is
becoming that we need to incorporate or reintegrate within our thought, in an attempt to
give it  new life.  But  the role that  rhythm might  take within  this new kind of  thought  is
ambiguous. Rhythm seems to be at play in both thought and becoming, but in an opposing
69 GS §127 
70 GS §112 
71 GS §124 
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sense in each. The continuum of becoming expresses one aspect of rhythm, flowing and
unstoppable, which seems entirely at odds with the compulsive rhythm of human thought
that  thinks  to  impose  form upon  it.  In  the  last  chapter  we  explored  Nietzsche's  early
understanding of rhythm as the form of time, but a form that was conceived as different to
that which it represented, and in a manner that left Nietzsche decidedly ambiguous about
the status  of  rhythm.  We shall  now return  to  GS §84,  where Nietzsche's  goes  on to
suggest the temporal and specifically futural relationship he thinks is at play in the origin of
rhythm.
Rhythm as binding the future
As Nietzsche’s account of the origin of rhythm continues, we learn more about how he
thinks the seductive power of rhythm operates. In the early notes, Nietzsche vacillates
over the status of rhythm and the nature of its relationship with the time that it forms and
makes appear before us. Here in  The Gay Science  Nietzsche identifies more precisely
which aspects of  rhythmic thought  he finds troubling. In  GS §84 he suggests that  the
rhythmic identities we construct are an attempt to exert compulsion not just over the world,
but over the future. Instrumental in this process is the figure of Apollo, the god of rhythm:
To ask for a prophecy - that meant originally (according to the derivation of the 
Greek word that seems most probable to me) to have something determined: one 
thought one could force the future by gaining Apollo's favour - he who according to 
the oldest views is much more than a god of foresight. The way the formula is 
pronounced, with literal and rhythmic precision, is how it binds the future; the 
formula, however, is the invention of Apollo, who as god of rhythm can also bind the
goddesses of fate.
The Birth of Tragedy features a dialectical relationship between the two gods, Dionysus
and Apollo, who express the impulse towards undifferentiated becoming and differentiated
form respectively.  Throughout  The Birth of Tragedy Apollo  is predominantly associated
with rhythm as the "image-making power which they [the Greeks] developed to represent
Apolline  states,"72 although  there  is  also  a  point  at  which  Dionysus  takes over  in  the
Dionysian dithyramb, in which "'excess' unveiled itself as the truth" and "rhythm, which had
72 BT §2
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previously  moved  only  in  the  simplest  zig-zag  pattern,  now  loosened  its  limbs  for  a
Bacchanalian dance."73 
Here in The Gay Science, however, Apollo alone is named as the god of not only rhythm,
but also of foresight and prophecy. Rhythm, the way we perceive an irregular noise as part
of a regular beat, is not only what allows us to “predict” the future. In the ancient world
populated by gods, rhythm seemed to offer us a way to control the future. We perceived
the influence rhythm exerted over our own thought, and believed that rhythm would have
the same effect on a natural world that was the domain of the gods. The demon or spirit
who makes the water rise is in the same position as the jogger going for their morning run.
When  it  hears  our  bailing  song,  the  demon  will  regulate  its  pace  just  as  the  runner
moderates their steps to the music in their headphones, and we shall in this way control
the waves that threaten to overwhelm us, and temper them to our own ends. 
And if, instead of the spirit of a particular stream, we are singing to the goddesses who
control  the  strings  of  the  world  and  the  course  it  will  take,  the  effect  we  expect  is,
according to Nietzsche, just the same. The regular movements of spinning and weaving,
the  rising-and-falling  of  the  spindle  and  the  back-and-forth  of  the  loom  as  the  Fates
entwine the future - if we are able to pronounce the formula correctly, then these rhythms
too will be drawn into ours. The pattern of the future woven by the Fates will succumb to
our rhythm, just as irresistibly as the steps of the runner as they beat their path along the
side of the canal. Rhythm is what promises us this prophetic power over the Fates as we
attempt to make our thoughts "darker, stranger," and "more distant"74 by stretching them
into the future. In Nietzsche’s account of the ancient origin of rhythm, we love its seductive,
addictive power because it  seems to have the power to “mould the future according to
one's own will,”75 to force the Fates to favour us and dance to our tune.
Nietzsche’s account of the origin of poetry reveals an ancient understanding of rhythm as
an oppressive force which attempted to tame not only a world, but also a future, that was
73 The Dionysiac World View §2, written in 1870, unpublished during Nietzsche's lifetime (cited 
below as DWV). We shall return to the question of an alternative Dionysian rhythm which expresses
"excess" rather than boundaries in a moment.
74 GS §84
75 ibid.
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the remit of anthropomorphised gods. How this world behaved, how the future played out,
was understood to be the result of a choice made by these humanised figures and so we
mobilised rhythm as a weapon that could allow us to control them, and direct their choices.
This is the ancient power of our human, rhythmic thought, which is predicated on the belief
that the world we inhabit is the mirror of ourselves. When broken down in this fashion, any
faith in the superstitious power of rhythm appears ridiculous, but it also raises questions
about  the  efficiacy  of  our  rhythmically  creative  thought.  We  can  say  that  a  rhythmic
pronouncement is more  persuasive - and the rhythmically perfected forms that we have
created for ourselves were certainly capable (for a time) of persuading us. But to say that
rhythm has for this reason any more relevance to the world around us is based on the
fundamental misapprehension that this world is open to being persuaded. Why should we
believe that the rhythmic nature of our thought can fare any better with its relationship to
becoming, when the origin of rhythm is based on an attempt to crush any difference from a
world that it fundamentally misunderstands?76
Nietzsche classes the ancient faith in rhythm as a “superstition” to which even the wisest
of us occasionally falls prey, becoming “a fool for rhythm,”77 just as we have ever been
fools  for  love.  Although  this  ancient  superstition  now  seems  ridiculous,  it  "cannot  be
completely  eradicated,"78 and  as  we  saw  in  GS  §109  Nietzsche  believes  that  this
mischaracterisation of the world as a reflection of ourselves is still at play in the way that
we think today. We may believe that we have moved on from the time when we saw the
universe  as  a  collection  of  anthropomorphised spirits,  but  we still  need  to beware “of
thinking that  the world  is  a  living  being,”79 because our  thought  is  still  scarred by the
shadows of these anthropomorphisms. We are still woefully prone to understanding the
universe on our own terms, as a reflection of our own organic and rhythmic life, whereas,
as Nietzsche argues, it is anything but. Nietzsche's point is not that we still believe that
76 It is important to note that Nietzsche is not attempting to debunk the power of rhythm and art 
merely by revealing its base origins, for as he writes in the second edition of The Gay Science, “a 
morality could even have grown out of an error, and the realization of this fact would not as much as
touch the problem of its value.” (GS §345) By examining the presuppositions at work in the ancient 
belief in the power of rhythm, Nietzsche is instead questioning precisely what kind of values we find 
at work in rhythm, whether they are creative or repressive.
77 ibid.
78 ibid.
79 GS §109
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rhythm has the prophetic effect he describes in GS §84. It is that the rhythmic structure of
our thought still retains the anthropomorphic character he describes in  GS §109, and as
such must change if we are to create anything that can configure the differential and fluid
force of becoming in a new, non-nihilistic way. 
The problem with altering the rhythm of our thought comes from the force of the ictus that
Nietzsche  held  responsible  for  the  degeneration  of  the  ancient  sense  of  rhythm.  A
characteristic of rhythm that we saw when we explored the difference between ancient and
modern senses of rhythm is its enframing quality - it not only gives us the ability to create
what we think we “recognise” as patterns within becoming by hearing repetitions where
there are  none.  It  also  creates and reinforces  the structure  by which we select  these
patterns. Our proficiency in hearing a particular rhythm, or sense of rhythm, encourages us
to filter everything through this sense, and makes it difficult to hear or to think in other
ways. Our human perspective is one such enframing rhythm, which makes us judge the
universe in human terms - we unconsciously  give it  goals and expect it  to be working
towards some kind of purpose, seeing meaning where there is none. The problem, then, is
not  that  the  future  remains  unpersuaded  by  our  rhythmic  imprecations.  It  is  that  we
ourselves  are  all  too  susceptible  to  them.  Nietzsche  fears  that  it  is  precisely  this
rhythmically binding characteristic of thought that he describes in  GS §84 that holds our
thought back. 
Nietzsche's suspicion of this enframing, addictive aspect of rhythm emerges elsewhere in
The Gay Science. He presents  the rhythmic  prayers  of  GS  §128  as  a  repetition  that
produces stasis, encouraging the feet to keep still, not to dance. 
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...the formulas of prayer as a long mechanical work of the lips, combined with 
exertion of the memory and a same fixed posture of hands and feet and eyes! So 
they may, like the Tibetans, go ahead regurgitating their 'om mane padme hum' 
countless times or, as in Benares, count the name of the god off their fingers, Ram-
Ram-Ram ... - the main point is that this work keeps them still for a time...
...From such people religion wants only that they keep still with their eyes, hands, 
legs, and other organs; thus they are made beautiful for a time and - more like 
human beings!80
Repetition here functions in its controlling, binding aspect to produce a static form, to make
people “beautiful for a time,” but not for the time that is to come. It does not allow them to
transform, or to dance,81 but instead keeps them still and makes them “more like human
beings.”82 This is what Nietzsche diagnoses within the current rhythm of our thought - a
relationship with the future founded on the illusion of control, but which has the effect of
closing off any meaningful relationship with this future, and instead holds us back. Logic,
causality,  our  belief  in  eternal  substances and eternal  truths -  all  of  these are fictions
produced by the rhythmic operation of rounding off, of being able to see different beats as
a repetition of the same. The realisation of our own role in the production of the ideals that
oppress us should free us for the creation of new, more mobile fictions. But the seductive
aspect of rhythm makes it hard to discard the old shadows of God.
80 GS §128 
81 In the final book of The Gay Science, published several years later, the ability to dance to the 
rhythm of a thought is brought out as a means of evaluating its worth - see GS §366 ("Our first 
question about the value of a book, a person, or a piece of music is: 'Can they walk?' Even more, 
'Can they dance?'") and GS §368 where Nietzsche's foot "revolts" at the music of Wagner, which 
does not satisfy its need for "tempo, dance, march". Nietzsche concludes: "I wouldn't know what the
spirit of a philosopher might more want to be than a good dancer" (GS §381). Cohen (2008) argues 
that Nietzsche's concern is that we find the rhythms that are personally right for us, judging a 
rhythm to be "either beneficial or harmful depending on its complementarity or conflict with the 
music of our lives" (Cohen 2008:307). This sense of rhythm using dance as a means of resetting or 
restoring "the proper tension and harmony of the soul" is certainly what we find in GS §84. I 
however argue that we should be wary of Cohen's interpretation, which implies an essentialist view 
in which each person or soul has a proper tension, or its "own inner tempo" (Cohen 2008:307). The 
body, as Nietzsche stresses, is composed of a "host" of rhythms ("der ganze Leib eine Unzahl von 
Rhythmen enthält" KGW 2:3:322), and I argue that it is this inherently multiple nature of rhythm that 
attracts Nietzsche, and that we should therefore not seek to collapse into a unity. The sense of 
dancing that Nietzsche uses in book five is similarly transformative, and should be contrasted with 
the retrogressive sense we find in GS §84.
82 GS §128 
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We pointed out before that the weaponised rhythm that we find attempting to control the
future via its construction of static identities that reproduce our current goals seems at
odds  with  the ceaselessly  flowing  rhythm of  becoming,  that  Nietzsche  earlier  used  to
explain his Heraclitean conception of becoming. This, perhaps, is where we will find the
Dionysian rhythm that continually exceeds the boundaries set in place by the Apolline, in
which  case  we  could  rescue  this  Dionysian  rhythm  from  the  accusations  of
anthropomorphism  and  repression  that  are  levelled  at  rhythm  in  GS §84.  But  while
Nietzsche does draw a distinction between "good" and "bad" aspects of rhythm in the
works  following  The Birth  of  Tragedy,  it  is  not  upon Dionysian/Apolline  lines.  Apolline
rhythm is described as a "wave-like rhythm"83 just as is the "wavebeat and rhythm"84 of
Heraclitean  becoming  -  there  is  no  sense  of  a  metaphysical  divide  here,  in  which
Dionysian rhythm could be framed as the "good" rhythm of becoming, with Apolline rhythm
relegated to the "bad" rhythm of thought.  The Birth of Tragedy considered the "unified
stream of melody and the quite incomparable world of harmony" to be "un-Apolline,"85 the
province of Dionysus alone - yet in The Gay Science melody and harmony are no longer
privileged  phenomena in  which  "the 'Will'  reveals  itself  directly."86 Melody is  instead a
tranquiliser, the very human expression of the desire to appease the gods, and harmony
the narcotic state of the tranquilised - both driven and controlled by the seductive force of
rhythm. Finally, we can recall the account of the role of the  ictus  in the degeneration of
ancient  rhythm that  we saw in chapter two,  in  which we found that  the  ictus  was not
opposed to, but rather emerged from the transformative and excessive nature of rhythm
itself. In The Gay Science we find that we need to evaluate the rhythm of thought not as
Dionysian or Apolline, but based upon its relationship to time. It is impossible to entirely
separate the sense of rhythm as artistic creation from rhythm as control, because both are
expressions of the will to power - the rounding off that makes perfect and transforms via
art is also the rounding off that closes down, that cuts off a future that we cannot as yet
recognise.
83 BT §2
84 PTAG §5
85 BT §2
86 DWV §1
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This  revelation  of  the  shortcomings  of  rhythm  is  reflected  in  a  more  cautious  stance
towards  art  towards  the  end  of  book  two  following  GS  §84.  Nietzsche’s  previous
glorification  of  the artist-lover is  now more tempered -  the artist  is  not  necessarily  the
creator of  the most  beautiful  truth,  but  often a mere follower  of  fashion,  reflecting  the
judgments  of  “the  rich  and  idle,”87 producing  a  feeling  that,  while  powerful,  is  an
“intoxication.”88 The force of art can be that of a habit-forming narcotic that draws weaker
rhythms into itself, as “now one uses artworks to lure poor, exhausted, and sick human
beings to the side of humanity's road of suffering for a short lascivious moment; one offers
them a little intoxication and madness.”89 
Nietzsche's theories about the way our thought comports itself towards the future indicate
the precise aspects of the rhythmic and artistic anthropomophisms of which we should
beware. The seductive, addictive tendencies of rhythm close down the openness to the
future that the creation of brief habits requires. In the early notes on rhythm Nietzsche
highlights its potentially homogenising effect, in which minor rhythms are drawn into the
orbit of and eventually subsumed into the wavelength of a major rhythm. We now discover
in the The Gay Science that it is a specific relationship with time that seeks to control the
future that  produces this  dangerous side of  rhythm, turning the identities  produced by
rhythmical thought into greedy, imperial black holes that consume all meaning. It is this
aspect of our rhythmic thought that is complicit in our descent into nihilism, that stifles our
attempt to think becoming, and if we wish to overcome nihilism, we must leave it behind.
We are faced here with a question of the legitimacy of creation and style. Nietzsche on the
one hand claims that our thought should revel in its creativity rather than the adequacy of
its representational skills. But equally, there must be something that grounds or legitimates
87 GS §85
88 GS §86 
89 GS §89. Elsewhere in The Gay Science Nietzsche will identify Wagner as one such artist whose 
Schopenhauerian brand of romanticism offers the "intoxication, paroxysm, numbness, madness" 
that appeals to "those who suffer from an impoverishment of life" (GS §370). Cohen (2008) argues 
that Nietzsche's criticisms of Wagner's music are concerned with the way Wagner's use of rhythm 
disturbs the listener, claiming that "In the case of endless melody, Nietzsche does not explore it 
harmonically ... but rather turns the conversation to rhythm. In other words, even if the musicologists
and Wagner himself disagree, Nietzsche makes endless melody be about rhythm, and thus by the 
same token about time."
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our creations within becoming. We cannot sustain thoughts that we consider to be actively
opposed to becoming, if we are to have the faith in our creations that we need if we are to
avoid  nihilism.  Nietzsche’s  genealogy  of  anthropomorphic  rhythmic  thought  in  GS §84
taken with GS §109 precludes any such faith in the way we currently think becoming. The
anthropomorphised cosmos that Nietzsche describes has become less useful and more
dangerous to us, not because we have made it up, but because we have made it up badly,
as nothing more than a pale copy of ourselves. As such, the hollow universe it creates is in
no way equal to the task of supporting the meaning we need to invest in it. We know that it
is a fiction, but also sense that it is  bad fiction, and therefore cannot perform the artistic,
playful  suspension  of  disbelief  that  is  necessary  to  function  with  fictional  identities.
Listening  to  and  recognising  a  rhythm is  a  learned  behaviour,  that  we  become more
proficient in the more we do it as it reshapes our ways of thinking and hearing to better
attune to it. It is this addictive, pattern-forming aspect of rhythm that seems to bind the
future and turn it into a repetition of the past. Nietzsche’s main concern is to break this
cycle. This is why he introduces the thought of eternal return - to disrupt the moribund tick-
tock of the modern rhythm of thought, and make it possible to draw new rhythms from the
subrhythmic rumbling of becoming instead.
Eternal return as a new disruptive rhythm
Nietzsche is trying to make possible a new way of thinking, one that avoids the nihilistic
elements into which our current thought has fallen. This needs in some sense to emerge
from our existing way of thinking, otherwise we would not be able to think it - we would not
be able to recognise it as a thought (or in rhythmical terms, hear it as a rhythm). But at the
same time Nietzsche also needs to break the cycle of our current nihilistic way of thinking.
The problem he is struggling with is therefore how to emerge from, while also disrupting,
our existing patterns of thought. In his early notes, Nietzsche noted the transformative and
modulating character intrinsic to all rhythm, deriving from the irrational beat at the heart of
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even  the  most  apparently  regular  rhythmic  repetition.90 It  is  this  rhythmic  capacity  for
transformation that he draws upon with eternal return. 
In book four of  The Gay Science, Nietzsche focuses on the nature of repetition and our
relationship  with  the  past.  In  GS §335  he  stresses  that  we  can  only  ever  have  the
appearance of sameness, and that every act is unique: 
...there neither are nor can be actions that are all the same; that every act ever 
performed was done in an altogether unique and unrepeatable way, and that this 
will be equally true of every future act; that all prescriptions of action (even the most
inward and subtle rules of all moralities so far) relate only to their rough exterior; 
that these prescriptions may yield an appearance of sameness, but only just an 
appearance;91
As we have seen, it is the rhythmic practice of rounding off that produces this "appearance
of sameness." But it is just an appearance. Rhythm is built of difference, it must be multiple
if it is to be rhythmic. If we fail to recognise the fictional nature of our rhythmically created
identities, by failing to recognise that it is the rhythmic process of our thought that smooths
the difference out of becoming, then we shall “drag the past a few steps further through
time,” exhibiting the controlling relationship with the future that we find described in  GS
§84. Nietzsche wants instead to encourage a transformational move into the future:
We, however, want to become who we are - human beings who are new, unique, 
incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves! To that end we 
must become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary 
in the world…92
To become who we are we need first to discover “everything that is lawful and necessary.”
We discussed in chapter one how amor fati, learning to love that which is necessary, is the
90 As Sauvanet notes, while rhythm is an ordering of time, this ordering is repeatedly characterised 
in terms of a re-ordering, "reorganisation, new determination (einteilt, neu gegliedert, einem neuen 
Gesetz, bestimmt werden ...). There is an order, but this order can change, from one sphere to 
another, from the biological to the aesthetic, from the outside to the inside. There is an order, but it 
is a modifiable order." ("C’est pourquoi le texte insiste autant sur les notions d’ordonnancement, de 
réorganisation, de nouvelle détermination (einteilt, neu gegliedert, einem neuen Gesetz, bestimmt 
werden...). Il y a un ordre, mais cet ordre peut changer, d’une sphère à l’autre, du biologique à 
l’esthétique, de l’extérieur vers l’intérieur. Il y a un ordre, mais c’est un ordre modifiable..." 
(Sauvanet 2001)
91 GS §335
92 ibid.
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key to how we make things beautiful. It would seem to make sense that before we can
love what is necessary, we must first learn to recognise or discover it.93 What is necessary,
in thought as in becoming, is the constitutional moment of difference that makes possible
the rhythmic operation of making perfect. Only once we have recognised the necessity of
this difference can we turn ourselves to the task of  willfully  giving ourselves laws and
creating ourselves, as an artistic practice.
GS  §339 seems to offer the chance of escaping the patterns of the past.  The task of
seeing the beautiful, which will let us create ourselves and become who we are, is not as
Nietzsche recognises here purely driven by past knowledge, by a “good will”94 that is so
often a corrupted form of something much more sinister.  It  also “requires the rarest of
lucky accidents.”95 To make things beautiful,  to become who we are, we must learn to
recognise and to love that which is necessary. This is the lucky accident, the alignment of
all the aspects that come into play. And the beauty, the form or identity we create by so
doing, is anything but persistent:
But what does unveil itself for us unveils itself for us only once! The Greeks, to be 
sure, prayed: 'Everything beautiful twice and thrice!’ Indeed, they had good reason 
to summon the gods, for ungodly reality gives us the beautiful either never or only 
once! I mean to say that the world is brimming with beautiful things but nevertheless
poor, very poor in beautiful moments and in the unveilings of those things.96
There must be a break in the pattern - a moment in which chaos and chance, in which
becoming, enters the world and breaks through our pre-existing causal forms. The ancient
power of rhythm attempted to secure the return of particular events - but as Nietzsche
points out, the illusion of this possibility is dispelled in an ungodly reality, upon which the
seduction of rhythm has no effect, “for ungodly reality gives us the beautiful either never or
93 Domino (2012) writes that "to apply amor fati requires a means of differentiating the necessary 
from the accidental. If we cannot figure this out, either amor fati is ultimately incoherent or [as 
Domino will indeed go on to argue] it can’t be rendered from eternal recurrence." Domino interprets 
this as a call to love our actual, necessary life, rather than any idealised version of it. If however we 
take GS §109 into account, I argue that we must cease to think of necessity and accident as 
opposed in the manner that Domino suggests, and that instead Nietzsche is attempting to invoke a 
love of becoming as necessary.
94 GS §339
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
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only once.” Rhythm cannot affect the results of chance. What rhythm can do, however, is
help us understand what repeats. Rather than events, rather than the particular beat, it is
the division or separation that is repeated. In  GS §277 Nietzsche writes that "no matter
how  much  we  have  confronted  the  beautiful  chaos  of  existence  and  denied  it  all
providential reason and goodness, we still have to pass our hardest test" of resisting the
urge to interpret serendipitous events as evidence of divine guidance,  and instead "be
content with the assumption that our own practical and theoretical skill in interpreting and
arranging events has now reached its  apex."97 Rather  than an eternal  divine agent  of
becoming,  becoming  itself  produces  the  accidents  that  are  necessary  to  give  us  the
beautiful, when  "occasionally chance guides our hand, and the wisest providence could
not invent music more beautiful than what our foolish hand then produces."98 
It is at this point Nietzsche places a hypothetical situation before us. A demon appears,
who flatly contradicts Nietzsche's assertion in  GS §339 and says that there is repetition.
The Greeks desired every beauty return to us two or three times, but Nietzsche told us this
was impossible in the wake of the death of God, when we have realised on some level our
own role in the production of the forms around us. But  now the demon says that it  is
possible to have repetition - that repetition is more than possible, it is mandatory. What,
then, are we repeating, if it is not the beautiful product of chance? When we thought we
could importune the gods of the future, when we thought that we could rhythmically entreat
and persuade them to fall into step with us and repeat the rhythm of the present into the
future, we were persuading them to repeat an optimal action of our choosing - we were
selecting the beautiful form or moment, the future that should return. The reality presented
by the demon is not like this.  Everything will repeat, he says, and not just once or twice,
but forever - again and again, eternally. 
How,  asks  Nietzsche,  do  we  feel  about  this  prospect?  The answers  he suggests  are
dependent on which temporal state grounds our thought. The first state is as we are now -
in the “loneliest loneliness” of the nihilism of late modernity, where we stand alone, without
the omnipresent  companionship  of  eternal  God or  truth.  In  this  first  state,  that  of  our
97 GS §277
98 ibid. We shall go on to explore the importance of chance in Deleuze's reading of eternal return in
the final chapter.
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present, Nietzsche says that this thought “would transform and possibly crush you.” On the
face of it, the second possibility is predicated not upon the present, but upon the past - that
we may have experienced moments that we loved, moments that made it all worthwhile,
those  rare  moments  that  produced  the  beautiful  forms  for  which  the  Greeks  prayed,
rhythmically desired, to be repeated - moments which were so good, that the return of
everything else would be worth it, just to have these again. Nietzsche has said that this
kind of  return is  impossible  without  a god.  If  the second response to eternal return is
affirming  the  return  of  events  in  time,  then  this  is  what  the  demon  becomes.  The
affirmative  response  to  eternal  return  that  we  explored  in  the  first  chapter  therefore
requires not only an affirmation of the re-inscription of gods within the world, but that on
the basis of their presence, we affirm the whole of time, past, present, and future, on the
basis of a single moment in the past.
To create from the demon a new god, and to tie our affirmation of time to one single point
in the past - this seems to go against everything Nietzsche has so far argued in The Gay
Science about the need to reopen ourselves to a de-deified universe, and to resist the
nihilistic practice of treating a single moment as representative of an entire process. If we
truly  desire  to  be  transformed,  then  when  the  demon comes  to  us  and  asks  for  our
response to eternal return, we should presumably choose not the path of affirmation based
on the past, but the first option, allowing this thought to transform us, even if  this also
results in it crushing out the vestiges of human thinking. But this is not the answer that
Nietzsche  seems to  be encourage.  There  must,  therefore,  be something other  to  this
affirmation of the moment than the desire for the return of beautiful events. 
At this point, the original edition of The Gay Science performs its own transformation into
the very different rhythm of  Thus Spoke  Zarathustra. Nietzsche has set up the rhythmic
problem of thought over the course of  The Gay Science,  showing how we are still  too
beholden to the rhythmic thought patterns that work against transformation, in which our
"creation" of the world is no more than a recreation on the basis of ourselves, and the
future on the basis of the past. In order to to break this pattern, Nietzsche has to find a
new way for  us  to  shape  the continuum of  becoming into new,  and more temporary,
beautiful  forms. This is precisely what Nietzsche attempts to do when he develops the
second option, in which we affirm the thought of eternal return on the basis of the moment.
This is the second response to the demon that Nietzsche presents: the greatest weight,
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the thought of eternal return, that summons Zarathustra. We shall go on to see in chapter
four how Zarathustra’s experience of the moment in eternal return stages an interruption
into our existing rhythm of thought by reconfiguring our relationship to temporality. 
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4. Recapitulation: Eternal return as the confrontation of time in the moment
We first examined the thought of eternal return in chapter one, where we explored it as the
culmination of Nietzsche's investigation into thought as love, in which Nietzsche presents
us with the descent of our thought into nihilism, and names amor fati  as the new kind of
loving relationship with the world that he would like to put in its place. The thought of
eternal  return is  how he proposes to produce this  new relationship  with the world,  by
reconfiguring our current nihilistic patterns of thinking.  Using eternal return as a test of
affirmation, however, will  not produce this change if  we have not understood the initial
creative process that thought enacts upon becoming, as we saw when we explored the
criticisms of the anthropological reading of eternal return. Our exploration of the rhythmic
nature of thought over the subsequent two chapters helped us to understand in more detail
the task that faces Nietzsche, and which aspects of thought he wants to adjust with eternal
return. The problem with our current way of thinking is not just our inability to affirm the
identities we create, but how we understand our relationship with becoming, specifically
the rhythmic temporal framework that structures our thought. 
We see the problems within this relationship with becoming in Nietzsche's account of the
rhythmic nature of thought in  The Gay Science. Nietzsche recognises that the rhythmic
structure of our thought has artistic and transformative possibilities, but also that it is prone
to mobilising these in a retrogressive way, which prevents us from thinking the future as
anything other than a repetition of the past. This aspect of rhythm, which binds us to the
past, seems at odds with the other sense of rhythm as flow or continuity, which we find in
Nietzsche's characterisation of becoming. But these apparently contradictory aspects of
rhythm, as both flow and the binding of this flow into discrete points, do not correlate with
the positive and negative features that Nietzsche identifies. The impulse to flow beyond
any  bounds  motivates  both  the  rhythm  of  becoming  and  the  creative  process  of
transformation in art. But at the same time, the impenetrability of the flow of becoming
seems to offer no prospect of interruption in which the creative transformation of thought
can take place, and the artistic process of shaping or rounding off becomes a process of
gatekeeping or closing down. In both these aspects of rhythm as flow and form, therefore,
there is  the problem of  how to navigate our relationship  with becoming in  a way that
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provides a space for the creativity of thought, an act of creation that nihilism understands
as separate from becoming. 
In  order  to  address  this  we  need  a  new relationship  with  time,  one  which  offers  the
prospect of transforming our way of thinking out of its current nihilistic thought patterns.
We shall turn to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where Nietzsche uses eternal return to provoke
a different relationship with time. We shall examine interpretations of eternal return that
attempt to read it "literally" as a cosmology that seeks to realign us with the workings of
time and the universe.  On the failure  of  this  cosmological  approach,  we shall  instead
explore eternal return as a thought that develops a more radical reconfiguration of time as
"momentary,"  which  aims  to  disrupt  the  nihilistic  aspects  of  rhythmic  thought  that
Nietzsche  indicated  in  The Gay Science, before highlighting  the tensions that  I  argue
emerge through Nietzsche's presentation of Zarathustra's relationship with time in  Thus
Spoke Zarathustra.
Zarathustra and the gateway Moment
Immediately  after  Nietzsche  introduces  the  thought  of  eternal  return  in  GS  §341,  the
"tragedy begins"1 and we meet the figure of Zarathustra, as he decides to descend from
the mountains where he has spent the past ten years in solitude, in order to reconnect with
humanity  once  again  and  communicate  his  ideas  to  the people  below.  This  dramatic
entrance, as Nietzsche later tells us, comes at the highest point of nihilism at which the
distinction  between  the  "real"  world  of  eternity  and  the  "apparent"  world  of  forms
disintegrates, and both are destroyed:
(Noon;  moment  of  the  shortest  shadow;  end  of  the  longest  error;  pinnacle  of
humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)2
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, we find out what happens at the end of the longest error, as
Zarathustra strides  around a  biblical  landscape of  dancing  kings,  talking  animals,  and
other strange characters, to whom he presents his (often opaque) insights. One of these,
indeed "Zarathustra’s fundamental thought"3 if we are to believe Nietzsche himself, is the
1 "Incipit tragoedia" (GS §342)
2 TI ‘How the “true world” finally became a fable’
3 EH III 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody' §1
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thought of eternal return. In the figure of Zarathustra, we might therefore expect Nietzsche
to answer the question raised by the demon in GS §341 and indicate what he thinks our
response to eternal return should be. 
For  the  first  two books,  however,  Zarathustra  makes no  mention  of  eternal  return.  In
‘Zarathustra’s Prologue,’  Zarathustra emerges from his solitary mountain to speak in a
village square, and his first words are “I teach you the overman”4 - a figure who has, in a
shadowy and as yet undefined fashion, become something other than human. Zarathustra
does not  directly  say who or  what  the overman is,  but  instead uses this  new idea to
encourage his audience to reconsider what it is to be human. The "pinnacle of humanity"5
that we find in modernity should not be viewed as the goal of all previous history, and
Zarathustra instead asks the people in the square to consider that, just as "all creatures so
far  created  something  beyond  themselves,"6 the  human  can  (and  should)  in  its  turn
develop into something else. Humanity is not the end point, but instead “something that
must be overcome,”7 a transitional stage that acts as “a rope fastened between animal and
overman,”8 and  we  should  value  humanity  precisely  for  these  transformative  qualities
rather than as something that will eternally endure.
The overman is the one who has managed to move beyond the "longest error"9 of nihilistic
thought  that  characterises human thinking.  But  as such,  the overman is a problematic
figure to understand from within our still  all-too-human thought, one who seems on the
face of it  to check many of the boxes of nihilism - defined by that which they are not
(inhuman),  teleological  (a  goal  to  which  the human must  progress),  and transcendent
(providing a meaning to humanity from beyond the human). Zarathustra however is at
pains to stress that the overman should not be understood as anything transcendent in the
traditional nihilistic sense of a world beyond.10 The meaning that the overman provides is
4 TSZ I 'Zarathustra’s Prologue' §3
5 TI ‘How the “true world” finally became a fable’
6 TSZ I 'Zarathustra’s Prologue' §3
7 ibid.
8 TSZ I 'Zarathustra’s Prologue' §4 
9 TI ‘How the “true world” finally became a fable’
10 Stambaugh defines this potentially transcendent aspect of the overman as follows: "...there is 
nothing beyond man in the sense that there is no God of substance or world beyond him. 
Accordingly, for Nietzsche, the word transcendence cannot have its traditional meaning of naming 
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not a godly ascent into something that transcends the earth, but instead “the meaning of
the earth,” and Zarathustra implores his listeners to “remain faithful to the earth and do not
believe  those  who  speak  to  you  of  extraterrestrial  hopes!”11 The  audience  in  the
marketplace, unfortunately,  do not appreciate or understand his message. They do not
want to be transformed beyond the human, but instead crave the unimaginative and self-
satisfied mediocrity of the last human, a figure whom Nietzsche despises as one who has
lost even the ability to see beyond himself. Disappointed, Zarathustra retreats from this
initial skirmish, carrying the body of a literal “over-man,” a fallen tightrope walker, who lost
his struggle with gravity in a graphically catastrophic fashion. It seems that those in the
market place are not ready to hear about the overman, and Zarathustra sets off in search
of more sympathetic listeners, intending to show them "all the steps to the overman."12 The
thought of eternal return is the most crucial of these steps.
Zarathustra's first attempt to convey the thought of eternal return comes in book three, and
takes the form of  what  Zarathustra describes  as a  “riddle"  which  is  "the vision of  the
loneliest one,” that Zarathustra tells to the fellow travellers on a ship, addressing it beyond
them to the “bold searchers, researchers, and whoever put to terrible seas with cunning
sails.”13 The presentation of eternal return in The Gay Science was posed in the form of a
hypothetical question. Here, on the other hand, it is (as Zarathustra promises) a riddle - a
Lynchian (or, possibly better, Jodorowskian) dream-sequence in which mountains morph
into childhood nightmares. In his vision, Zarathustra is struggling up a mountain, carrying
the paralysing “Spirit of Gravity” - a dwarf, who jumps down from his bearer’s back when
some kind of being but, rather, acquires the meaning of what man does; or, rather, has never yet 
done but could do. Nietzsche states repeatedly in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 'Man is something that 
has to be surpassed.' I believe Nietzsche is striving for a new meaning of transcendence. This new 
meaning is the shift from thinking transcendence as something beyond man to thinking it as man's 
activity in transcending his human, all too human condition." (Stambaugh 1994:4-5) Stambaugh 
understands this kind of transcendence as self-overcoming, which does not go beyond the human, 
but is rather the most proper human activity.
11 TSZ I 'Zarathustra’s Prologue' §3 
12 TSZ I 'Zarathustra’s Prologue' §10 
13 TSZ III 'On the Vision and the Riddle' §1. The “loneliest one” is Zarathustra, who had been 
struggling in the preceeding aphorism with the issue of love and selection, and the "bold searchers, 
researchers" who have "put to terrible seas" are the readers of The Gay Science who have 
"forsaken the land and gone to sea" (GS §124), attempting to navigate the Heraclitean sea of 
becoming without the nihilistic charts and identities that formerly (mis)guided us.
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Zarathustra threatens to tell  him an “abysmal thought”  which he thinks  that  the  dwarf
“could not bear!”14 Here it is Zarathustra who takes the role of the demon who presents the
thought of eternal return in  GS §341, and the dwarf (rather than the reader, or indeed
Zarathustra’s audience) who is challenged to listen and respond. Zarathustra’s attempt to
explain eternal return involves a vision of a gateway: 
“See this gateway, dwarf!” I continued. “It has two faces. Two paths come together 
here; no one has yet walked them to the end. 
This long lane back: it lasts an eternity. And that long lane outward – that is another 
eternity.
They contradict each other, these paths; they blatantly offend each other – and here
at this gateway is where they come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed 
at the top: ‘Moment.’ 
But whoever were to walk one of them further – and ever further and ever on: do 
you believe, dwarf, that these paths contradict each other eternally?” –15 
The idea of eternal return is not as yet mentioned, but only suggested, with Zarathustra’s
question as to how these two contradictory eternities of the past and the future can co-
exist. It is the dwarf’s response that first raises (an) idea of eternal return, when he treats
Zarathustra’s “abysmal thought” as old news, contemptuously responding, as if it were so
obvious as to be mundane, that “all truth is crooked, time itself is a circle.”16
The dwarf’s dismissive attitude enrages Zarathustra - either this interpretation of the riddle
is not what Zarathustra meant, or the dwarf has failed to appreciate what it is about this
thought that should be so cataclysmic. Where The Gay Science provides two alternatives
of what might happen if we think eternal return properly (despair or rapture), Thus Spoke
Zarathustra offers  us  a  counter-example  of  a  character  thinking  it  inadequately.  The
response of the dwarf is clearly not the effect that Zarathustra (or, presumably, Nietzsche)
is after, but it  is not immediately obvious why this is the case, only that the dwarf has
apparently made it "too easy" on himself, merely going through the motions rather than
registering the “heaviest weight” of the thought. If we think it properly, if we put our backs
into  it,  the  implication  is  that  eternal  return  will  change  us,  rather  than  leaving  us
14 TSZ III On the Vision and the Riddle §2. Zarathustra refers again to his "abysmal thought" in 
TSZ III 'On Unwilling Bliss' and TSZ III 'The Convalescent' §2.
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
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complacently  indifferent.  So  Zarathustra  tries  again  to  clarify  the  significance  of  the
moment, and the eternal character of the paths that spring from it: 
From this gateway Moment a long eternal lane stretches backward: behind us lies 
an eternity.
Must not whatever can already have passed this way before? Must not whatever 
can happen, already have happened, been done, passed by before?
And if everything has already been here before, what do you think of this moment, 
dwarf? Must this gateway too not already – have been here?
And are not all things firmly knotted together in such a way that this moment draws 
after it all things to come? Therefore – itself as well?
For, whatever can run, even in this long lane outward – must run it once more!”17
The key aspect that Zarathustra wishes to stress is not, as the dwarf suggested, that “time
is a circle.”  The nature of  time in the abstract  is  not  what  horrifies Zarathustra.  What
shocks him are the consequences of what he suggests about the nature of time, which he
thinks  necessitates  the repetition  of  everything.  In  particular,  it  is  the  repetition  of  the
present moment that is the horrific part - it is this that he continually points out to the dwarf,
forcing him to confront it again and again in the hope that he might come to understand it
in the same way as Zarathustra himself: 
And this slow spider that creeps in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and I 
and you in the gateway whispering together, whispering of eternal things – must not
all of us have been here before? 
– And return and run in that other lane, outward, before us, in this long, eerie lane – 
must we not return eternally? –18
The talk of the spider, and the moonlight, and the moment, links Zarathustra’s vision with
the demon’s presentation of eternal return in The Gay Science, with Zarathustra taking on
the demon’s role as the teacher of eternal return. Zarathustra however goes further than
the demon, as his image of the gateway which separates the two eternities of past and
future suggests a possible rationale for why we should believe that everything eternally
returns. The demon, in his role as mythical being, was quite in character to just pronounce
the sentence of  eternal  return without  offering  any proof.  But  Zarathustra  offers some
thoughts to support this idea, suggesting that if the past is truly an eternity, then everything
that can happen, must already have happened - and yet, things keep on happening, so it
must be the case that they are happening again. Zarathustra also seems more personally
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
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affected by the idea of eternal return than his demonic counterpart. The demon of  GS
§341 asserted that he himself was one of the things caught up in eternal return, and would
return  eternally,  but  didn’t  seem  in  any  way  concerned  by  this  -  making  a  cameo
appearance within a single aphorism, the demon’s role was primarily that of a messenger,
and one whose own fate within  eternal  return was offered merely  as  an afterthought.
Zarathustra, on the other hand, is the central character of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, whose
many struggles and disappointments we have followed through the preceding hundred-
odd pages. Zarathustra tells us his vision of eternal return from the point of view of a fellow
sufferer - if the dwarf is a speck of dust who will eternally return, then so too is Zarathustra
himself.  As  such,  Zarathustra bears  the weight  of  both  delivering  the news of  eternal
return, but also of acting as the vicarious expression of our own likely reaction. 
It seems at first as if the thought of eternal return might indeed crush Zarathustra - his
voice gradually trails off in fear at the point where eternal return is named. But then the
scene changes - the gateway disappears, and Zarathustra is mysteriously transported by
the sound of a howling dog to another time, possibly a memory from his childhood, in a
manner that Zarathustra himself does not understand. The dog is distressed by the sight of
a man, a shepherd, who is choking on a snake that has apparently crawled into his mouth
while he slept. Zarathustra, realising that the snake has latched its teeth onto the inside of
the man’s throat, shouts at the man, telling him to bite the snake’s head off - that the
counterintuitive act of shutting the snake’s head, the pain, within him, is the only thing that
will kill it and loosen its hold on his throat.
The scene is frenetic, panicked, nightmarish - we, and Zarathustra, are whisked from the
desolate windswept mountain, in which men, dwarves, and spiders, may contemplate and
argue about the nature of time, to a chaotic noisy confusion in which Zarathustra and the
shepherd must act in the moment and make an instantaneous life-or-death decision. And
at this point, Zarathustra as the narrator of the vision steps outside it and addresses his
audience, asking them to “now guess me this riddle that I saw back then, now interpret me
this vision of the loneliest one ... what did I see then as a parable? And who is it that must
some day come?”19 We are about to find out, as we return from this brief aside, to find the
mood of the vision changed once again:
19 ibid.
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– Meanwhile the shepherd bit down as my shout advised him; he bit with a good 
bite! Far away he spat the head of the snake – and he leaped to his feet. – 
No longer shepherd, no longer human – a transformed, illuminated, laughing 
being!20
At this point, the vision, and the aphorism, ends. Zarathustra has been plunged into the
depths of despair by the insight that every moment, including the present, has happened
before and will happen again, before being confronted with a cataclysmic scene in which a
man is transformed into something “no longer human,” which leaves Zarathustra in a state
of longing to once again hear this laughter that is beyond our current human capability.
The vision of eternal return has been a painful experience, leaving him full of “riddles and
bitterness,”21 but whether this bitterness is caused by the thought of the return of every
moment, or the loss of the inhuman figure who followed this revelation, we do not know.
The connection of eternal return and the overman becomes explicit  at the end of ‘The
Vision and the Riddle,’  when the Spirit  of Gravity and the gateway with its two eternal
paths fade away to reveal the shepherd struggling with the snake. Once the shepherd
bites the head off the snake, he becomes a “transformed, illuminated, laughing being” who
is “no longer human” - he becomes the overman. Zarathustra clearly considers that the
“bold  searchers”  that  form his  audience  may  be ready  to  grasp  the  possibility  of  the
overman in a way that the listeners in the prologue were not. However, they only attain this
level of readiness after they have heard his account of the vision of eternal return. The
thought of eternal return leads to, or makes possible, the overman. More than this - if the
manner in which we think eternal return is to be considered successful, it must allow us to
understand the overman in a manner that is  not the reactive, teleological,  transcendent
idea  that  it  seems.  This  is  the effect  that  eternal  return  must  achieve:  to  change our
thought in such a manner that it  is possible for us  to understand our future other than
nihilistically. We said that eternal return is supposed to do something - this is what it is
supposed to do, and this is the criteria upon which we can judge its success.
The nervous tension generated by the vision of eternal return fills the remainder of book
three  of  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra as  Zarathustra  struggles  to  come to  terms  with  his
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
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“abysmal thought,”22 until finally he addresses it head on, is overcome, and collapses.23
When he finally recovers, he discusses the confrontation with his animal companions, the
eagle and the snake. Zarathustra describes how he despaired at the thought that, in the
vision described by eternal return, all human beings will return. What crushed him was not
that extreme moments of evil from human history would return along with the good, but the
“eternal recurrence of even the smallest,”24 the most mediocre and banal of humanity. This
nihilistic thought, that the return of everything means that “all is the same, nothing is worth
it,” was the monster that Zarathustra says “crawled into my throat and choked me! But I bit
off its head and spat it away from me,”25 just like the shepherd in his vision. Unlike the
shepherd,  though,  Zarathustra has not sprung up laughing from this experience.  He is
happier,  but  he is  also tired,  weak,  and still  shuddering at  the memory of  the nausea
brought on by the eternal return of the smallest man. Zarathustra’s animals try to cheer
him  up  with  a  more  joyous  version  of  eternal  return,  in  which  “all  things  themselves
approach dancing; they come and reach out their hands and laugh and retreat – and come
back. Everything goes, everything comes back; the wheel of being rolls eternally.”26 When
this fails to work, they remind Zarathustra of his destiny as “the teacher of the eternal
recurrence”27 and even present him with a script for what they think he should say, that:
22 TSZ III 'On Unwilling Bliss'
23 TSZ III 'The Convalescent'
24 TSZ III 'The Convalescent' §2
25 ibid.
26 ibid. This has a similar cast to the Spirit of Gravity's claim that "time is a circle" (TSZ III 'On the 
Vision and the Riddle' §2), and some commentators take Zarathustra's silence as a kinder, but 
equally discouraging response as his angry retort to the Spirit of Gravity - see e.g. Nehamas (1980),
Lampert (2017). Deleuze concludes that in the formulations of both the dwarf and the animals, 
eternal return "appears as a truth not yet reached and not yet expressed" (DR 370) because the 
song they make of eternal return is the "old" song of "the cycle and the whole, universal being. But 
the complete formula of affirmation is the whole, yes, universal being, yes, but universal being ought
to belong to a single becoming, the whole ought to belong to a single moment." (NP 72)
27 Nehamas also thinks he detects Zarathustra's disagreement with his animals, and stresses that 
"it is they, not Zarathustra, that declare that they 'know what you teach'," while Zarathustra "remains
silent and does not once acknowledge the view which they attribute to him." (Nehamas 1980). 
Marsden, on the other hand, implies that the animals speak with Nietzsche's own voice at least 
sometimes during this passage, at any rate in their insistence to Zarathustra that convalescents 
should sing or play, rather than speaking (Marsden 2002:119). It is at this point that Zarathustra 
calls them "foolish rascals and barrel-organs" (TSZ III 'On the Vision and the Riddle' §2), not 
following the presentation of their version of eternal return. Zarathustra is not ignoring the animals, 
rather he "did not hear that they were silent" and is "conversing with his soul" (TSZ III 'On the Vision
and the Riddle' §2), presumably as a result of at least parts of what they have been saying.
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the knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs – it will create me again! I myself 
belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence. 
I will return, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this snake – not to a 
new life or a better life or a similar life:
– I will return to this same and selfsame life, in what is greatest as well as in what is 
smallest, to once again teach the eternal recurrence of all things –28
Zarathustra, however, does not respond. It is not until many years have passed, at the end
of the final book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, that he is able to teach that “joy wants itself,
wants eternity, wants recurrence, wants everything eternally the same.”29 Zarathustra now
asks  the  question  that  Nietzsche  posed  in  The  Gay  Science,  whether  we  have  ever
“experienced a tremendous moment”30 that we would affirm, and in so doing welcome the
return of everything else along with it: 
Have you ever said Yes to one joy? Oh my friends, then you also said Yes to all 
pain. All things are enchained, entwined, enamored – 
– if you ever wanted one time two times, if you ever said “I like you, happiness! 
Whoosh! Moment!” then you wanted everything back! 31
Zarathustra’s presentation of the relationship between affirmation and eternal return shifts
from a riddle to a statement of logical consequences. In The Gay Science, the demon told
us that everything would return, and Nietzsche asked whether we would affirm one thing if
this also meant affirming everything else. For Zarathustra, in contrast, it seems that there
is no “if” about it - affirming one thing necessarily entails affirming everything else. 
In  Ecce Homo, where Nietzsche discusses the development of this thought with varying
degrees of hyperbole, he describes it as the “doctrine of the 'eternal return,' ” clarifying that
by this he means “the unconditional  and infinitely  repeated cycle of  all  things -  this  is
Zarathustra's doctrine.”32 But if it is a “doctrine,” in the sense of a unified set of teachings
that we are supposed to accept, it is not presented as such in  Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Nietzsche’s  use of  different  voices and styles throughout  all  of  his  work confronts the
reader with a very different experience to a more traditional  philosophical  argument or
essay.  Thus Spoke Zarathustra in particular provides an experience that is more akin to
28 TSZ III 'The Convalescent' §2
29 TSZ IV 'The Sleepwalker Song' §9
30 GS §341
31 TSZ IV 'The Sleepwalker Song' §10
32 EH III ’The Birth of Tragedy’ §3
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reading a novel, in which what the different characters say may not be what the author
thinks, but nonetheless combines to present us with the author’s view of a possible world.
Even after having read what Nietzsche has to say about eternal return, we are therefore
still left with the task of working out what precisely the thought of eternal return is.
Nietzsche is explicit about this need for us as readers to do some work, presenting the
thought of eternal return as something that specifically demands a response - whether this
be from the reader of The Gay Science (“What if this happened? What would you do?”) or
Zarathustra’s  audience,  the  “bold  ones”  on  the  ship,  and  any  other  “searchers”  and
“researchers” who may be listening (“Now guess me this riddle that I saw back then, now
interpret me this vision of the loneliest one!”)33 Whether it is as a hypothetical question, or
a riddle, eternal return is presented in a way that does not tell us what it is, but instead
asks us to work this out. In chapter one, we explored the attempts to interpret the demon's
question  in  GS §341  as  a  test  of  affirmation,  but  concluded  that  the  anthropological
readings of eternal return did not do enough to call into question the existing structure of
our  thought.  As  I  have  argued,  Nietzsche  understands  the  structure  of  thought  as
rhythmical in nature. Nietzsche's insight that rhythm is both an attempt at individuation,
and the form of time, indicates it is the nature of this rhythmical and temporal structure that
must  be  challenged  if  we  are  to  overcome nihilism.  We shall  therefore  now examine
interpretations of eternal return which argue that the affirmation involved in eternal return
involves a disruption of our everyday theory of time.
Zarathustra's exploration of the way the gateway "moment" interacts with the competing
eternities of past and future explicitly identifies eternal return as an engagement with time.
However Nietzsche never develops a formal theory of time,34 so our first task is to uncover
Nietzsche's understanding of time and the role it plays in the relationship between thought
and becoming. Nietzsche's conception of the role of time is broadly based on that of Kant,
via Schopenhauer,35 in the sense that he thinks that time is not something "in itself," but
33 TSZ III On the Vision and the Riddle §2
34 As several commentators who have set themselves the task of constructing such a theory 
recognise (see for example Stambaugh 1987:10, Moles 1990:223 and Richardson 2009)
35 As Stambaugh argues, Schopenhauer's own understanding of time is modulated from Kant via 
Hegel. Kant introduces the idea of time as the form that structures sensibility, which Hegel 
incorporates within his account of the dialectical unfolding of Absolute Spirit in time, in which time 
140
something  that  structures  our  thought.36 However,  Kant  takes  pains  to  ensure  some
objectivity to time as a structure, drawing on causality, which he views as a category of the
understanding, in order to "make the empirical cognition of temporal relations (universally)
valid  for  all  time,  thus  objectively  valid."37 Nietzsche,  as  we  have  seen,  shows  that
causality is a product of the separation of doer from deed that inheres within our own
thought. Causality, for Nietzsche, has no place in the undivided flow of becoming, and as
such it  cannot provide any guarantee of objective and universal validity.38 The fictional,
rather than categorial, nature of causality opens up the possibility that not only is there no
time "in itself," but that the way time structures our thought may also vary. This, as we saw
in chapter two, is what Nietzsche detects when he examines the differences between the
ancient and modern senses of rhythm, and the correspondingly different senses of time
that these rhythmic senses promote. Earlier in his career, Nietzsche conceived this change
as a degredation,  in  which our sense of  time becomes less "pure" with the increased
prominence of the  ictus. But as we saw in chapter three, when Nietzsche takes up the
question of rhythm again in  The Gay Science, it  is brought to bear on a conception of
becoming that is very different to his earlier Schopenhauerian metaphysics. The difference
between ancient  and modern temporal structures can no longer be judged in terms of
adequation to a "pure" sense of time, but must instead be evaluated on the basis of its
transformative  potential  for  thought,  and  the  quality  of  the  structure  it  provides.  The
relationship to the future that Nietzsche examines in GS 84 was revealed as fundamentally
unsuited to this task, seeking to reproduce rather than to create. At the end of book four of
structures the dialectical process of sublation of Aufhebung via "the negation of the negation" 
(Stambaugh 1987:13). It is this that suggests to Schopenhauer "the temporal character of the 
abstraction of consumption" (Stambaugh 1987:13) in which he conceives time as that which 
continually destroys (see also Stambaugh 1988:64ff).
36 As Small puts it, "for Nietzsche, becoming is a fact but time is an interpretation" in which "the 
conceptual structures of temporality - that is, the categories of earlier and later, and of past, present 
and future" are not "to be taken simply as descriptions of reality, or as generalizations from 
perception and observation. Rather, they have the properties of what Nietzsche calls 
'perspectives.'" (Small 2010:2)
37 Kant 1998:A211
38 Nietzsche does provide an account of how our sense of objective time arises, which as Moles 
shows comes about through a pragmatic effect of the herd mentality in which "arbitrary stipulations" 
such as our sense of time are gradually shaped into a common sense of time through "a constant 
and deliberate effort on the part of the dominant members of the group to eliminate those 
individuals whose perception of the world was different," thereby accomplishing a "uniform mode of 
perception, on which the vast majority could agree" (Moles 1990:230)
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The Gay Science Nietzsche introduces the thought of eternal return as that which may be
able to change our temporal structure, and in so doing change our thought as well. This is
what we shall go on to explore in the remainder of this chapter.
The cosmological reading of eternal return as cyclical time
Having realised that we must understand eternal return as a revised theory of time, we can
now return to the question of interpretation. The "cosmological" reading has in some ways
the most apparently straightforward way of reading eternal return, which is to take what the
various  characters  say  about  the  structure  of  time  at  face  value.  On  this  reading,
Nietzsche's goal is to realign humanity with a de-deified world by presenting us with a
cosmology that shows us how time "really" works, as something that forbids any lingering
nihilistic tendencies towards the teleology or persistent identities which, as we have seen,
have no place in becoming. When the demon in The Gay Science tells us that everything
will take place again just as it already has - not once, but “innumerable times again”39 - it is,
on  this  reading,  also  Nietzsche  who  tells  us  this.  When  Zarathustra  asks  “must  not
whatever can happen, already have happened?”40 it is Nietzsche, too, who suggests this
idea to us. Nietzsche after all  refers to not just Zarathustra, but also himself  as “I,  the
teacher  of  the  eternal  recurrence,”41 and  if  he  is  teaching  the  idea  of  eternal  return
anywhere, presumably it is here. 
If we understand eternal return as a cosmology, rather than as a thought experiment, it
does indeed disrupt our everyday experience of time as a unidirectional line in which one
moment  follows another.  In  this  everyday understanding,  time is  thought  as a  type of
container, full of the events or things that happen “in” time. This impression of time as a
unidirectional line brings with it two assumptions. Firstly, the line or flow of time cannot be
broken - one moment will always succeed the previous one. Our inability to stop or pause
time is so ingrained that such a thing is unimaginable - the way that time structures our
experience and thought  means that  without  time,  that  experience disappears.  Science
fiction tropes that involve the stoppage of time only ever stop time for other people - the
protagonists and the viewer or reader continue to experience their own time, in which they
39 GS §341
40 TSZ III On the Vision and the Riddle §2
41 TI ‘What I Owe the Ancients’ §5
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can wander through an interrupted world of birds frozen mid-flight and men arrested mid-
fall  (gravity  also  takes  a  rest  with  time).  We  may  be  able  to  imagine  (and,  when
approaching a deadline,  fervently desire)  the temporary cessation of time,  but  only for
other people, while we are left to finish our essay or loot the mall in (literally) our own time.
The halt of time as it applies to us, on the other hand, means a halt in our own thinking,
after which we blink back on again like a clock after a power cut, and must use the cues
from our surroundings and our own body to determine the passage of  the intervening
hours. Everything we experience, we do so in time, and to imagine it stopping in such a
way that we are present to experience it is inconceivable.
Secondly, each distinct point in time is unrepeatable - once a moment has flowed passed,
it stays in the past. This notion of the uniqueness of each moment is not as immediately
obvious  because,  viewed retrospectively,  events  that  we experience  or  are  told  about
within time seem to have a certain similarity - the alarm clock goes off every morning, the
start of term comes round again, fashions and political trends recur every few years or
even centuries. But the place these repetitions hold in time guarantees their individuality.
The  10,000th  bowl  of  cornflakes  we  pour  ourselves  in  the  morning is  different  to  the
10,001st, the flared trousers worn in 1975 are different to the same trousers worn in 1995,
or even 2015, because the moments in which they appear are different moments in time,
which carry the history of the preceding moments along with them. We can perceive this
uniqueness in our experience of the present, which has an entirely different character to
the past, irrespective of what happens in it. The action of breathing in and out feels in one
sense the same as the breath I took a moment ago - and if I look back in five minutes time
and try to distinguish one breath from another, they will indeed all blur into repetitions of
the same action. But in the moment in which I experience it, there is no confusion. I do not
mistake that which I am doing now, for that which I did a moment before. Even as an old
argument  starts  up,  and I  think  “here we go again,”  I  am not  experiencing  the same
moment as before, but a new instance of the argument, with the weight of all the previous
remarks bundled into it. 
Our everyday experience of time therefore has these two characteristics: that time is an
uninterruptable  continuum  and  that  each  moment  is  unique  and  unrepeatable.
Zarathustra’s  description  of  the  past  and  the  future  as  “two  eternities”  joined  by  the
gateway of the present moment, strange as it may be, functions as a visual representation
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of this everyday understanding of time as an unstoppable linear progression. We cannot
imagine anything outside time (we cannot wander off the paths, onto the surrounding rocky
terrain of the mountain), and we cannot imagine a state before time began, nor what or
how anything might continue to exist if time comes to an end. One moment has always
been and always will be followed by another, and so the past and the future do indeed
therefore  seem  to  stretch  on,  eternally  leading  away  from  each  other  in  opposite
directions.
The everyday experience of time unravels as Zarathustra examines the gateway and tries
to communicate its significance to the Spirit of Gravity:
...behind us lies an eternity. 
Must not whatever can already have passed this way before? Must not whatever 
can happen, already have happened, been done, passed by before?
And if everything has already been here before, what do you think of this moment, 
dwarf? Must this gateway too not already – have been here?42
If the past is an eternity, an infinite amount of time without limit, then how can there be
anything that happens that it  does not already contain? There is time for  everything to
happen  in  eternity,  and  so,  everything  that  could  ever  happen  must  have  already
happened, in the past. We would seem to find ourselves standing at the end of history, at
a point in which everything, meaningful or otherwise, has already taken place, if it were not
for the future. The future is also an eternity, and so is subject to the same logic, stretching
on forever, with time for every conceivable event to take place. Everything  has already
happened, but everything is also still about to happen. 
Everything happens in the past, and everything happens in the future - in other words,
everything  must  repeat.  This  point  is  brought  out  by  the  contradiction  of  the  “two
eternities,” an oddness that Zarathustra stresses to the dwarf. Eternity is a time without
limits, a time without end. How, then, can there be two of them? As eternity, each could be
supposed to be unchallenged in the domain of time - but instead they “come together” and
“blatantly offend each other”43 in the present. The two paths meet in the gateway as rivals,
each blocked by the other in their attempt to encroach on the other’s territory and claim it
42 TSZ III On the Vision and the Riddle §2
43 ibid.
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as their natural right. But although the separation of the gateway makes the paths of the
past  and  future  appear  completely  distinct  and  to  “contradict”  each other,  Zarathustra
seems to suggest that this is ultimately an illusion - that if you were to set off walking along
the  path  of  the  future  (as  we,  living  our  lives  in  time,  are  indeed  doing)  you  would,
eventually, find yourself walking along the path of the past and approaching the present
moment again. If  the past must always contain everything, and the future must always
contain everything, the only way to reconcile this is if they are, in fact, the same thing, the
same path.
According to the cosmological reading of eternal return, this is Nietzsche’s philosophy of
time,  his  response  to  the  problem  of  the  two  eternities,  and  the  solution  to  the
“contradiction” of the moment. The only way the past and future can both be an eternity,
can both contain every moment, is if they loop back on themselves, becoming part of the
same eternal cycle. The unstoppable nature of time, which seems to be leading the future
ever further from the past, ultimately makes this distance impossible. Nietzsche therefore
seems to be making the point that the two aspects of our everyday understanding of time
contradict each other. If time is an eternity without end, then there must be repetition within
this. We cannot have it both ways - time cannot be both unstoppable and unrepeatable. In
this  understanding  of  eternal  return  as a cosmology,  we  can only  have eternity  if  we
abandon the fiction that each moment is unique.
This is, admittedly, a lot to extract from Zarathustra’s poetic vision of the gateway on the
mountain, and in any case only indicates the apparent impossibility of the everyday view of
time  as  a  linear  progression.  It  may  (if  we  go  along  with  Zarathustra’s  argument)  be
logically incoherent to say that time is both unstoppable and unrepeatable, but all this does
is  tell  us  that  our  everyday  understanding  of  time  is  inconsistent,  which  (given  the
problems with our everyday understanding of pretty much everything else) doesn’t come
as a massive shock. Why should we assume that eternity and the unstoppable nature of
time are worth holding onto, if the unique nature of every moment is not? Generally the
cosmological  reading  claims  to  find  support  for  this  interpretation  of  Zarathustra’s
argument from a number of “proofs” of eternal return in the unpublished notes.44 In these,
44 With the exception of Loeb, who attempts to draw the cosmological reading primarily from the 
published material, arguing that Zarathustra’s dialogue with the Spirit of Gravity forms a "dialectical 
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Nietzsche sets out  the consequences of  a mechanistic  understanding of  the universe.
These focus on the contradiction between infinite time, and the finite amount of force that
there is to produce events within this time, echoing Zarathustra’s suggestion that, given an
eternal stretch of time, we would run out of things to happen. In these notes, Nietzsche
sets out two initial presuppositions: that time is infinite, but that the possible combinations
of states of energy is finite.45 Therefore - these combinations must repeat. There is no way
for time to continue on its unstoppable progress, with its insatiable demand for moments to
fill it, unless these moments are recycled, repackaged, and the old replayed as new. 
Taken as a viable model of time in this cosmological form, however, eternal return has not
been very convincing.46 Most cosmological readings do not attempt to defend it as such.
They try instead to show how this understanding of eternal return functions within the rest
of Nietzsche's thought as a counter to nihilism, focusing on the implications a cosmological
eternal return would have for our thought if it were true. If we accept that time truly does
behave in the cyclical manner described by eternal return as a cosmology, then this would
indeed have radical  consequences for  the way we understand our identity,  because it
would dispel the notion that we can find any meaning outside ourselves, in either an origin
or an end goal. We could no longer privilege a conservative approach because it more
closely reflects the “proper” way of doing things, or a progressive approach that sees us
and deductive proof of eternal recurrence that assumes relational time and causal entanglement 
and that closely resembles the proofs Nietzsche sketched in his notes" (Loeb, 2013). Given the 
force with which Nietzsche warns us against attributing either causality or cyclical patterns to the 
nature of becoming, however, this is hard to accept, as we shall go on to explore in a moment.
45 See Krueger (1978) for a summary of the unpublished passages that constitute Nietzsche's 
"proof" of eternal return as a cosmological doctrine. Both Krueger (1978) and Oger (1997) point out 
that often within the same fragment, Nietzsche questions the cosmological interpretation that the 
note has been taken to support.
46 See Simmel (1986) and Danto (2005) for refutations of Nietzsche's "proof" of eternal return, 
which show that the proofs make certain unsustainable presuppositions. Even with commentators 
such as Loeb (2013) who attempt to defend eternal return as a cosmology, the bulk of their efforts 
are directed towards showing whether Nietzsche could have taken it seriously given the scientific 
knowledge of his day, rather than attempting to convince a modern-day reader that they should do 
so. Widder however argues that the failure of the unpublished proofs does not signal the failure of 
eternal return within a mechanistic worldview, but rather Nietzsche’s demonstration of the failure of 
mechanism itself (Widder 2008:7), and that mechanism alone is unable to explain the action of 
force without the presence of the differential principle of the will to power (WTP §619 (1885)). In the 
next section we will explore a different theory of time that incorporates the emergence of forces 
from the will to power. 
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moving ever-closer to a future ideal. Neither future nor past exist in this sense, if we accept
the cosmological account of time continually circling back on itself - sure, there are events
that are still to come, but they are the same as the events that have already happened.
Time in this cyclical eternal return is not a straight line that has been joined together, so
there is no initial link that we can mark as it goes past - there is no start to it, and no end,
for each link is, and has always been, determined by the link before, just as much as it
determines the link that follows.47 
Equally bound up with accepting this cosmological version of eternal return is the need to
reassess the value we place on the perdurance of identity. Not only would I no longer have
the crutch of valuing something for the wealth of history behind it, or for the promise of
something else to which it might lead - I would also have to accept the ephemeral nature
of anything I might value. If I, or indeed anyone else, were to become capable of affirming
life  for  itself,  this  transformation  would  come  with  the  knowledge  that  it  is  a  fleeting
transformation. Part and parcel of affirming things for themselves, as Nietzsche insists, is
affirming "the values of the briefest and most transient, the seductive flash of gold on the
belly of the serpent vita,”48 and the nature of a cosmological eternal return would seem to
prevent any other kind of affirmation, through the knowledge that any transformation into a
new way of thinking would be succeeded, in its turn, by a chain of events leading us back
to where we are now. Zarathustra indicates the difficulty of an affirmation of transience
drawn from this cyclical cosmology. He is particularly horrified by the idea that the last man
will also recur eternally, not just because the nature of eternal return is that everything will
return, every miserable life and wretched torturous death (horrific enough as this is). It is
also  more particularly  that  the last  man is  the height  of  nihilism that  we are currently
struggling to overcome. With the cosmological reading, for all the transformative effort that
we  put  in  to  wresting  our  thought  out  of  its  current  self-destructive  grind  and moving
47 Loeb (2013) makes this point when defending Nietzsche, examining the claim that we can have 
no memory of previous iterations of eternal return. The argument is that, if we were to have a 
memory of a previous repetition, this would make the repetition containing the memory different to 
the one that is remembered. This however assumes an ‘original’ version of the event, which is then 
repeated with a memory of the original, which then is in turn possibly repeated with a memory of the
memory of the original. Instead, as Loeb says, there is no original point in eternal return. All 
iterations of the event contain a memory of a previous event - these memories are themselves 
events, and loop back in a circle just as the events themselves do.
48 WTP §577 (Spring-Fall 1887)
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beyond this, we would nevertheless at some point be back exactly where we are now.
Again. And again. Without any hope of altering this pattern. This is what we must affirm, if
we accept the cosmological version of eternal return as an accurate description of time. By
accepting the finitude of all that we currently perceive as enduring, we would finally destroy
the nihilistic opposition of enduring being to the transience of becoming, thereby bringing
our thought into line with the continual flux that is all that is ever, really, eternal.49
The cosmological version of eternal return therefore does indeed appear to disrupt two
main attributes of nihilistic thought that Nietzsche identified in  The Gay Science, namely
the attribution of meaning due to a cause or goal outside the world, and our bias towards
persistent  identities,  which grow bloated and immobile  over  time.  With  a cosmological
eternal return, there would be no way to prioritise one moment over another,  because
there would be no precedence within time. We would be forced to realise the goallessness
or meaninglessness of becoming, and finally accept that we are the ones who create this
meaning ourselves.50 But while it would remove any element of teleology from becoming
and (on one level) seem to deny the possibility of any perduring forms, the cosmological
reading does not achieve Nietzsche's other important  requirements of  a new theory of
time. It does not allow us to affirm time in its movement of passing from one moment into
the next, instead requiring us to stand outside the process. And despite its disruption of the
enduring status of identities and dissolution of goals,  the theory of time we find in the
cosmological  reading  of  eternal  return  is  still  guilty  of  an  anthropomorphic
mischaracterisation of the nature of becoming and the creation of  a new impermeable
identity in the inescapable cycle of time.
49 This is why Simmel reads eternal return as "a synthesis of the need for finitude and the need for 
infinity on the highest metaphysical level" that resolves the ancient dispute between Heraclitus and 
the Eleatics. With eternal return, being becomes more transient, but at the same time becoming 
gains a sense of continuity through its infinite return, so that eternal return "has the function of 
mediating between being and becoming, and in this concept the two poles move toward each other 
simultaneously." (Simmel 1986:176-7)
50 As Danto puts it, "without a goal, there is no meaning to life. And, by parity, there is no meaning 
to the universe if it has no end. So man must give it one. The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence entails 
the meaninglessness of things, and the doctrine of the Übermensch is a response to that 
significance which man is obliged to will." (Danto 2005:193-4)
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This is why Nietzsche expressly states that a literal interpretation of time as a cycle of
eternally returning events is not the interruption into time that he is seeking. We have seen
that Zarathustra berates the dwarf for his suggestion that “all truth is crooked, time itself is
a  circle,”51 indicating  that  even  the  apparently  harsh  test  of  the  affirmation  of
meaninglessness demanded by the cosmological reading would be to "make it too easy on
yourself!"52 If we return to GS §10953 we see why the literal interpretation of time as cyclical
that  the cosmological  reading offers is  underplaying the radical  nature of  this heaviest
thought. In GS §109 we find that among the anthropomorphisms that Nietzsche lists, we
should "beware of assuming in general and everywhere anything as elegant as the cyclical
movements  of  our  neighbouring  stars."54 The  purported  benefits  of  the  cosmological
reworking of time is that it is supposed to overcome nihilism by prompting the realignment
of our thought with becoming. But, as Nietzsche tells us in GS §109, to reimagine time as
an eternally repeating cycle is merely to inscribe our anthropomorphic forms more deeply
upon this time, even as it seems to distance us ever further from our role in their creation.
To  gain  the  benefits  of  the  disruption  of  identity  and  teleology  that  the  cosmological
reading claims to offer involves adopting precisely the kind of godlike perspective on the
world that we are trying to eradicate from our thought. The cosmological reading asks us
to affirm the passage of time from the outside, rather than as one who is caught up within
the cycle. If we consider the effects of such an affirmation from within the cycle, then it is
hard to see what status this affirmation could have, imagining for a moment that I were to
achieve  it.  My  affirmation  of  eternal  return  would  at  that  point  become,  apparently,
inevitable. Countless previous and future iterations of “I” would already have thought this
about eternal return.55 And yet I must choose to think it anyway - to fight to the point of
exhaustion, in the face overwhelming odds and almost certain defeat, to drag from my
brain an impossible and futural thought which is at the same time a foregone conclusion.
From  within  the  cycle  of  time  suggested  by  the  cosmological  account,  there  is  no
51 TSZ III 'On the Vision and the Riddle' §2
52 ibid.
53 Which Loeb's cosmological reading privileges as not only "one of the most important passages 
in Nietzsche's corpus" but "his very first published reference to eternal recurrence." (Loeb 2013)
54 GS §109
55 "...and I and you in the gateway whispering together, whispering of eternal things – must not all 
of us have been here before?" (TSZ III 'On the Vision and the Riddle' §2)
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difference between this and how we currently think of our actions - I do not know what has
happened in previous repetitions of the cycle,56 I do not know whether or not I will be able
to transform my thought in such a manner, so I must always strive into the unknown, just
as I currently do with any uncertain outcome. But after the event, the knowledge that other
me’s had already been there, done that... that this was always going to happen... to know
this, and not feel cheated of the effort I had put towards this, of the love I had lavished on a
project that was in actuality a duplication of eternally already-existing work - in order to
affirm this, I would have to adopt the perspective of eternity, stepping outside the cycle to
reach across the repetitions and collapse them into an eternal identity.
The cosmological reading therefore does not challenge, but rather reinforces, the negative
aspects of our existing relationship with time - its sense of inevitability, in which one point
flows unstoppably onto another.57 As a cosmology, eternal return renders such start or end
points meaningless, and stresses the transience of everything we experience - but this
transience is contained within, and ultimately part of, the same cycle. Persistent identities
within time may be outlawed,  but  time itself  becomes just  such an identity  -  it  is  the
unbroken circle that the Spirit  of  Gravity suggested, and that Zarathustra so vigorously
rejected.  This is the element of  traditional  conceptions of time that  the dwarf's cyclical
version of eternal return does not challenge, in which time is conceived as a container or
framework,  within  which different  events occur.  Everything is ultimately  subsumed into
56 Loeb argues on the contrary that Zarathustra does indeed “remember” future events from his 
own life and death, citing the incident of the howling dog of which Loeb writes that "Nietzsche's 
clear implication is that the reason Zarathustra comes to believe that he will now be reliving his 
qualitatively identical life is that he remembers having already lived the qualitatively identical 
childhood moment that he is experiencing now just after having died" (Loeb 2013). This is, I would 
argue, anything but clear - as Small points out, Zarathustra never at any point tells us "that the 
gateway has been there before," or in other words that he remembers it, "but rather that it must 
have been there" (Small 2010:137). Stambaugh also points out that in 'The Convalescent,' when 
Zarathustra undergoes what (on Loeb's interpretation) would seem to be the "same" experience, 
prefigured in Zarathustra's vision of the shepherd biting off the head of the snake, "What is most 
astonishing here is that the experience is totally new. No reference is made to the shepherd or to 
what happened to him. It is as if Zarathustra knew nothing about him at all... Evidently there is no 
cushioning through past experience here. The experience is starkly immediate." (Stambaugh 
1988:42)
57 As Stambaugh points out, this sensation of being "caught" in time "applies equally well to the 
basically Christian concept of historical, 'directed' time, which has a beginning, a middle, and an 
end, and to the Greek and to most of the Eastern ... concepts of cycles of time repeating 
themselves." (Stambaugh 1988:105)
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one, a part of the same cycle. We therefore find that with the theory of time offered by the
cosmological reading, the gateway ‘Moment’ is revealed to be nothing but a mirror. When
we think  we see the path  of  the future stretching  onwards,  we are in  fact  witnessing
nothing more than the reflection of the past. Within this closed circle, all that we have is the
eternal  circulation  of  the  same  -  the  same  meanings,  the  same  thoughts,  the  same
identities.  If  we  attempt  to  translate  this  into  rhythmical  terms,  we are  not  left  with  a
musical fugue, in which the repetition of a theme causes it to fly away from itself, multiplied
and transformed. Instead we find a fugue state of repetition as trauma, in which we do not
affirm but are rather forced to repeat. Any attempt to break out into something new has
been tried innumerable times before, will  be tried again, and will  always end up in the
same place. Eternal return as a cosmology therefore does not overcome, but rather plays
out the claustrophobia of nihilistic identity on a universal scale. I described in chapter one
how the issue with  our  current  way of  thinking  identity  is  our  tendency to exclude all
difference to the point of sterility. Thought collapses in on itself, an entropic black hole with
which we can no longer produce the meanings that allow us to thrive and grow. In the
cosmology of  eternal return, this fate applies to the entire universe - nothing new, but
instead one endless repetitive action, as hopeless and futile as the rocking of an abused
child or the convulsive shudders of a snake devouring its own tail.
The cosmological reading seeks to align our thought more accurately with what it claims to
be the operation of time and becoming, and as such recalls the more metaphysical slant58
that we find at points within Nietzsche's early writing on rhythm, when he suggests that the
ancient Greek sense of rhythm gave the Greeks access to a better, purer sense of time.
But  this  was  disrupted  by  Nietzsche's  investigations  into  the  driving  force  behind  the
supposed degredation into modern rhythm, in  which he concluded that  time and force
were intermingled within rhythm from the start. This ambiguity persisted throughout  The
58 This is how Löwith interprets eternal return, as Nietzsche's return "to the place from which he 
had started. As the teacher of the eternal recurrence, he remembered the problem of the birth of 
tragedy, and the end of his attempt combines systematically with its beginning in the highest kind of 
Dionysian Being" (Löwith 1997:16). Löwith argues that eternal return expresses the same 
contradictions as The Birth of Tragedy, in which Nietzsche urges a return to a more originary past 
state, while simultaneously recognising its impossibility. In chapter two I argued that Nietzsche's 
preoccupation with rhythm holds the key to understanding this apparent contradiction, and as we 
shall go on to see rhythm is similarly crucial for successfully navigating the tensions within eternal 
return.
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Gay Science, where we saw that the same qualities of rhythm proved creative and nihilistic
in  equal  measure.  The  rhythmic  impulse  towards  form emerges  as  the transformative
identities of art, but also as the nihilistic suppression of difference. The sense of rhythmic
flow  expresses  the  generative  nature  of  becoming,  but  also  seems  to  preclude  any
intervention of thought into this flow. In order to provide a genuine challenge to the nihilistic
disjunct between thought and becoming, it  is necessary to find a conception of time in
which we can understand the connection between these two aspects of rhythm. As we
have seen, while the cosmological reading challenges our everyday understanding of time
as unrepeatable,  it  fails  to disrupt  the sense of time as an unstoppable succession or
continuum,  which  creates  the  sense  of  inalienable  division  between the  continuum of
becoming and the unwarranted interventions of our thought. Neither did the cosmological
reading offer us a way of affirming the passage of time, replacing this with an overarching
view of the entire cycle of time in which all moments collapsed into one. We shall therefore
turn to an alternative theory of time as eternal return that emerges from Nietzsche's work.
This theory addresses the sense of time as a continuum by engaging with the apparent
rhythmical disjunt  between flow and the points within it.  This  will  then allow us to see
whether this understanding of temporality is one that we can affirm.
Time as the discontinuous moment
Rather than a cosmology in which events recur within cycles of time, Nietzsche is working
with a conception of  time as momentariness (Augenblichlichkeit).59 This functions as a
disruption not only to the everyday understanding of time as an infinite linear progression,
but  more  importantly  to  the  idea  that  time  is  continuous  -  that  there  is  no  sense  of
difference within  the passage of  time.  The dwarf's  sweeping  statement  encompassing
everything  within  the  single  circle  of  time  reinforces  the  nihilistic  view  of  time  as  an
impenetrable flow that brings everything to dust, rendering everything ultimately the same.
But in doing so, he ignores the aspect of the gateway moment in which the two paths of
the past and future are encompassed, but in such a way that they "contradict" each other,
rather than collapsing into one.60 It is this crucial nature of the moment that Zarathustra is
59 This theory of time as momentary or instantaneous is principally developed by Stambaugh 
(1988:107ff) and is also taken up by Moles (1990:295ff) and Miller (1999). 
60 The notion of contradiction in the moment, as Stambaugh points out, precludes the possibility of 
time as a continuum, pointing out that "the flux of time, no matter what its 'direction,' cannot produce
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so keen for us to think, a focus which emerges in an unpublished note in which Nietzsche
once again attempts to understand the nature of becoming shorn of the anthropomorphic
trappings  of  thought,  stating  that  "the  lawfulness  of  nature  is  a  false  humanitarian
interpretation" which we impose upon "the absolute momentariness of the will to power."61
As the rhythmic creatures of  GS §84, our thought is entirely goal-oriented, preoccupied
with survival and "the anticipation of the future" that constitutes our attempt to impose our
desires upon the world. But as we shall see with the idea of time as momentary, Nietzsche
is trying to elaborate a different, but no less rhythmic, understanding of time - one that
reconciles the apparently contradictory aspects of rhythm in the way the moment emerges
from the relationship of forces as the will to power.
Each moment, for Nietzsche, is a meeting or combination of forces. But the nature of force
is that it does not remain the same - we cannot separate an eternal force from the effects
that  it  perpetrates,  but  instead  must  conceive  of  force  as  activity.  In  each  moment,
therefore, we find that the forces at play have changed. There is no single identity that
persists through these moments, for as the activity acts (here we get into the problems of
expressing  becoming  in  the  language  of  subject  and  verb,  ending  up  with  seemingly
tautological formulations - as the force forces? As the flow flows?) it  ceases to be the
same state as it was a moment previously. There is no gap in becoming, but instead the
activity of the will  to power itself is what ensures this non-continuous change from one
moment  to  the  next.62 Nietzsche's  attempt  to  develop  a  new  conception  of  time  as
momentary reflects how he conceives the activity of forces in the will to power, as discrete,
a contradiction. A 'contradiction' can occur only in the moment." (Stambaugh 1988:40)
61 "Die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Natur ist eine falsche humanitäre Auslegung. Es handelt sich um eine 
absolute Feststellung der Machtverhältnisse, um die ganze Brutalität, ohne die Milderung, welche 
im organischen Leben das Vorausnehmen der Zukunft, die Vorsicht und List und Klugheit, kurz der 
Geist mit sich bringt. Die absolute Augenblicklichkeit des Willens zur Macht regirt" 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1885,40[55] eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 
August–September 1885.
62 Nietzsche writes that "At any precise moment of a force, the absolute conditionality of a new 
distribution of all its forces is given: it cannot stand still. "Change" belongs to the essence, therefore 
also temporality: with this, however, the necessity of change has only been posited once more 
conceptually." (WTP §1064 (1885)). As Stambaugh stresses, "The most important thing about the 
moment is to think its arising and perishing. Moments of time are not strung out like a series of 
atomistic points which may be continuous or discontinuous. Each moment arises and perishes, and 
it is precisely it perishing or passing away which allows the next moment to arise, to come into 
being." (Stambaugh 1988: 114)
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but not separate and isolated. On this understanding, time is something that does not exist
independently of the forces that inhabit it, and we can therefore understand momentary
time as that which emerges from, rather than against, becoming.63
It is the moment, understood as this discontinuous transformative activity, that eternally
returns. Not a particular combination of forces or events, because the nature of force as
transformation forbids that there could ever be such a return. "Force," Nietzsche writes, "is
eternally the same and eternally active,"64 but as such, forces can never be the same. If a
force were to persist  in  a single  state,  without  increase or decrease,  then it  would no
longer be active or, in other words, it would no longer be a force. This is the understanding
of eternity that Nietzsche is able to retain, after all the other eternal substances, laws, or
identities  have been discarded as anthropomorphic  creations.  The eternal  activity  and
changeability of force, expressed in the multiple nature of the will  to power, is the only
thing which is "eternally the same" and which repeats in every moment.
Stambaugh’s reading of eternal return incorporates this understanding of eternity into the
theory of momentary or what she refers to as “vertical time,”65 in which eternity is viewed
not as the opposite of transient linear or “horizontal” time, but as that which linear time
"breaks out into."66 Eternity conceived as the eternal activity of force operates like a third
dimension  of  time,67 the  way  that  depth  transforms  our  understanding  of  a  flat,  two-
dimensional plane. And it is this third dimension of the vertical time of eternity that allows
everyday  horizontal  time  to  pass  in  the  manner  that  we  experience  in  the  everyday
understanding  of  time.  This  happens  on  a  moment-by-moment  basis,  with  what
Stambaugh refers to as the “spikes” or “Spitze” of time.68 Rather than flowing smoothly,
becoming ‘spikes’ or intensifies, as the activity of the will to power forces the ending of one
63 Moles highlights this connection between time and force, emphasising that "a moment and its 
force are not separate; when a force recurs, its moment recurs with it" (Moles 1990:295) so that 
"every new moment is the moment of a newly-maximised power" (Moles 1990:236).
64 "die Kraft ist ewig gleich und ewig thätig" http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-
1881,11[202] eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 1881.
65 Stambaugh 1988:107
66 Stambaugh: 1988:126
67 Stambaugh stresses the problems and limitations of trying to describe temporality using spatial 
concepts such as "horizontal," and "vertical," but that we are nonetheless forced to use to try and 
challenge traditional theories of time (Stambaugh 1988:117)
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state and the beginning of another, in a manner that cannot be conceived as a smooth
flow. Stambaugh elaborates this characteristic of time as ‘instantaneity,’ which “in contrast
to the image of time as a continuous flux, instantaneity emphasizes the ‘occurrence’ of
time, the arising, immediate perishing, and arising anew of the instant.”69
Nietzsche's focus on the moment aims to provide a conception of time without continuous
inevitable succession, that does not fall into the timeless trap of eternalisation.70 Equally,
however, we should not understand time as divisible, placing artificial bulwarks which have
no place in becoming. To understand time as split by discrete points would again be to
place something timeless within  it,  to make an immovable  instant  that  stands against,
rather than with, the time that it divides. Understanding time as continuous is just as much
a  product  of  the  rhythmic  smoothing  of  difference  in  thought  as  is  perceiving  the
fundamental discontinuity of causality as something inherent to becoming. We have seen
how Nietzsche continually struggled with the simultaneously continuous and divided nature
of rhythm in thought. We now find that both elements of this tension are contained within
the moment. It is not just past and future, but also difference and identity, that are gathered
together in the momentary activity of time.
Stambaugh recognises the rhythmical nature of the eternal activity of time as that which
flows precisely as these spiking moments, noting that that the eternal activity of changing
force that comes to the fore in the moment: 
68 This develops an idea that Stambaugh first finds expressed by the medieval mystic Meister 
Eckhart, who writes that the “Now of eternity,” the moment, “is neither a piece of time nor is it a 
portion of time, but rather it is a taste of time, the sharp point of time and an end of time.“ (Eckhart 
1994:114)
69 Stambaugh 1988:117 
70 As Moles expresses it, Nietzsche's account of time as momentary is intended to generate "a 
perspective of understanding which allows the novelty and uniqueness of each momentary event to 
stand out more clearly, within a new conception of time." (Moles 1990:231 )
155
"could perhaps be most approximately compared with what is called rhythm, 
whether this rhythm is thought as the rhythm of a life or of a statue or a piece of 
music. In the last case rhythm is the temporally forming principle, the constant 
measure that itself knows no change, but makes a change possible."71 
As I have argued, Nietzsche understands rhythm as the "temporally forming principle" in
not just the last, but in all of these cases - it is the temporally forming principle of thought,
the way in which time appears to us as thought. But it is only through understanding the
activity of force in the will to power that we can perceive the linking of the two apparently
contradictory aspects of rhythm that we have noted throughout Nietzsche's work, in which
its  flowing  tendency to  exceed can be understood as  that  which  also  instantiates  the
moments or beats within it.
It is will to power, with its continual changes in combinations of force, that gives rise to the
fluctuations in tempo that are the wave-like rhythm of becoming, and it is these different
tempos that we then perceive in thought as individuated beats or identities.72 At this point,
we move from the contrast between the rhythm of the waves and the rhythm of the world
to a more complex soundscape. For the rhythms that emerge from the will to power are
not  single  rhythms,  but  multiple.  It  is  these  different  tempos  that  we  shape  into  the
rhythmic forms we create in the world around us. This is the raw material that is subject to
the process of selection, which allows us to pick out differences that we then transform
through our rhythmic process of thought into patterns, as repetitions of the same. It is this
development  of  forms of  the present  as part  of  a rhythmic process that  produces the
impression of continuity between the present moment and the past.73 But the plurality of
71 Stambaugh 1987:189. Small more explicity highlights the connection between Nietzsche's earlier
thoughts on rhythm and the different tempos of the will to power that we find in his later work, 
writing that "it is the will's fluctuations and intermittences that provide the basis for succession and 
rhythm, the forms of appearance that turn becoming into time." (Small 2010:74)
72 Small likens the activity of thought upon these variations in the tempo of becoming to the 
process that takes place when we listen to orchestral music, in which "our hearing performs a 
complex piece of data analysis: we can tell one instrument from another, and hear them as playing 
together, each one being located in a different place. The analysis that Nietzsche is proposing here 
is similar, except that the intended outcome is the empirical world, with all its objects in their 
relations to one another." (Small 2010:68)
73 Moles notes a tension within Nietzsche's account of how we construct our experience of time as 
duration: "A strange paradox underlies Nietzsche's account. According to it, we would have no 
experience of duration (or of succession either) without the intellectual function of memory. Yet this 
account seems to presuppose the view of time that he is criticizing. After all, present experience is 
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the rhythms that are now shown to make up the seemingly singular wave-like rhythm of
becoming show that we have not one, but many temporalities.74 Not only is there no time
in-itself, but there is no objective time, or single sense of the present. As with the chronos
protos identified by Aristoxenus, the moment can be determined only in relation its own
temporality or rhythm, and does not extend beyond this into any kind of universal time.75
The new conception of time that Nietzsche seeks to develop is one that allows of multiple
times - as there are multiple perspectives76 - one that reveals the "universal" herd time that
interpreted on the basis of a comparison with remembered past experiences; but memory itself 
already presupposes the endurance of past experience. Nietzsche makes no attempt to answer this
objection; he appears to be unaware of it." (Moles 1990:226) This is the problem that Deleuze takes
up in the three syntheses of time, which we shall go on to explore in the next chapter.
74 Nietzsche's early work on rhythm is admittedly more suggestive of a shifting sense of 
temporality, than multiple concurrent senses. Small traces Nietzsche's theory of multiple 
temporalities to his interest in the biologist Karl Ernst von Baer, who "illustrates the relative 
character of our experience of time by posing a sequence of thought experiments, involving 
different rates of the life process," (Small 2010:86) in which the different lifespans and pulse tempos
of organic life are imagined to produce correspondingly different temporalities. Baer concludes that 
a "greater measure" would provide a more overarching perspective coming "closer to the truth" 
(Small 2010:87) of an ideal time. In contrast, "Nietzsche's conclusion is that the best measure of 
time is a much smaller one than ours, corresponding to the countless brief processes that we 
usually overlook." (Small 2010:90) These can be combined, and "it is likely that Nietzsche's real 
preference is for this multiplicity of perspectives, rather than taking one or another as having a 
privileged status." (Small 2010:91) 
75 Moles makes this point, arguing that for Nietzsche "there is no universal moment, no universal 
'present' or simultaneity. Time in Nietzsche's philosophy of nature is perspectival—it is determined 
within local forces, each with their own moments, their own 'presents.' Accordingly, Nietzsche 
denies that there is any such entity as absolute (or self-existing) time. There is no independent unity
of measure for all the different events in the universe. By making time perspectival, Nietzsche is 
proposing its relativity. Every measurement of time is made relative to some perspective or other." 
(Moles 1990:233-4)
76 Moles highlights a difficulty here in understanding the relationship between multiple temporalities
and, specifically, the non-universalised moments that they contain: "it is also difficult to conceive in 
any detail the relationship between moments. As has been shown, it can be reconstructed from 
Nietzsche's account that moments are bound together in a strict order by the necessity with which 
forces occasion other forces. But forces form hierarchies; one system of force contains many sub-
systems, themselves hierarchical. These inner force-systems are subject to quantum change, and 
by Nietzsche's conception of temporality each new state has its own moment. Are moments then 
nested within hierarchies, like forces themselves? If so, it seems that moments are divisible in a 
sense, despite the fact that Nietzsche's conception implies the contrary... One moment would then 
replace another at the sub-system level, all within the moment of the dominant force... It is hard to 
think of answers to these objections; certainly Nietzsche does not offer any." (Moles 1990:237) I 
argue that understanding the different temporalities as different rhythms solves this problem of the 
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we have gradually internalised as a seductive rhythm that has closed down others, and
opens up the possibility  that  we can learn to detect,  and to develop,  other senses of
temporality.77 This is not by any means an easy task. Merely to be aware of the presence
of other temporalities is not to be able to understand or "hear" them, as we saw in the
experience of attempting to listen to ancient rhythm today, and our inability to hear it as
rhythmic. But although the ancient sense of rhythm is incommensurate with the modern,
that is not to say it cannot impact upon it - that it cannot work its rhythmic effect. Although
we can never return to or recover the ancient sense of rhythm, this is not to say that it, and
other rhythms, cannot affect our own. Rather than a poor imitation of ancient  rhythms,
which  entirely  misses  the  different  temporality  that  gives  rise  to  them,  the  goal  of
Nietzsche's engagement with the past is to allow it to speak within the temporality of the
modern age. The persistence of his attempts to invoke different temporalities, particularly
that of ancient thinkers, suggests a more positive outcome than the image of a dominant
rhythm mastering another. It  seems that even a gentler, subtler rhythm such as that of
ancient Greece can affect the forceful rhythm of modernity. If we are able to conceive of
multiple  rhythms,  of  multiple  temporalities,  then  this  opens  up  the  possibility  of  a
correspondingly  richer  way  of  thinking  within  time,  one  that  does  not  fall  prey  to  the
relationship between moments, coming closer to Small's description of the multiplicity of 
Nietzschean time as more entwined than hierarchical, as "temporally extended processes ... which 
not only overlap in time but are held together like the intertwining of strands in a rope." (Small 
2010:75) Rhythms behave in precisely this manner - one rhythm can indeed be seen as nested 
within another, but for all this is not dominated by it. The Aristoxenian chronos protos is indivisible 
as it is heard within the context of its own rhythm, rather than with reference to other rhythms or 
subrhythms at play even within the same piece. If we understand time as made up of a multiplicity 
of such rhythms or temporalities, driven by the different tempos of becoming, then we can see how 
this overlapping is possible. In the next chapter we shall see how the notion of multiple interweaving
rhythms functions within Deleuze and Guattari's account of the refrain.
77 Nietzsche offers examples of where our sense of temporality shifts, for instance "as a hashish 
smoker or at the moment of mortal danger ... we humans get a notion that in one second of our 
pocket watch, a thousand thoughts can be thought, and a thousand experiences experienced." He 
takes such experiences to show that we should be "suspicious of all apparent 'simultaneity'" of 
times, and that rather than any universal measure or beat, time is made up of these "time-
fragments" which follow a different tempo. ("Seien wir mißtrauisch gegen alle anscheinende 
'Gleichzeitigkeit!' Es schieben sich da Zeit-Bruchstücke ein, welche nur nach einem groben Maaße,
z.B. unserem menschlichen Zeitmaaße klein heißen dürfen; in abnormen Zuständen, z.B. als 
Haschischraucher oder im Augenblick der Lebensgefahr bekommen aber auch wir Menschen einen
Begriff davon, daß in einer Sekunde unserer Taschenuhr tausend Gedanken gedacht, tausend 
Erlebnisse erlebt werden können." http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1885,40[49] 
eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885)
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nihilistic sense of closing down that happens when there is one and only one overarching
beat.
This  is  the  revised  relationship  with  time  that  Nietzsche  is  attempting  to  convey  by
understanding eternal return as the moment. The cosmological reading failed because it
took a position outside time, from which it  imagined observing events going round and
round  in  an  eternal  washing  cycle  of  time.  But  with  the  understanding  of  time  as
momentary, we find that eternal return does not take place  in time, but rather,  eternal
return  is time,  understood as  this  rhythmic  process of  returning.  Time is  the  rhythmic
activity of the moment as the varying tempos of the will  to power take form within our
thought. Nietzsche indicated this rhythmic conception of time in his early notes, where he
realised  that  rhythm  is  the  ordering,  or  the  form  of  time.  But  rather  than  the  earlier
understanding of form or appearance as something whose multiplicity renders it a poor
copy of an original reality, we find in Nietzsche's later work a concordance between the
multiplicity of rhythmic thought and rhythmic becoming that suggests that, if we can think it
in this multiplicity, an overcoming of nihilism may yet be possible.
Time flies away: a criticism of Nietzsche’s presentation of eternal return
In its rhythmic connection with becoming, an understanding of time as momentary resolves
the tensions in the understanding of rhythm that we found throughout Nietzsche's work,
from the early notes through to The Gay Science. It is this sense of the moment emerging
from the eternal  confrontation of  forces in  the will  to power that  Nietzsche is  trying to
express with the thought of eternal return, and the understanding of time that Nietzsche is
operating with as we follow Zarathustra through his adventures. But as we have seen, the
connection  between  momentary  time,  the  will  to  power,  and  eternal  return,  emerges
principally  from  the  unpublished  notes,  which  we  must  then  deploy  to  elucidate  the
mysteries of Zarathustra's vision of the gateway 'Moment,' and how this might lead to the
figure of the overman as one who lives with a fundamentally different relationship to time.
We saw in Nietzsche's exploration of the incommensurable nature of ancient and modern
rhythm that it is impossible to think across the leap of one to the other. As a radically new
thought, Nietzsche's presentation of eternal return is faced with the similar challenge of
making it thinkable for us, in which eternal return must disrupt our current relationship with
time,  but  not  to  the  extent  that  we  cannot  think  this  at  all.  We must  still  be  able  to
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recognise it  as a rhythm, as a thought -  but as a new rhythm that is not prone to the
problems of  the  old.  Nietzsche uses his  troubled spokesperson Zarathustra  to convey
some of these difficulties, as we see Zarathustra struggle both to understand and accept
the thought himself, as well as to adequately convey it to others. Nietzsche's presentation
of  the  temporal  experiences  within  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra attempts  to  convey  the
disruptive nature of the moment as an interruption to our nihilistic understanding of the
ceaseless continuum of time. But although the intensely rhythmic theory of momentary
time that  commentators such as  Stambaugh have constructed from Nietzsche's  notes
offers a way to move beyond the temporality of nihilistic thought, Nietzsche's attempts to
convey the nature of the moment via the figure of Zarathustra are not nearly so effective,
precisely because they lose the rhythmic sense of the passage of time.78
Zarathustra's engagement with time in Thus Spoke Zarathustra comes not just through the
vision of the gateway "moment," but at various points throughout the narrative when he
experiences  a  cessation  of  time in  the  hour  of  noon  or  midnight79 -  these apparently
opposing  times  collapse  into  one,  as  Zarathustra  realises  the  eternal  nature  of  ever-
changing force at work in his conception of momentary time.80 Zarathustra's reflections on
time both at noon and at midnight81 are clearly connected with his vision of eternal return
and  his  understanding  of  the  moment.82 At  noon  he highlights  the need  to  affirm the
78 Stambaugh admits that Nietzsche is not ultimately effective in conveying the theory of 
momentary time, noting that it occurs to him "only in fragmentary, momentary insights, the 
implications of which he was unable to think through in connection with the whole," (Stambaugh 
1988:105) and that the sense of eternity in momentary time is "an experience so radical that 
Nietzsche himself was unable to maintain the purity of the dimension we have described here as 
the 'vertical,'" (Stambaugh 1988:107) concluding that "part of Nietzsche's emphasis on eternal 
return as a thought was born of his realization that he had not completely penetrated his own 
experience. He somehow seemed to know that eternal return was yet to be really thought out. Thus 
he presented it as a doctrine still to be fathomed." (Stambaugh 1988:115)
79 Other references to a similar sensation occur in TSZ II 'The Soothsayer' ("Thus the time passed 
and crept by me, if time existed anymore – what do I know!") and TSZ II 'The Stillest Hour' in which 
Zarathustra feels time as the "ground" or structure of human consciousness fade away as he falls 
asleep.
80 "Just now my world became perfect, midnight is also noon." (TSZ IV 'The Sleepwalker Song' 
§10)
81 TSZ IV 'At Noon' and TSZ IV 'The Sleepwalker Song' respectively.
82 For Stambaugh, the experience of "timelessness" (Stambaugh 1988:106) in the hours of noon or
midnight is Nietzsche's attempt to convey "the significance of the Moment." (Stambaugh 1988:107) 
Small, in contrast, argues that the hour is a different conception of becoming for Nietzsche, and that
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transience of the moment [Augenblick], arguing that "precisely the least, the softest, the
lightest, a lizard’s rustling, a breath, a wink, a blink of an eye [Augen-Blick] – a little is the
stuff of the best happiness,"83 while at midnight he seems to be painfully transported once
again to his earlier vision:
Alas! Alas! The dog howls, the moon shines. I would sooner die, die, than tell you 
what my midnight heart is thinking right now.
Now I’ve died already. It’s gone. Spider, why do you spin around me? Do you want 
blood? Oh! Oh! The dew falls, the hour comes –84
The moment of eternal return is presented once again, but the affirmation that Zarathustra
advocates matches neither his tone, nor the experience of time that he conveys in these
passages. The hour of noon is suffused with stillness of sleep, that of midnight with an
apocalyptic tenor of death as Zarathustra strains to affirm everything in the unreasoning
cruelty of becoming, with joy and pain united as noon and midnight. And in both of these
passages, precisely at the point where Nietzsche is trying to convey the transience of the
moment for us to affirm, time - has gone.
Against the endless succession of time, Zarathustra continually cries "Still!" as Nietzsche
tries to indicate a radically different and discontinuous experience of time. But he achieves
this  impression  by  stopping,  and  hence  removing,  time  for  us  altogether.  Even  as
Zarathustra talks of the happiness to be found in the laughter of a sleeping god, it is time,
"Old noon" who is sleeping, while Zarathustra himself sleeps, "like a ship that sailed into its
stillest  bay,"  that  now  "leans  against  the  earth,  weary  of  the  long  journeys  and  the
uncertain seas."85 This is not the voyage into becoming undertaken by the bold searchers
"a great deal of confusion is caused by running it together with the 'moment.' " (Small 2010:161) 
However this distinction rests on Small's opposition of the moment as "consituted by an exclusion of
past and future, while the hour is supposed to incorporate them," (Small 2010:162) whereas, as 
Stambaugh argues, it is precisely this incorporation (rather than exclusion) of past and future within 
the moment that Zarathustra's vision of the gateway is trying to convey. Small admits that in the 
case of some commentators, "what is meant [by the moment] may be what I am calling the 'hour,'" 
(Small 2010:162) and I suggest that this is indeed the case with Stambaugh's reading, and that 
Small's separation of these two temporal relationships within Thus Spoke Zarathustra is 
unnecessary.
83 TSZ IV 'At Noon,' cf. "the values of the briefest and most transient, the seductive flash of gold on 
the belly of the serpent vita” (WTP §577 (Spring-Fall 1887))
84 TSZ IV 'The Sleepwalker Song' §4
85 TSZ IV 'At Noon' 
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and researchers whom Zarathustra tasked with the riddle of eternal return. Instead of the
rhythmic passage of time, we find that there is no longer any beat at all:
– as secretly, as terribly, as cordially as that midnight bell, which has experienced 
more than any human, says it to me:
– which long ago tallied the heartbeat beatings of your fathers – oh! oh! how it 
sighs! How it laughs in dream delight, the old, the deep deep midnight!
Still! Still! Then things are heard that by day may not be said; but now, in the cool 
air, where the noise of your hearts has fled –
– now it speaks, now it listens, now it creeps into nocturnal, over-awake souls – oh! 
oh! how it sighs! How it laughs in dream delight!86
The midnight bell that speaks to Zarathustra is the inhuman time of becoming, from which
the rhythm of our organic lives emerged, and the experience of it here signals the death of
the human - but with it, both rhythm and time as we live them are silenced. "Do not sing!
Still! The world is perfect,"87 whispers Zarathustra to his heart, and time departs:
Didn’t time just fly away? Am I not falling? Did I not fall – listen! – into the well of 
eternity?88
and again at midnight, when he cries:
Woe to me! Where has time gone? Did I not sink into deep wells? The world sleeps 
–89
Nietzsche  wants  to  present  an  experience  of  time  that  is  uninfected  by  the
anthropomorphic  thoughts  and  rhythms  of  GS  §84.  But  to  do  so,  he  must  still  our
heartbeats as well.  The interruption of time that occurs in the moment is not something
that can be experienced - it is that which constitutes our experience, that forms the self we
experience it  with. Nietzsche's presentation of this in the hour of noon and midnight is
intended to open up a radically different sense of time. But instead, both Zarathustra and
time are  caught  still  while  they  simultaneously  fly  away.  The experience of  time here
interrupts the sense of being continuously dragged along in time, but rather than freeing
either Zarathustra or time, it holds them back, as Zarathustra continually urges himself, but
also time as the other sleeper, to "Get up!" and get moving - and yet he falls asleep again,
86 TSZ IV 'The Sleepwalker Song' §3
87 TSZ IV 'At Noon' 
88 ibid.
89 TSZ IV 'The Sleepwalker Song' §4
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unable to move.  In what  is intended to be a transformative scene at the end of  Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, which sparks Zarathustra's return and emergence from his cave once
again, the affirmation we find is that of the desperate final efforts of the bloodied hero
calling up the last reserves of his strength. And the effect is that of transformation into
death. 
The  implication  Nietzsche  is  trying  to  convey  is  that  the  moment  signals  the  end  of
humanity, and the beginning of a new relationship with time. But coming, as it does, at the
cost of the exclusion of time from the moment, this is not something that we as readers
can either live, or affirm, cutting the bridge between man and overman. In the final section
of  Thus Spoke Zarathustra that follows the hour of midnight,  when Zarathustra's heart is
transformed at the futural sign of the overman, we are told that "this lasted a long time, or
a short  time:  for,  properly  speaking,  there is  no time on earth for  such things."90 This
absence  of  time,  specifically  of  time  on  earth,  is  why  Zarathustra's  experience  of  the
moment cannot be affirmed in the manner that Nietzsche himself requires. At the start of
this chapter, we stressed that the overman is no transcendent figure, but rather a new
relationship to time that emerges from the human, and that "shall be the meaning of the
earth!"91 Later, he reiterates the importance of this to his disciples:
Remain faithful to the earth, my brothers, with the power of your virtue! Let your 
bestowing love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the earth! Thus I beg and
beseech you.
Do not let it fly away from earthly things and beat against eternal walls with its 
wings! Oh, there has always been so much virtue that flew away!
Like me, guide the virtue that has flown away back to the earth – yes, back to the 
body and life: so that it may give the earth its meaning, a human meaning!92
In the hours of noon and of midnight, time flies away from earthly things. Zarathustra's own
transformation involves the motif of dance and flight that recurs throughout  Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. The deep midnight of time without the living rhythm of the heartbeat "carries
me away, my soul dances"93 and he asks any who would achieve the new relationship to
time of the overman:
90 TSZ IV 'The Sign'
91 TSZ I 'Zarathustra’s Prologue' §3
92 TSZ I 'On the Bestowing Virtue' §2
93 TSZ IV 'The Sleepwalker Song' §5
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Have you flown high enough? You dance: but a leg is not a wing.
You good dancers, now all joy is gone, wine became resin, every cup became 
brittle, the graves stammer.
You did not fly high enough; now the graves stammer: “Redeem the dead!..."
To dance with the feet is not enough - a leg is not a wing - and what dance could we in any
case perform in the unearthly time of these passages where the rhythmic beat has been
stilled? The only dance that is possible is that of Zarathustra's soul, carried away, beyond
the earth. But as such, the experience of temporality that Nietzsche describes in the hours
of noon and midnight does not allow us to affirm the rhythm of time in its passage, nor
prompt the discovery of a new relationship with time from out of our existing rhythms. It
does not provide the nuanced affirmation of the existing creative and artistic elements of
our thought that we explored in Nietzsche's account of rhythm in The Gay Science. This is
the kind of rhythmic and temporal affirmation we need, if we are to follow Zarathustra's
earlier advice to his disciples, and finally move beyond nihilism:
Let your spirit and your virtue serve the meaning of the earth, my brothers: and the 
value of all things will be posited newly by you! Therefore you shall be fighters! 
Therefore you shall be creators!94
The hour, like the gateway moment, functions as an interruption to continuous time. But as
it opens up this space within the relentless rhythm of our everyday experience of time, we
find that time misfires, grinds to a halt. It is important to note that this is not the effect that
Nietzsche intends to convey, as we saw from the theory that we find in the unpublished
notes of the moment as the necessary emergence of change in the will  to power. The
moment is supposed to be a temporary pause - Zarathustra's experience of 'The Stillest
Hour' begins as "the hand advanced, the clock of my life drew a breath."95 As Small notes,
this brief pause is what occurs in the poetic caesura or cut, a breath taken within a line of
poetry that drives the rhythm on.96 If Zarathustra were to go on to sing, or to dance, then
94 TSZ I 'On the Bestowing Virtue' §2
95 TSZ II 'The Stillest Hour'
96 As Small says, "these brief pauses are everyday occurrences. When a clock's hand moves, it 
commonly stays where it is before moving again. Similarly, drawing breath is a familiar action in 
speech, as well as in singing or playing a wind instrument." These examples are indeed, as Small 
notes, "apt metaphors for what he [Nietzsche] is trying to indicate: a suspension of time which is 
not, however, the negation of change that gives rise to a belief in enduring things and the 'I' that 
corresponds to them." (Small 2010:37) The problem is that what immediately follows in 
Zarathustra's account does not take up these rhythmic metaphors, instead leaving him suspended, 
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we could  indeed  perceive  this  as  a  temporary  cut  that  is  constitutive of  our  rhythmic
experience of time. Instead, Zarathustra sleeps - the rhythmic ground of time falls away.
The experiences of interrupted time that Zarathustra describes do not allow us to affirm
time in its passage - and it  is precisely this which eternal return must do, if  it  is to be
successful in setting up a non-nihilistic relationship with time. Instead, Zarathustra offers
us an experience of time as interrupted, ephiphantic, revelatory - but also as dead, and
unearthly.  We saw earlier  that the cosmological reading of eternal return fails not only
because it did not disrupt the notion of time as succession, but also because it required
that  we  step  out  of  time  in  order  to  affirm  it.  The  interpretation  of  eternal  return  as
momentary  seems  capable  of  succeeding  on  both  these  counts.  But  Nietzsche's
presentation of the interruption of time in  Thus Spoke Zarathustra  does not. In order to
explore the time of the moment in a manner that we can affirm, we must move away from
Nietzsche's  own  presentation  of  the  experience  of  discontinuous  time  in  Thus  Spoke
Zarathustra, and indeed from Nietzsche's own words altogether.
Nietzsche's work indicates a theory of time based on the moment, as that which emerges
from  the  flow  of  becoming  through  the  multiple  nature  of  the  will  to  power.  The
understanding of becoming that emerges from Nietzsche's work is that of a rhythm which,
while it does not tarry, does "spike." By understanding the only constant as the nature of
force as that which eternally changes, we are able to address some of the tensions that we
found in Nietzsche's account of rhythmic thought. The impulse of rhythm to round off, and
the impulse of rhythm to flow on and exceed its bounds, cannot be separated. In just this
manner, the self-closing nature of the moment is that which emerges from the flow of
becoming, as the self-dividing nature of rhythmic becoming. The operation of rhythm as
that which divides up time, and attempts individuation, can now be clarified - the rhythm of
becoming creates time, precisely as these individuating moments. The different tempos of
force indicate the way in which we come to conceive the flow of becoming as the rhythmic
forms we perceive in the world around us. While we have traditionally misinterpreted these
temporary and mobile  forms as  static  identities,  by understanding  the rhythmic nature
common to both form and becoming we find that the process by which we isolate and
delimit our thoughts is not the arbitrary act that in the depths of nihilism we had come to
out of time. We will return to the role of the caesura within rhythm in the next chapter, when we look 
at Deleuze's third synthesis of time.
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fear. The challenge is to learn to hold open the creative and transformative potential of
rhythm, rather than closing this down into a single beat. We indicated that the multiplicity of
rhythmic temporalities holds the key to this openness for Nietzsche. We must find a new
way to not only understand the moment, but to create and affirm its rhythmical connection
with other moments, and the other rhythms that we must learn to hear. 
We shall now turn to the thought of Deleuze and Guattari to find the account of rhythmic
multiplicity that we find suggested in the Nietzschean idea of time as the moment. It is here
that we find the seeds of momentary time developed into Deleuze's account of becoming
and the role of eternal return as discontinuity or caesura, before the plurality of rhythm as
individuation finds its most thorough expression in Deleuze and Guattari's acount of the
refrain. 
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5. Coda: the fabrication of time in the refrain
We have seen how an understanding of a rhythmic relationship with time emerges from
Nietzsche’s unpublished notes, which he attempts to convey through the notion of eternal
return in The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. By understanding becoming as a
rhythmic process that gives rise to moments of time, Nietzsche indicates a way in which
the rhythmically individuating activity of thought emerges from becoming, rather than being
opposed to it. In so doing, he aims to open up a space for the new kind of thought he calls
amor fati, in which he hopes we might affirm both the creative process of thought and the
temporal and transient nature of the forms that it creates. But as we have seen, Nietzsche
does  not  explicitly  develop  this  theory  of  time  as  momentary  in  his  published  works.
Nietzsche's presentation of the experience of the moment in Thus Spoke Zarathustra does
not allow us to affirm the  passage of  time, and it  is this that is key to addressing the
problems of nihilistic thought. Instead we shall turn to the work of Deleuze, who develops
an ontological reading of eternal return that draws out the multiple nature of the will  to
power that was intimated in Nietzsche's unpublished notes. It is as an ontology, rather than
as  either  a  pyschological  or  cosmological  theory,  or  even  the  revelatory  experience
described by Zarathustra, that we can understand eternal return as a rhythmic theory of
time.
Deleuze identifies himself as a "pluralist" whose aim “is not to rediscover the eternal or the
universal,  but  to  find  the  conditions  under  which  something  new  is  produced
(creativeness).”1 His  deployment  of  eternal  return  within  his  own  work  is  precisely
concerned with the plural nature of becoming, and discovering the conditions under which
a future that is genuinely new can emerge from the past, rather than merely repeating it,
as the problem of the passage of time. We shall see that Deleuze’s understanding of time
as the three syntheses of present, past, and future provides us with the most rhythmic, and
the most successful, reading of eternal return that we have yet encountered. Integral to
this reading is Deleuze’s attempt to think the univocity of being, in which becoming shares
the plural character of the world we perceive, rather than standing opposed as a single
continuum which is then painfully translated into individual beings. The rhythmical nature
1 Dialogues II vii 
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of becoming and the way in which the different tempos of the will  to power emerge as
discontinuous and temporal forms is developed in Deleuze's and Guattari's concept of the
refrain, in which we find a more thorough account of how the multiplicity of becoming takes
on form through an explicitly  rhythmical process. By recognising the ontological role of
rhythm, Deleuze and Guattari are able develop the rhythmical strain within Nietzsche’s
thought  in  a  more productive  way,  and  we  find  in  their  work  a  more  fully  developed
conception of rhythmic becoming that builds on the discontinuous possibilities of eternal
return, and provides a more successful answer to the problem of rhythmic individuation. 
The eternal return of the dice in Nietzsche and Philosophy
Deleuze’s earliest and most dedicated reading of eternal return takes place in Nietzsche
and Philosophy. Deleuze’s interest here lies in uncovering the role eternal return plays in
how becoming becomes, in how it effects the passage of becoming into what we perceive
as beings. Nietzsche’s importance for Deleuze lies principally in the account he is able to
derive from Nietzsche’s work of becoming as plural.  As we have seen in chapter four,
Nietzsche indicates in his unpublished notes that becoming is not a smooth continuum, but
that it expresses the multiple nature of the different tempos of the will to power. This was
not made explicit in The Gay Science surrounding the introduction of eternal return. There,
when he does talk about becoming, it is in the ambiguous sense of a continuum or flux,
rather than becoming conceived as something explicitly  plural.2 For his own reading of
eternal return, Deleuze draws his account of Nietzsche’s conception of the multiplicity of
becoming mostly from On the Genealogy of Morality, which was published shortly after the
second edition of The Gay Science.3 He then combines this with a reading of eternal return
2 See GS §111-2 where Nietzsche discusses "the origin of the logical" as the creative 
predisposition to "treat the the similar as identical," giving them “a head start over those who saw 
everything 'in a flux',” (GS §111) for “in truth a continuum faces us, from which we isolate a few 
pieces, just as we always perceive a movement only as isolated points.” (GS §112)
3 Ward (2010) raises concerns about the legitimacy of Deleuze’s interpretation of eternal return on 
the grounds that Deleuze takes Nietzsche's account of the genealogical struggle of forces which 
give sense to phenomena in On the Genealogy of Morality, and applies this to the earlier thought of 
eternal return, whereas Ward describes these as “two different stories” with which Nietzsche is 
trying to address different problems. As I have shown in chapter four, there is evidence in the 
unpublished notes that the plural character of the will to power and the way this expresses itself 
through the moment are precisely what Nietzsche is attempting to convey with the thought of 
eternal return, even though, as I have argued, this is not something that emerges strongly enough 
from the account of the moment in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
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that relies primarily upon passages from  Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the unpublished
notes of the 1880s, with the result that the introduction of eternal return in  GS §341 is
notably absent from Deleuze’s account.4 As such, Deleuze does not at this point explicitly
address the rhythmical concerns that emerge from The Gay Science. It is only later in A
Thousand Plateaus that we find the rhythmical nature of becoming brought to the fore.
Even in Nietzsche and Philosophy which is ostensibly a presentation of Nietzsche’s, rather
than Deleuze’s, version of eternal return, we find something that appears very different to
the traditional anthropological or cosmological readings that we saw in earlier chapters. As
I  have  argued,  Nietzsche’s  own  attempt  to  express  this  through  his  account  of
Zarathustra’s experience of the moment is ultimately unsuccessful, because it presents the
moment as a break, but without allowing us to affirm this as part of the rhythmical passage
of time. We shall see that in going beyond Nietzsche’s own presentation of eternal return,
Deleuze  offers  us  a  version  of  eternal  return  that  comes  much  closer  to  addressing
Nietzsche’s original rhythmical concerns, and which develops the rhythmical account of
time that Stambaugh suggested with her reading of the moment.
Deleuze  writes  that  Nietzsche  and  Philosophy “sets  out,  primarily,  to  analyse  what
Nietzsche calls becoming,”5 to explore why becoming is such an important concept for
Nietzsche, and what it is that Nietzsche’s work introduces or reveals about becoming for
the first time. While Deleuze identifies in the opening of the work that ”Nietzsche's most
general project is the introduction of the concepts of sense and value into philosophy,”6 it is
key  that  this  does  not  devolve  into  a  reintroduction  of  established  values,7 which  as
4 Deleuze does draw on Nietzsche’s introduction of the overman in GS §335 to indicate the 
transformation that eternal return is supposed to achieve. But for the nature of eternal return itself 
he relies on other material, using notes from 1881-2 to indicate how eternal return should not be 
interpreted (as a cyclical cosmology), and then later notes from 1884 onwards to develop his own 
interpretation of eternal return as that which filters out reactive forces. I am grateful to Keith Ansell 
Pearson for sharing an unpublished piece which explores the use Deleuze made of the unpublished
notes collected as La Volonté de Puissance, and where possible details the corresponding section 
of The Will to Power.
5 NP xi
6 NP 1
7 A tendency that Deleuze detected in the period following the second world war, in which 
“everyone was all for using a concept of value, but they had completely neutralized it; they had 
subtracted all critical or creative sense from it. What they made of it was an instrument of 
established values. It was pure anti-Nietzsche—even worse, it was Nietzsche hijacked, annihilated, 
suppressed, it was Nietzsche brought back to Sunday mass.” (DI 136)
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Nietzsche  makes  clear  in  On  the  Genealogy  of  Morality  are  notoriously  skillful  in
rebranding and smuggling themselves back into prominence. Nietzsche’s project is rather
a critical approach to evaluation that allows for the creation of new values. But as I have
argued throughout this thesis, in order to see how such a critical and creative operation is
even possible,  we must first  understand how the creative futural nature of thought can
emerge from becoming – how thought is able to “split the continuum,” in a manner that
does not destroy its connection to it. I therefore argue that for Deleuze, it is the idea of the
multiplicity of becoming that is Nietzsche’s revolutionary thought. Nietzsche is the historical
figure who goes furthest to recoup becoming from its Platonic understanding as something
completely at odds with the world of being, which could only conceive it as “an unlimited
becoming, a becoming insane, a becoming hubric and guilty.”8 This chaos without borders
or limits would be utterly incapable of producing the world of things we perceive around us
were it not for “the act of a demiurge who forcibly bends it, who imposes the model of the
idea on it.”9 Platonic becoming, as intrinsically unformed, requires the external hand of
God in order to form it into beings. God, however, is dead, and Nietzsche as we saw in GS
§109 must unpick the effects of his shadow from the way we conceive becoming. If there
is no god, nothing that stands outside the world, how do we get beings from becoming?
Deleuze makes explicit that which was suggested in the previous chapter, that the answer
to this problem lies in Nietzsche’s conception of becoming itself, as that which "does not
receive its law from elsewhere," but instead "possesses its own law in itself.”10 The "law"
that becoming contains in itself is the "lucky accident"11 that allows us to see things as
beautiful. Once we move away from viewing becoming purely in terms of lack, as an empty
indeterminacy waiting for God to come and give it purpose and form, we start to see how
8 NP 26-7
9 NP 26-7
10 ibid. See PTAG §5 on the “one world” of Heraclitus, “supported by eternal unwritten laws, flowing
upward and downward in brazen rhythmic beat.” In chapter three we noted the tension between the 
untarrying rhythm of Heraclitean becoming and the “myopic” rhythm of thought that produced land 
within it, but suggested in chapter four that the key to resolving this tension lies in rethinking the 
nature of becoming as a continuum – that rather than a smooth flux, the “spikes” of this “brazen 
rhythmic beat” emerge from the differential nature of the will to power. In A Thousand Plateaus 
Deleuze and Guattari go on to develop the idea that the roots of this “myopic” vision lie within the 
rhythms of becoming itself, as the geological process of stratification and the rhythmical process of 
territorialisation (the emergence of different kinds of land, physical or named) emerge as a part of 
univocal being. 
11 GS §339
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becoming is capable of generating its own order rather than requiring this to be imposed
from outside. Instead of an opposition between being and becoming, the idea that “being
and law are present in becoming"12 begins to show us how the passage from one to the
other can occur without external intervention.
Once the Platonic legislator is out of the picture, becoming is free to entertain itself as it
sees fit, and the rules it invents are those of a game – the notion of play that we find not
only in the sense of music in The Gay Science, of the improvisor who “constantly plays the
riskiest game,”13 but continually throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as the “better players”
for whom Zarathustra is a “prelude,”14 the “playful monsters” concealed at the bottom of
Zarathustra’s  sea.15 Deleuze finds in  Thus Spoke Zarathustra  the idea that  we are all
players, but that we can learn to play  better, to think the game of becoming better. The
optimism about our prospects comes from the sense that in playing the game of becoming,
we  are  expressing  becoming  –  we  are  supported  in  our  endeavors  by  a  sense  of  a
becoming that wants to play – that is at one with us in our attempts to individuate it in
thought.  Becoming  itself  creates  this  multiplicity,  dividing  itself,  for  “in  this  game  of
becoming, the being of becoming also plays the game with itself; the  aeon (time), says
Heraclitus, is a child who plays, plays at draughts.”16 Becoming (which as we see here is
also  aeon, the time of becoming17) may appear unitary, but like the child who can play
draughts with itself  by taking on the roles of both opponents, it  encompasses different
impulses within itself. This playfulness of becoming signals its commonality with the world
around  us.  Becoming  is  not  a  Schopenhauerian  ground,  but  instead  an  “objectified
deception,”18 with  its  own  urge  towards  fiction.  As  such  it  not  only  “counts  as  more
profound, primeval, 'metaphysical', than the will to truth, to reality, to mere appearance,”19
12 NP 28
13 GS §303 
14 TSZ III ‘On Old and New Tablets’ 20 
15 TSZ II ‘On the Sublime Ones’ 
16 NP 23
17 On Deleuze's account of the two temporalities of chronos and aeon in Logic of Sense, see 
Sellars (2007) and Williams (2011:134ff).
18 NP 174
19 Deleuze (NP 174) quotes WTP §853 in which Nietzsche writes that even in The Birth of Tragedy,
"the will to appearance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming and change (to objectified 
deception) .. counts as more profound, primeval, 'metaphysical', than the will to truth, to reality, to 
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but  also  cannot  be  said  to  stand  opposed  to  them.  Becoming  differs  from being  not
because it is unindividuated, but because it is individuation. It does not passively await the
divine creation of the world, but instead invents and creates difference itself.
As with the child’s game of draughts, in Nietzsche and Philosophy the game of becoming
is split into two sides or tendencies, qualities of force that are either active and reactive.
Deleuze draws this distinction primarily from On the Genealogy of Morality, and we find the
best example of it in Nietzsche’s reworking of the Hegelian encounter between the master
and  the slave.20 In  Hegel’s  master-slave  dialectic,  each side  of  consciousness  craves
recognition from the other, and the distinction between them collapses when each realises
that  their  identity  depends  on that  which  they  are  not.21 In  the  first  essay of  On the
Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche argues that this is indeed how one half of the pairing view
this dynamic. The slave absolutely bases their existence, and their idea of what is good,
on that which they are not, because “slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to everything that
is ‘outside’,  ‘other’, ‘non-self’22 - according to this view, the master is evil,  I  am not the
master, therefore I am good. To be “good,” for the slave, is not a positive attribute, but a
lack, which is given specification negatively (to be good is to be unlike the master). This
need  to  negate  the master  precedes  and  defines  their  being,  to  the  extent  that  their
existence is  a reaction  against  their  other.  But  this  is  not  true of  the master,  who as
Nietzsche  writes  “conceives  of  the  basic  idea  ‘good’  by  himself,  in  advance  and
spontaneously, and only then creates a notion of ‘bad’!”23 The master’s evaluation of the
slave as that which differs from and therefore is worse than themselves is no more than
“an afterthought, an aside, a complementary colour, whilst  the other is the original,  the
beginning,  the  actual  deed  in  the  conception  of  slave  morality.”24 This  type  of  value-
formation is active, expressing itself as an entirely new, immanently conceived creation,
mere appearance: - the last is itself merely a form of the will to illusion"
20 If the plurality of becoming is Nietzsche’s most important insight for Deleuze, then Hegel (who 
“wanted to ridicule pluralism” NP 4) is concommitantly his most important enemy, and “anti-
Hegelianism runs through Nietzsche's work as its cutting edge” (NP 8)
21 NP 8-10 
22 GM I §10 
23 GM I §11
24 Ibid.
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acting to “impose forms, to create forms,”25 rather than reacting to something that already
exists.26
The distinction Deleuze emphasises  between active and reactive forces elucidates  the
seemingly contradictory characteristics that Nietzsche identifies within rhythm. In chapter
three,  we  explored  the  way  in  which  two  opposing  aspects  of  rhythm  emerge  from
Nietzsche's work in The Gay Science - not of flow and point, or the Dionysian and Apolline,
but  between  rhythm's  creative  and  retrogressive  properties.  Nietzsche  had  previously
located these conflicting aspects in the distinction between temporal ancient rhythm and
the accented rhythm of modernity, but is forced to conclude that both are co-present as
force and time within rhythm. Deleuze now identifies these tendencies as the becoming-
active  and becoming-reactive  of  forces  in  the  will  to  power.27 The rhythmic  difference
between the two lies in their relation to the time which constitutes them, and whether their
drive  is  to  release this  time or  to  supress and control  it.  Both are aspects of  rhythm.
However Deleuze states that we only have the ability to recognise the reactive forces of
becoming.28 In  chapter  two we noted the difficulty  of  hearing our  way out  of  our  own
familiar sense of rhythm, in which ancient rhythms sound so different to our own that we
do  not  even  recognise  them  as  rhythms.  This,  for  Deleuze,  is  why  we  understand
becoming as a reaction to or lack of static being. As creatures, we are primarily reactive.
Memory, habit, nutrition, reproduction, adaptation - and therefore also the consciousness
that emerges as the combination of all these forces - all are reactive. We are thinking with
25 NP 39
26 The relationship of active and reactive forces should nonetheless not be viewed in terms of 
temporal precedence – the time of aeon or becoming is not linear chronological time, but as we 
shall see a different kind of time which functions at an ontological level, in which “action and 
reaction are not in a relation of succession but in one of coexistence in the origin itself.” (NP 51)
27 These two qualities of force are intimately bound together for Nietzsche, as I have argued his 
engagement with the phenomon of rhythm makes clear. Understanding the relationship between 
active and reactive as non-oppositional is essential if we are to avoid the problems of nihilistic 
thought that we explored in the first chapter. Norman (2000) stresses that it is the affirmative 
character of difference that prevents a nihilistic understanding of Nietzsche's thought as a negation 
of negation, and highlights Deleuze's interpretation as one that succeeds in advancing this aspect 
of Nietzsche's work.
28 This for Nietzsche is the "administrative nihilism" which has led to the becoming-reactive of 
modern science by "spiriting away their basic concept, that of actual activity" by forcing "'adaptation'
into the foreground, which is a second-rate activity, just a reactivity, indeed life itself has been 
defined as an increasingly efficient inner adaptation to external circumstances." (GM II §12)
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reactive brains,  and it  is  therefore very hard to think outside our  accustomed reactive
perspective  and  “to  characterise  these  active  forces  for,  by  nature,  they  escape
consciousness.”29 The active forces within becoming are a rhythm that we cannot hear, like
the subtle temporal differences that we have lost the ability to perceive. Consciousness is
motivated by reactive forces, and so our attempts to think becoming can only pick up on its
reactive side. When we try to conceive what becoming might be reacting to, we imagine
for it an other – Being, Identity, Eternity, all reactively defined as that which becoming is
not. Our thought is shaped, enframed by nihilism to the extent that we cannot recognise
anything  else,  and that  is  why  “we have  the hierarchy  that  we  deserve,  we who are
essentially reactive, we who take the triumphs of reaction for a transformation of action
and slaves for new masters – we who only recognise hierarchy back to front.”30
We are right, as far as it goes - the becoming that we are aware of is reactive. But what
the  reactive  forces  in  becoming  are  reacting  to  is  not  being,  but  becoming  itself  –
becoming-active. As we have seen, becoming is able to be its own opponent, to counter its
own moves in its game of draughts. If we are able to think the multiplicity of becoming, we
will then be able to see that becoming is more than purely reactive. This is Nietzsche’s
principal importance for Deleuze. By understanding becoming as something that involves
more than one force, driven by more than one kind of quality, Deleuze says that Nietzsche
opens the way to a philosophy that can think difference as primary, because we can now
see that becoming can react to itself, rather than requiring something other than it – being,
identity – to which it must react. 
Deleuze’s examination of the nature of becoming has defined the task for eternal return.
As the transformative counter to nihilism, eternal return needs to allow us to think active,
rather than only reactive, forces. But how is it to achieve this, when “ressentiment, bad
conscience and nihilism are not psychological traits but the foundation of the humanity in
man. They are the principle of human being as such?”31 Reactive forces appear to have
the upper  hand,  not  only  because consciousness is  reactive,  but  also because active
forces  do  not  remain  active  –  they  fall  prey  to  the  depredations  of  reactive  forces,
29 NP 38
30 NP 56 
31 NP 60
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becoming reactive in their turn. This “distressing conclusion,” that not only are reactive
forces part of becoming but that “everywhere they are triumphant” explains why “we do not
feel, experience, or know any becoming but becoming-reactive.”32 As Deleuze explains,
the triumph of reactive forces comes about  not  because they are stronger than active
forces, but because the reactive force performs “a subtraction which separates active force
from what it can do and denies its difference in order to make it a reactive force.”33 As
difference,  what  the active force can do is  generate something new within  being.  The
separation from its activity is the nihilistic process we described in chapter one, in which
we excluded our creative role from the identities we created,  excluding difference and
novelty  and  instead  externalising  these  as  the  actions  of  a  malevolent  Fate.  This
apparently inevitable decline of active forces into the reactive is what we need to arrest. 
This all-encompassing sense of existence as reactive finds its temporal manifestation in
our understanding of causality, in which nothing is conceived as an immanent action but
instead as an effect of that which precedes it. An ever-non-existent past is located as the
ultimate site of  all  activity  and ultimately agency,  as we saw in chapter one when we
explored our relationship with Fate. Deleuze names causality as the first moment of the
process by which forces become reactive – in which force, before being separated from
what it can do, is first split into doer and deed, and “an imaginary relation of causality is
substituted for a real relation of significance.”34 Our inability to think in any but reactive
terms is what leads to the concept of the world and ourselves as determined - everything
is an effect, a reaction to a prior cause. As I have argued in the previous chapters, the way
that we understand time is crucial in shaping the way we conceive identities, which was
why  Nietzsche  sought  to  disrupt  our  habitual  rhythmic  time  which  succumbs  to  the
deadening power of the  ictus  with the more subtle rhythmic differentials of the time of
eternal return. Now we find here in Deleuze’s account that viewing time as the inevitable
playing out of a linear causal progress is fundamental to reactive thinking. As with the
reading of eternal return that we developed from moment time in the previous chapter, the
construction of a new relationship with time is the key to developing a new, non-nihilistic
32 NP 59
33 NP 53
34 NP 115
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mode of thought. But by recognising the active and reactive forces within the will to power,
Deleuze is able to explain more clearly how eternal return can achieve this.
For Deleuze, eternal return functions as an interruption of determinism and the oppressive
relationship with the past that we saw at work in Nietzsche’s presentation of rhythmic time.
Specifically, Deleuze’s eternal return achieves this through encouraging us to reconfigure
our relationship with chance, which as we have seen is what we must affirm as necessary
if we are to make things beautiful, in the kind of love Nietzsche names amor fati. Chance is
that which lies outside reaction, and therefore that which we struggle to understand as part
of  the  becoming-reactive  that  is  available  to  consciousness  in  thought.  The nature  of
becoming as multiple presents the multiplicity of beings in the world in a new light. The role
of chance in eternal return, and how this operates within a non-causal time, is what will
allow us to hear the forces that actively emerge from becoming rather than operating as a
predetermined effect of the past. 
The nature of becoming as a plurality of forces, either active or reactive in character, is
crucial  for  Deleuze’s  reading  which  distinguishes  Nietzsche’s  own  position  from  the
scientific “proofs” in which he thinks through the implications of a mechanistic view of the
universe,  and  which  as  we  have  seen  are  taken  up  by  the  cosmological  reading  as
Nietzsche’s  own understanding of  eternal  return.  We need to differentiate Nietzschean
becoming from the mechanistic view of becoming which results in the idea of “the great
dice game of existence,“35 in which a finite number of forces necessarily produce repetition
across infinite time.36 In this great game of becoming we, the player, must imagine the
different forces as dice. We have a handful of these dice, which we throw again and again.
But there is no goal that would offer a resolution or winning condition for this game - the
game stretches on into infinity, and “in infinite time, every possible combination would at
some time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times.”37
Eventually, we would throw the same combinations of dice, in the same order, again.. and
again.. an infinite number of times. Nietzsche concludes that according to the mechanistic
35 WTP §1066 (March-June 1888)
36 Widder traces Nietzsche's rejection of this mechanistic conception, which rules out an 
understanding of eternal return as a recurrence of the same (Widder 2008:7).
37 WTP §1066 (March-June 1888)
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view, a multiplicity of forces of becoming would result in “the world as a circular movement
that has already repeated itself  infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum.”38 There
would be constant change, but nothing new. The mechanistic conception of the universe,
which  imagines  that  these  finite  forces  must  eventually  reach  a  final  state,  therefore
undoes itself. We must find a new way to understand the relationship of force and time.
We saw in chapter four that the ever-changing nature of force as it emerges in moment
time severs any possibility of the mechanistic causal connections that are entailed in this
unbroken circular movement. Deleuze now explicitly reconfigures the nature of the game
by  changing  the  perspective  of  the  player,  and  their  relationship  with  chance.  The
mechanistic “proof” of eternal return operates as a totality built not from the throws, but
from their results, in which we are not playing the game, but processing it as a table of
numbers after  the  event.  The mechanistic  understanding places us outside the game,
outside even the infinity of time that the experiment encompasses, taking up the position of
the  eternal  divine  agent  of  novelty  that  Nietzsche  has  eradicated  from the  de-deified
universe of  GS  §109. Deleuze concentrates instead on the moment of  each individual
dicethrow, from the perspective of becoming itself – from the perspective of the player.39
And we find that what is missing from the mechanistic account is another moment which
comes before the combination  of  results  is  determined,  in  which the dice  are thrown.
Considered individually then, rather than as part of a series recorded than after the event,
each throw of the dice contains  two  moments. In the first, secret moment, the dice are
thrown into the air - all combinations are possible, we know that anything can happen. This
is the moment of chance. But we also know that the dice must fall to earth again. This, the
second moment, is necessity. This is the return of eternal return that Deleuze is talking
about in Nietzsche and Philosophy - not the return of a moment, a thing, or of some kind of
cycle  of  the  whole  of  time,  but  the  return  of  the  forces  of  the  past  in  a  particular
combination. The moment theory of time that we explored in the previous chapter identifies
difference in the return of the moment. Now Deleuze further specifies this difference as the
double moments of the dice thrown and then returning as they fall.
38 Ibid. Deleuze explains the mechanistic “proof” as an “apologetic” defense of eternal return, 
mobilised when it is a question of “defeating the bad player on his own ground” (NP 190 note 23).
39 See Conway (1998) who emphasises that Nietzsche too “is concerned not with a repetition of 
dicethrows, dutifully choreographed by the sterile statistician, but with the repetition contained within
a single, fatal throw of the Dionysian cubes.”
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This is how Deleuze refines the “cosmological and physical doctrine”40 of eternal return, by
reading  it  as  an ontological  account  of  becoming,  which  helps  us  to  understand how
something  new can emerge  into  being,  rather  than as  the product  of  reactive  forces,
determined by the past. By interrogating the idea of the dicethrow found in the mechanistic
account, Deleuze separates necessity from determinism - it is necessary that  something
will  happen, that the dice will  fall,  but  what this is is not determined.  This is how time
passes rather than being caught up or enchained in causality, and this is how the creativity
of thought takes place. But in order for this creative thought to happen, our attitude to the
game of becoming and time is of crucial importance. We must not only understand, but
affirm, both moments. We previously stated that the test of affirmation in the traditional
anthropological reading of eternal return was insufficient, because it did not encompass
the moment of selection. Deleuze's reading incorporates this successfully with the second
aspect of eternal return, in which the anthropological reading is reborn as an “ethical and
selective thought,”41 as which we affirm not only the role of chance, but also the movement
into  being.  In  the  first  moment,  when  the  dice  are  thrown,  we  affirm  becoming  as
multiplicity. But the dice, once thrown, must fall to earth. Chance must lead to necessity.
And it  is  this second affirmation,  as one particular  combination of  forces emerges and
takes hold of the phenomenon, that affirms becoming as being, affirming the unity of this
multiplicity in the dice that fall.42 When we live the passage of time, rather than placing
ourselves outside it, we find that the chain of determinism is broken, because the second
moment of necessity must always be preceded by this first moment of chance.
The world in which the mechanistic account of the dicethrow takes place is one in which
we are all too painfully aware of our lack of any goal. We are attempting to play a game
40 NP 43
41 NP 63
42 Woodward, while he recognises that Deleuze's understanding of eternal return is not a 
dialectical negation of negation, does however accuse him of replacing our devalued former values 
with a new ontological "guarantee" of difference, in which "multiplicity, becoming, and chance might 
provide just as much existential security as unity, being, and necessity," but in a manner that 
devalues life, as "the affirmation of the abstract conception of life, as pure process of creation, 
implies the negation and destruction of all the actual life of this world." (Woodward 2013) This, I 
argue, is to miss the aspect of double affirmation that Deleuze calls for with eternal return, in which 
not just chance, but also the necessity and actuality of particular combinations of forces must be 
affirmed.
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with rules, but the last page of the rulebook has been torn away with the death of God, and
so we throw on and on with no winning condition in sight. Deleuze draws instead on the
image of the playing child that we touched upon in chapter three, and which also runs
throughout  Thus Spoke Zarathustra,  to ask us to reimagine this  endless game as the
creative play of the child, or the artist. In the first moment, we pick up the identities we
have created, and consider them as all the possible forces which could take them up - we
think them not in the set pattern they have been, but free of these ties (dinosaur in chess
set, in medieval castle, in cutlery drawer). In the second moment, we actualise them as
one of these possible combinations. The key to this creative process is the affirmation of
eternal return itself, which differs in kind from all the options - unlike the bad player, we are
not  looking  for  a  particular  combination.  We are  not  Veruca  Salt’s  father,  setting  his
workers to shelling a million chocolate bars in the hope of finding one golden ticket, relying
on the sheer weight of probability to produce this in the end. In order to be good players, in
order  to  be  good  thinkers,  we  must  embrace  free  play.  We  must  affirm  chance,  by
affirming  the  possibility  that  any  of  the  numbers  may  come  up.  We  must  affirm  the
selective operation of the moment that produces the beautiful moments of GS §339, rather
than the return of particular events or contents within any individual moment.
Thinking the future via an affirmation of this moment of chance allows us to break the
causality of habit and interrupt the deadening nihilistic rhythm of thought in which we form
identities along set lines and relations because that is the way we formed them before.
Instead, we have to throw them up, into the air, affirming all of the outcomes. And there
has to be the moment of chance in order to produce the moment of destiny - if the dice are
to land, if there are to be any forces emerging into the world as being, then they must be
thrown first. The dicethrow of eternal return, as the simultaneous affirmation of chance and
necessity, indicates not only that “necessity does not suppress or abolish chance,” but that
”unity does not suppress or deny multiplicity.”43 The unity of being is not opposed to the
multiplicity of becoming, the fallen dice to the thown dice, but instead the second moment
is a completion, an affirmation, of the first. What we are affirming in these two moments
therefore is difference – the multiplicity of the possible combinations, but affimed within the
unity of the selection that emerges from the throw. The way in which forces become does
43 NP 24
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not  reactively  deny  the  force  of  becoming,  but  affirms  it  as  the  transformation  into
existence that is what an active force can do.
This is why Deleuze insists that only active forces return in the dicethrow of eternal return,
because the necessity of the second moment is built on the first moment of chance, rather
than determinism. Chance does not react - there is no wind that skews the dice, there are
no  weighted  sides  which  force  a  particular  combination.  On  an  ontological  level,  the
affirmation of chance, of the plurality and becoming of forces, must take place before there
can  be  the  return  of  this  becoming  as  being.  The  role  of  chance,  which  as  Deleuze
stresses is “the opposite of a  continuum.”44 creates not only the space for novelty but,
when conceived as the first moment of the dicethrow, indicates how a future can emerge
from this break.  Deleuze therefore suggests that  the task of  thinking eternal  return,  in
which  there  is  no  static  being  but  rather  the  return  of  the  moment  of  difference  that
produces  this  effect,  "must  be  formulated  in  yet  another  way,"  as  the problem of  the
passage of time:
how can the past be constituted in time? How can the present pass? The passing 
moment could never pass if it were not already past and yet to come - at the same 
time as being present. If the present did not pass of its own accord, if it had to wait 
for a new present in order to become past, the past in general would never be 
constituted in time, and this particular present would not pass. We cannot wait, the 
moment must be simultaneously present and past, present and yet to come, in 
order for it to pass (and to pass for the sake of other moments). The present must 
coexist with itself as past and yet to come.45
We saw in the previous chapter that Nietzsche's attempt to convey the discontinuity of time
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra fails because it does not allow us to affirm the passage of time.
The cessation of  time that Zarathustra experiences in the hours of  midnight  and noon
takes place beyond the earth, without  the rhythmic beat that allows us to think and to
affirm  time  as  both  flow  and  point,  as  the  discontinuous  moment  in  its  essential
relationship to the passage of time. If we are to be able to affirm time in the rhythmic mode
in which it appears to us, then we need to understand not only how the moment is always
different  to  the  past,  but  also  how it  emerges from the past.  Only  by recognising  the
interdependence of present, past, and future in this manner will we learn to hear and to
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think the rhythms of the future and to affirm the temporal individuations, including our own,
that are constructed as this passage of time.
Nietzsche and Philosophy therefore brings out the idea that eternal return functions as not
just  a break in time,  but  as the motor of its passage, as "the synthetic relation of  the
moment  to  itself  as  present,  past  and  future  [which]  grounds  it[s]  relation  to  other
moments.”46 The development of this idea however is not found in Nietzsche's own work
(either  published  or  unpublished),  or  in  Nietzsche  and  Philosophy,  but  in  Deleuze's
account  of  time  in Difference  and  Repetition.  We must  turn  here to  understand  why
Deleuze insists that “eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis; a synthesis of time
and its dimensions,”47 and the way in which its role within this synthesis shows how “the
eternal return is thus an answer to the problem of passage."48
Univocal being and the three syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition
In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze argues that eternal return is the way in which forces
become, via a selection in which only active forces return. In  Difference and Repetition,
published six years later, he encompasses and revises this reading of eternal return within
his own ontology of difference. Eternal return is part of a temporal process that involves
different levels of repetition and synthesis, and Deleuze argues here that these different
syntheses are together what make up time. The three syntheses that Deleuze describes
are,  I  argue,  fundamentally  rhythmic in nature.  Specifically,  they reveal the role of  the
caesura in generating the two supposedly contradictory aspects of rhythm as point and
flow.  We understand rhythm on the one hand as something inherently  multiple,  which
necessarily contains many beats. But we also talk about the rhythm of a piece in the sense
of overarching flow, such as the rhythm of a life, in which disparate events are linked into a
cohesive whole. Deleuze's account of time in Difference and Repetition expresses both of
these aspects of rhythm, drawn together via eternal return in the third synthesis, the empty
form  of  time  that  synthesises  the  first  two.  Deleuze's  account  of  time  as  the  three
syntheses thus functions as a development of Nietzsche's intimation that "rhythm is... the
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form  of  time"49 almost  one  hundred  years  previously. We shall  therefore  turn  now to
Difference and Repetition, to see how eternal return functions within Deleuze’s ontology to
transform the multiplicity of becoming into thinkable and individuated beings in the world
around us. 
We saw that in Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze developed an account of becoming as
plural,  with eternal return as the filter that selects the active forces which will  become,
returning as being. Deleuze identifies this idea of the plural nature of becoming as "the
great discovery of Nietzsche's philosophy, which marks his break with Schopenhauer and
goes under the name of the will to power or the Dionysian world.”50 As we saw in chapter
two,  Nietzsche’s  earliest  work  was  influenced  by  the  Schopenhauerian  insight  that
identities, such as the self we feel ourselves to be, have no existence in the abyss of
becoming. Schopenhauer believed that this wrenching of a single undivided Will into life as
the plurality of being was the cause of our suffering in the world. But as Deleuze continues
to argue in Difference and Repetition, Nietzsche did not equate the lack of identity with the
absence of individuation in this becoming, which:
is neither an impersonal nor an abstract Universal beyond individuation. On the 
contrary, it is the I and the self which are the abstract universals. They must be 
replaced, but in and by individuation, in the direction of the individuating factors 
which consume them and which constitute the fluid world of Dionysus. What cannot 
be replaced is individuation itself. Beyond the self and the I we find not the 
impersonal but the individual and its factors, individuation and its fields, individuality 
and its pre-individual singularities."51
This, for Deleuze, is the key point. ln order to think pre-individual becoming, we should not
be pushing towards that which is more abstract, towards an uninterrupted singular whole.
If we do so, ending up with an abstract Universal such as Schopenhauer’s will as Idea, we
do not escape identity, but instead produce a giant super-identity that has subsumed the
whole world within it, which has excluded plurality and difference along with the individual.
Nietzsche’s main insight for Deleuze is that we need to move in the other direction, if we
are  to  think  becoming  -  toward  more difference,  not  less.  He  argues  that  prior  to
49 eKGWB Nachgelassene Fragmente 1871 (see ch 2 note 30)
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51 Ibid. As in Nietzsche and Philosophy, it is this plural nature of becoming that is the most 
important aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy for Deleuze, with eternal return as the temporal process 
that reveals the plurality to us as becoming becomes.
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individuated beings, we find not a flat continuum, waiting to be divided into beings, but
instead the process of individuation itself. In Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze described
how becoming was populated by two kinds of forces, active and reactive. In  Difference
and Repetition he develops the nature of this pre-individuated becoming as “difference in
itself.”  As  in  Nietzsche  and  Philosophy,  becoming does  not  have  the  status  of  a  flat
indeterminate  morass,  passively  waiting  to  be  carved  into  beings  by  the  hand  of  an
external ground (whether this be God or the power of the negative). Instead it is an active,
roiling  surge  of  “formless  ungrounded chaos  which  has  no  law  other  than  its  own
repetition, its own reproduction in the development of that which diverges and decentres.”52
Now however the distinction of active and reactive is absent from Deleuze’s account of
becoming, as he emphases the multiple nature of being as one. Instead we find the idea of
primary difference as the self-differentiation of being,  of  being and the individuation  of
being as one. This is what Deleuze calls the “univocity of being.” The idea that being is
univocal, that it speaks with one voice, seems on the face of it a strange way to invoke
difference and individuation. How can speaking with one voice be difference? For Deleuze,
univocity expresses the idea that being as becoming is not opposed to the way it manifests
in the world as beings. There is no division between becoming and being, they do not
speak  different  languages,  which  require  an  untranslatable  conversion  as  a  smooth
continuum or unitary Will of becoming unaccountably dissolves into individuated beings.
Instead the “voice” we hear in the world around us is also the voice of becoming, a voice
that  produces itself.53 In  Difference and Repetition we find that  the difference between
becoming and being lies not in the nature of the song, but in its repetition. It is through
repetition, through the play of eternal return, that we are able to “isolate and delimit” that
52 DR 82
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which is individuated in being ”as a life in itself,”54 but as a repetition that develops within
the melody itself, without an identity that precedes this repetition. 
Deleuze reiterates in Difference and Repetition that Nietzsche’s “eternal return is in no way
the return of a same, a similar, or an equal,”55 but of difference, and must be understood as
a filter that operates on the forces in becoming, in which only those that go to the limit of
what  they can do emerge to find expression as being. The forces which pass through
eternal return, and the others that remain unexpressed in being, are all trying to transform
into something new, to pass to their limit and then beyond, and become something else.
The only thing that separates them, the successful from the unsuccessful attempts, is that
the  filter  of  “eternal  return  alone  effects  the  true  selection,  because  it  eliminates  the
average forms,”56 and so the forces that pass the test of eternal return are more what they
can  be,  because  they  transform  and  become  something  different.  Deleuze  therefore
argues  that  “eternal  return  is  the  univocity  of  being,  the  effective  realisation  of  that
univocity,”57 because the movement of eternal return will not permit us to privilege identity
over difference - it is “at once both production of repetition on the basis of difference and
selection of difference on the basis of repetition.”58 The three syntheses of time are an
account of how this production and selection that we first explored in the first chapter take
place.
In the first chapter of Difference and Repetition Deleuze describes becoming as a process
in which eternal return filters forces to allow through only those which go to their limit. In
chapter two he approaches this from the opposite direction, to understand the process that
contitutes us as subjects that can experience these beings. Beginning with our experience
of  time,  Deleuze  works  progressively  deeper  to  explore  the  different  repetitions  that
constitute the foundation of our experience, the ground, and finally uncovers eternal return
as that which “ungrounds,” opening up the space to make possible our experience of time,
and of ourselves as temporal beings. We shall see that for Deleuze, time does not just
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structure  our  experience,  but  also  constitutes  the  self  that  has,  or  better,  is these
experiences. Rather than the Kantian search for the conditions of possible experience,
Deleuze is concerned with discovering the “conditions of real experience” - not what can
happen, but what does happen, and these conditions “are indistinguishable from intensity”
understood as non-oppositional, non-representative, primary difference.59 His account of
the different kinds of difference present in three distinct, but interdependent, syntheses of
time is an attempt to explain not how the multiple forces of becoming are able to transform
into the individuated beings that we perceive, but the conditions under which they actually
do, what it is that makes this take place, working backwards to find eternal return at the
root of this experience.
In order to understand how the theory of time Deleuze develops here extends the rhythmic
theory of time that we traced throughout Nietzsche's work, I will look at each of the three
syntheses  in  turn,  and  show how we need  to  understand  time as  involving  all  these
aspects:  the  linkages  of  habit  in  the  first  synthesis,  the  sense  of  flow in  the  second
synthesis, and how this is “ungrounded” in the caesura as the self-dividing nature of time
in the third synthesis. I argued in chapter three that rhythm and the rhythmical nature of
thought is the problem that Nietzsche takes up in  The Gay Science, and that he uses
eternal return to disrupt our current overly-accented and nihilistic rhythm. We then saw
how  a  theory  of  moment  time  emerges  from Nietzsche’s  unpublished  notes.  Here  in
Deleuze’s account of the three syntheses we find a theory of time that I argue is rhythmic
in nature (even though Deleuze does not name it as such). 
Nietzsche argues that the repetition we find with eternal return is one in which “everything
recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being."60 Nothing
persists or perdures, but some things or phenomena appear to return or repeat, and this
repetition is what creates the impression of static being. The underlying question then is
how do we come to perceive this repetition that produces the impression of static being as
its effect? What is it that allows us to link one instance or occurence of a beat to another,
in the rhythmic process that we described in chapter two that allows us to smooth these
irregular  differences  into  something  that  we  perceive  as  the  repetition  of  the  same?
59 DR 291
60 WTP §617 (1883-1885)
185
Deleuze now takes up this question, examining what happens when we perceive individual
phenomena (A) as repeating occurences within a series: A A A.. Let us translate this into
the rhythmical language that Nietzsche used in his early investigations - “A A A..” becomes
♪ ♪ ♪.. . As a rhythmical rather than logical series, A  ≠ A. No note is the same, and the
repetition is always of the irregular, the different. What is it, Deleuze asks, that allows us to
connect these disparate events, and on the basis of this expect a fourth beat? We do not
consciously analyse our surroundings to draw such series from them - and even in the
cases where we do (waiting for the other shoe to fall, expecting a particular coworker to be
late on a Monday) any conscious attempt to discern and predict the pattern is based on an
ability  to  firstly  retain,  but  then  also  to  link,  the  preceding  occurrences,  to  forge  a
connection between one beat and another. 
This ability to connect beats or instants must exist, and yet it is not  our ability, it is not
something we consciously do. Deleuze describes it as a habit - and yet it is not our habit,
either. It is what Deleuze describes as a passive synthesis, the habit of contracting habits.
A passive synthesis  is not a synthesis that we perform, but one that we are.  Deleuze
explains this by saying that the retention and the connection of these impressions or beats
are not two separate moments, two separate things that consciousness does, but rather
one movement of contraction that forms consciousness - indeed, that  is consciousness.
Nietzsche  insists  that  the  distinction  we  draw  between  doer  and  deed,  between  the
lightning and the action of flashing, is a false separation. Similarly, Deleuze says that to
make a divide between consciousness, the reception of impressions, their retention, and
connection,  is  to  misunderstand what  consciousness is.  Consciousness is  the flash of
lightning.  Consciousness is a habit,  which develops through the repetitive reception of
stimuli  as contracted or wrapped together.  The ability  to contract  several  beats into a
pattern or rhythm is something that develops into us, as consciousness. This is why it is
not our habit, not a habit that belongs to us - we are the habit. The stimuli of the world
slate down like rain upon the ground, and we are the hollow that forms underneath their
pressure and collects them like a puddle. This is what consciousness is.
And it is not just our consciousness, but our whole being that is made up of these different
abilities to retain and link - to contract - stimuli such as air, food, light. All beings are made
up of  these habits,  organisms as souls,  which “must  be attributed to the heart,  to the
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muscles,  nerves  and  cells  ...  whose  entire  function  is  to  contract  a  habit.”61 These
contracting souls are rhythms, collections of discrete points that are linked together. And
their temporality is a crucial feature of the nature of a rhythm. The beats of a rhythm are
not points in space, but moments in time. Aristoxenus wrote that we must be able to hear a
rhythm in order to consider it as such, and Deleuze now stresses that this ability is what
we are. The ability to hear or perceive a rhythm, to contract disparate beats into one single
sense of identity, is what our consciousness is. We find here the layered sense of division
and  repetition  that  we  found  when  we  explored  rhythm  through  Aristoxenus,  as  he
described the repetitions of time split  into beats, but then collected, split,  and repeated
again as the bar or meter. For Deleuze however it is not a case of time being split apart by
this  rhythmical  perception.  Being  is  univocal  -  already  multiple,  whether  it  has  been
gathered as consciousness or not. Rather than splitting becoming apart, it is time that is
gathered together, as this contraction of that which is inherently different into rhythms. 
The habit of rhythmical perception is the consciousness with which we think. As I look
around the room, I am the habits that are producing me even as I type, I am the rhythmical
activity of contracting all of my past habits and future expectations into this one moment,
this one beat - and then of doing it  again,  and again. We do not form such a habit  –
instead, we are its rhythmical performance. This is the passive synthesis of the present, in
which our awareness of our desires and needs and our simultaneous inheritance of that
which has made us are combined into a lived experience that is produced from both past
and future. 
This is the first synthesis of time that Deleuze outlines, in which the living present that we
experience comes about through a contraction of instants, the same process of contraction
that  is  at  work  in  rhythmical  perception.  It  is  this  passive  synthesis  that  produces
consciousness, and that therefore makes any active synthesis possible, in which we are
consciously aware of something as repetition. But in order for the passive synthesis of
habit to take place, something else is required. “The claim of the present is precisely that it
passes,”62 so there must be something for it to pass into, that will allow it to pass away. In
order for rhythm as a series of beats to be perceptible, there must also be another sense
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of rhythm at work - that of a continuous flow. The sense of rhythm as something inherently
divided seems to be at  odds with the other sense in which it  is  used - as something
smooth  and  coherent.  But  we not  only  contract  the  beats  we hear,  the  sense  of  the
previous beats leading up to the current one, and the imminent sense of which beats we
expect  to  follow.  We also  embed these individual  beats  into  our  sense of  the rhythm
overall. This is what takes place in Deleuze’s second passive synthesis of time, that which
“causes the present to pass, that to which the present and habit belong, which must be
considered the ground of time.”63
Whilst in the first synthesis the past and future were contracted into and resonated within
each single beat or moment, in order for this to happen we must also be able to hear these
beats as coexistent within an overall pattern or flow. Deleuze calls this sense of time as a
continuum the pure past, which can be assessed only as an absent event, rather than
while we are living it  as present.  We noted in the first chapter the problem of how we
initially delimit  phenomena as part of a melody, as a life in itself.  This is the operation
indicated by the pure past, in which a decision already made scopes the extent of what we
consider to be part of the melody. This selection or decision is once again not made by us
as the experiencing subject, but is once again a passive synthesis. Whereas the past and
potential  future beats of  the  series  of  the first  synthesis  emerged from the contracted
present, in the second synthesis the present is now implicated within the pure past, just as
the beat that we hear is a part of the overall rhythm of a piece, but as the most lightly
embedded moment within our overall sense of the piece. Whereas in the first synthesis
repetition draws  off  a  difference,  in  the  second  synthesis  the  difference  lies  between
different levels of repetition, as the entirety of the past is contracted into a point as the
present, a present which “designates the most contracted degree of an entire past, which
is itself like a coexisting totality.”64 It is this synthesis that gives us the sense of a past that
embraces within it absolutely everything in one long continuum, which we call "destiny."65 It
is this aspect of the past that characterises the oppressive character of time, that we focus
upon as the inescapable “it was” that has moved beyond our control. The “rhythm of a life,”
a phrase conveying a sense of unity and coherence through movement, is this aspect of
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the pure past - something that is said of that which has passed, with the sense of a eulogy.
The pure past must be there, grounding the present and giving it somewhere into which it
can pass. As with the first synthesis of the present, the second synthesis which layers
moments into the pure past is not something that we do - it is another passive synthesis
which makes possible the first passive synthesis of time, from which our consciousness
emerges.  It  is  not  the rhythm as we hear and experience it  in  the present,  and yet  it
grounds this present experience, providing the sense of rhythm as unified whole into which
we can embed the present, and hear the layering of rhythms as part of an overall rhythm,
delimited as a life in itself. 
In his account of the three syntheses of time Deleuze is proceeding backwards, starting
with  the  repetition  in  the  first  synthesis  that,  while  still  not  something  that  we  are
consciously aware of or that we actively do, is closest to the rhythms that we hear, to the
repetitions we are aware of in our everyday life. From here he explores another kind of
repetition in the second synthesis as the sense of rhythmic continuity that must be present,
if the first synthesis with its rhythmic contraction is to take place. This sense of continuity is
that which we had previously charactised as the flowing, in contrast to the divided, aspect
of rhythm. But this synthesis of the pure past is immobile, founded on the unrepresentable
and irrecuperable moment of delimitation. It is what provides the sense of coherence to the
contracted moments of the first synthesis, but not what makes them pass. We discover
then that this second kind of repetition too requires yet a deeper, different kind of time in
order to happen - the third synthesis, the time of eternal return. By this point, we are very
far from anything that we would usually understand as time. But by working backwards in
this fashion Deleuze hopes to show the lines connecting the alien movement of eternal
return as the movement of becoming with thought as the third synthesis of time. 
Finally,  then,  there is  the third synthesis  of  the future.  As in the case of  the  first  two
syntheses,  the  third  synthesis  is  contrasted  to  Kant’s  model  of  an  active  synthesis
performed  by  the  subject,  which  creates  the  time  that  structures  experience.  For  the
Kantian subject, it is the relationship between present and past that forms a Venn diagram
that provides the bounds for our identity. But for Deleuze the third, and most important,
synthesis of time is neither active nor passive. For the third synthesis is eternal return,
which  “ceaselessly  rumbles”  within  becoming, “the  theatre  of  all  metamorphosis  or
difference  in  itself.”66 Eternal  return  does  not  ensure  the return  of  identities,  but  their
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destruction – they are forbidden to return, even in the next moment.67 Eternal return is the
event of becoming itself, in which there are no subjects to perform syntheses or even to be
passively affected or constituted by them (as with the present and the past). The synthesis
of eternal return, as that which selects difference into being, is what makes it possible for
the other two subject-constituting syntheses to occur. It achieves this through a destruction
of  the  old,  the  existent,  Deleuze’s  reconfiguration  of  the  active  destruction  that  is
highlighted  in  Nietzsche  and  Philosophy when  reactive  forces  are  turned  against
themselves and transformed into a becoming-active in the filter of eternal return. But in
Difference and Repetition eternal return as futural becoming is explicitly identified as not
just  the  end  of  reactive  forces,  but  the  end  of  time.  It  excludes  anything  that  has  a
persisting identity (for nothing that remains, that has not gone, can return) but in so doing
also creates the identity of “the same and the similar” which “are fictions engendered by
the  eternal  return.”68 It  guarantees  the  possibility  of  a  future,  in  which  these  fictional
identities come to be, while at the same time ensuring that this future will  be different,
these identities necessarily non-identical to what has come before:
...what would eternal return be, if we forgot that it is a vertiginous movement endowed 
with a force: not one which causes the return of the Same in general, but one which 
selects, one which expels as well as creates, destroys as well as produces? 
Nietzsche’s leading idea is to ground the repetition in eternal return on both the death 
of God and the dissolution of the self.69
Eternal return is a repetition that  destroys the agent  or  self  who emerged through the
contraction of the discrete beats or moments of the living present. It destroys the pure
past, the smooth impenetrable sense of time as an undivided whole, decentring the divine
circle of changeless eternity. Prefiguring both the self and God, it is that which expels both
the present moment and the “it was” of the past, and makes something new come in its
place. By filtering out the Same, eternal return destroys the carefully constructed identities
of both the subject and time that were created in the first two syntheses. But by destroying
them  it  makes  it  possible  for  them  to  happen  again,  for  time  to  continue.  It  is  this
67 DR 372 "...the eternal return is the internal identity of the world and of chaos, the Chaosmos. 
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destruction of the subject that we saw in  Thus Spoke Zarathustra in which Zarathustra’s
experience of the moment signals his death.
Deleuze suggests that “Thus Spoke Zarathustra is unfinished, and that it was supposed to
have  a  further  section  concerning  the  death  of  Zarathustra.”70 As  a  living  subject,
Zarathustra  cannot  convey  the  experience  of  eternal  return,  because  it  cannot  be
experienced  –  it  is  that  which  constitutes  the  experiencing  subject,  emerging  as  the
individuation of a becoming that contains nothing individual and that permits nothing to
remain. Deleuze cites circular  texts such as Joyce’s  Finnegan’s Wake as works which
indicate the repetitive production of  difference which we find in  eternal  return,  texts in
which identity is revealed as “simulacra” as the identity of both the object (text) and subject
(reader) is dissolved by the impossibility of stating a first or original point. The repetition of
eternal return is the motor that produces this decentring, in which anything we might try to
grasp as an identity is already different from itself from the outset - there is no start or end,
“all resemblance abolished so that one can no longer point to the existence of an original
and a copy.”71 The “objectified deception”72 that we find in the game of becoming produces
these  simulacra  in  which  we  cannot  distinguish  between  source  and  its  object-child.
Eternal return, which (as in Nietzsche and Philosophy) is responsible for the emergence of
these  repetitions  as  individuated  beings,  is  not  a  mechanism  that  stands  outside
becoming,73 but instead the individuating factor of self-differentiating being, the differential
force of this chaos in which “everywhere,  the depth of difference is primary.”74 Eternal
return is therefore something that returns “at the cost of the resemblance and identity of
Zarathustra himself:  Zarathustra must  lose these,  the resemblance of  the Self  and the
70 DR 370 At a conference on Nietzsche organised by Deleuze in 1964, he notes the difficult task 
of reconstructing Nietzsche’s ideas: “We must not forget that the Eternal Return and the Will to 
Power, the two most fundamental concepts in the Nietzschean corpus, are hardly introduced at all. 
They never did receive the extended treatment Nietzsche intended. In particular, you will recall that 
Zarathustra cannot be said to have articulated or formulated the eternal return, which is on the 
contrary hidden in the four books of Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None... And 
Nietzsche's notes, in this case, do not permit us to anticipate how he would have organized any 
future essays concerning it.” (DI 117-8)
71 DR 82
72 NP 174
73 DR 81 "as Nietzsche said, chaos and eternal return are not two different things."
74 DR 62
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identity of the I must perish, and Zarathustra must die.”75 However, as we saw in chapter
four, the death of Zarathustra and the sleep of time indicates only the breakdown of the
continuum of the past. It does not allow us to affirm the passage of time as that which
allows  continual  creation  from  this  destruction.  Eternal  return  cannot  be  affirmed  as
something experienced by the subject, and instead must be understood and affirmed as
an ontology. The only possible “final part” to Thus Spoke Zarathustra would therefore be
something like Deleuze’s own reading of eternal return, as that which both disrupts and
generates narrative and therefore cannot  be encompassed within  any trajectory of  the
subject, whether living or dead.
In the third synthesis of time the grounding effect of the pure past is in its turn ungrounded
by the discontinuous time of the future. As such, it is what drives time, by generating the
movement of passage and provides us with a future into which to move. The subject, as
we have seen, is constructed from the contractions of habit in the first synthesis, and the
layered contractions of memory in the second synthesis. These must be related to each
other, the present must be allowed to pass into the past of memory, in order for us to
experience the passage of time. The third synthesis of time is what allows the first and
second syntheses to produce the subject, through a generative inequality that separates
our sense of what is past from the present. As Somers-Hall puts it, "the empty and pure
form of  time is  therefore  that  which  bifurcates  itself  into  the  past  of  memory  and the
present of habit."76 This sense of bifurcation or separation that we found in Nietzsche's
work on Aristoxenus, in which time appeared to us through a process of division, can now
be identified as the individuating rhythm of the future. The future is the dimension of time
which makes use of the repetitions of the past and the present, but which in doing so
moves beyond and destroys them, so that “in all three syntheses, present, past and future
are revealed as Repetition, but in very different modes. The present is the repeater, the
past  is  repetition  itself,  but  the  future  is  that  which  is  repeated."77 The  importance  of
75 DR 372
76 Somers-Hall 2011. As Somers-Hall notes, this past and present need not be empirical events - 
there is no sense of succession such as we find bound up in the first synthesis - but it is rather "the 
formal relations that present the metaphysical structure of temporality" that are generated within the
third synthesis of time.
77 DR 117
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chance and the dicethrow that we found in Nietzsche and Philosophy is now given context
as this third repetition, which is the source of difference, which has 
...no origin except these rules which are formally distinct for this ontologically unique
throw. This is the point at which the ultimate origin is overturned into an absence of 
origin (in the always displaced circle of the eternal return).78
As  part  of  the  three  syntheses,  eternal  return  performs  a  selective  function  as  the
gatekeeper of a living, shifting reality through its role as the form of time which “is itself the
new, complete novelty .. the future as such.”79 In the account of time in  Difference and
Repetition the dicethrow that shows necessity emerging from chance is more explicitly
read as a break or caesura within the moment.80 Rather than a causal chain in which each
moment is pulled inevitably after another, we have the disruption of eternal return, which
breaks these links.
Deleuze thinks that this is how eternal return forces us to perform “a Copernican revolution
which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept,” as a result of which
identity would lose the primacy we have come to accord it and instead exist “as a second
principle, as a principle become” in such a way “that it revolve around the Different.”81 This
final synthesis of time is what Deleuze calls the empty form of time - the time of the future,
in which eternal return functions as the movement of  forces to their  limit,  so that they
transform into something else. The rhythms of the first and second syntheses of time are
apparently disrupted, in this “pure order of time”82 which, according to Holderlin: 
78 DR 354
79 DR 113
80 Nietzsche in contrast notes in his reading of Aristoxenus that "rhythm has no caesura, but only 
the rhythmizomena" or thing made rhythmic ("Der Rhythmus hat keine Cäsuren, sondern nur die 
υθμιζό-μεναῥ. Unterscheidung zwishchen ῥυθμός und ρυθμιζόμευου " KGW 2:3:166). This I suggest is more characteristic of the less nuanced 
understanding of the rhythm of continuous becoming that we find operating in The Birth of Tragedy. 
As I have argued, eternal return is intended to function as precisely this kind of disruption or 
caesura within Nietzsche's thought, and it is this aspect that we find brought out within Deleuze's 
reading of eternal return.
81 DR 50
82 DR 111
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...no longer 'rhymed', because it was distributed unequally on both sides of a 
'caesura', as a result of which beginning and end no longer coincided. We may 
define the order of time as this purely formal distribution of the unequal in the 
function of a caesura.83
In  this  third,  “static  synthesis”84 of  time,  its  ground in  the rhythmic  flow of  the second
synthesis  is  overturned.  The  time  of  eternal return  therefore  marks  a  fundamental
inequality, a caesura or cut in which the force before is not equal to the force after the
event of eternal return. The caesura – a term from Greek or Latin verse - is a cut within a
line of poetry, an interruption to the rhythm that further divides the (as we saw in chapter
two) already inherently divided metric foot. The caesura is the pause that breaks the flow,
in order to breathe and to speak on. It is this assymetrical relationship that causes time to
tip over, causes one moment to extend beyond its bounds and become the next, that in
the  process  destroys  both  the  moment  of  the  present  that  passes  and  the  smooth
continuum of the past that it passes into. Rhythm as the series of beats is grounded by the
sense of rhythm as continuous flow, but this in its turn is broken up again by the caesura of
eternal return. 
Deleuze’s three syntheses are therefore the culmination of Nietzsche’s project in The Gay
Science,  which  introduces  the irregular  rhythm of  eternal  return  to  disrupt  the  overly-
accented rhythm of nihilistic thought. The double sense of rhythm as beat and continuum
is now expressed as the first and second syntheses of time, which are ungrounded by the
third synthesis  of  the pure,  empty form of  time with the caesura of  eternal  return.  By
exploring all three syntheses as different aspects of rhythmical time, Deleuze opens up the
rhythmic possibilities of eternal return as an active destruction, generating the rhythmic
time that it also destroys.  Rhythm, as difference, seeks to emerge at several key points
throughout Difference and Repetition, but as yet Deleuze does not make its individuating
role explicit.85 We need to move onto A Thousand Plateaus, in which Deleuze and Guattari
continue to develop new ways of thinking the multiplicity of becoming. Here we find that
rhythm as difference provides the motor that constitutes all elements of this becoming. As
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Although when Deleuze writes of eternal return as an ontological repetition, whose role is not to 
“suppress the other two [repetitions] but ... to distribute difference to them,” we find that the 
differences that are to be distributed are “differences in kind and rhythm.” (DR 365)
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Deleuze and Guattari more fully explore the univocity of being as multiple, rhythm plays a
crucial role in their account.
One or several rhythms: the refrain in A Thousand Plateaus
In  Difference  and  Repetition,  eternal  return  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  process  of
individuation in which only difference returns. By inscribing difference and multiplicity as
much within the chaos of becoming as to the beings that emerge from it, Deleuze moves
away  from  the  problematic  distinction  between  being  and  becoming  that  we  find  in
Nietzsche’s early work on rhythm from the era of  The Birth of Tragedy. In  A Thousand
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari develop Deleuze’s earlier understanding of the univocity of
being into a richer conception of the plane of immanence or consistency.86 When laying out
their  methodology,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  stress  that  “it  is  only  when  the  multiple  is
effectively treated as a substantive, ‘multiplicity,’ that it ceases to have any relation to the
One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image and world.”87 In Difference and
Repetition, Deleuze attempted to express the idea of this multiplicity, but the single term
“difference,”  so  often  placed  in  opposition  to  another  (“identity,”  “the  Same,”  or  even
“repetition”), has a tendency to assume an identity of its own. The shift from the usage of
the term “difference” to “multiplicity” signals Deleuze and Guattari's deepened engagement
with multiplicity as multiple. I argue that rhythm is key to this new conception of becoming
as not a single continuum, but continuums (plural).88 As we will see in this final section,
86 Beistegui suggests that the idea of becoming, which is “taken to its full conclusion” in A 
Thousand Plateaus, represents a further overcoming of some of the tendencies or “instances of 
transcendence” that he detects within the concept of the virtual within Difference and Repetition 
(Beistegui 2010:193) but that these still remain apparent within the dual planes of immanence (or 
consistency) and organisation that we hover between. I argue in contrast that we should not view 
the planes of organisation and consistency as poles that we hover between, just as we should not 
imagine there to be two “states” of “territory” and “deterritorialized.” By instead stressing the 
polyrhythmical processes of de- and re-territorialisation, with no primacy of an existing “territory,” 
Deleuze and Guattari are attempting to move away from the idea of becoming as an oscillation 
between two poles towards an idea of plural and multiple becomings that are always taking place 
on multiple levels (rather than back and forth between two states, along one “line” only, even if 
traversing it in two directions).
87 ATP 8
88 They write that “Inscribed on the plane of consistency are haecceities, events, incorporeal 
transformations that are apprehended in themselves; nomadic essences, vague yet rigorous; 
continuums of intensities or continuous variations, which go beyond constants and variables; 
becomings, which have neither culmination nor subject, but draw one another into zones of 
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Deleuze and Guattari emphasise the rhythmic struture of becoming in order to explain the
differences within becoming, and how things emerge from this multiplicity.
We have explored the way in which the account of univocity in Difference and Repetition
firmly embeds eternal return within becoming itself. In A Thousand Plateaus any remaining
distinction  between  becoming,  and  the  process  by  which  it  emerges  as  being,  is
completely abandoned. The univocity of being is now captured in the idea of “the plane of
consistency,”  which  Deleuze  and  Guattari  also  term  the  “plane  of  immanence  or
univocality.”89 This plane of consistency is the development and refinement of immanent
Nietzschean becoming,90 which knows no trace of the external Platonic legislator-god. As
we saw in chapter three, the key to a non-nihilistic relationship with becoming is that we
are able to construct the rhythmic consistency of the world as something new, rather than
as an attempt to reproduce ourselves within the world, or the past within the future. With
the revised rhythmic relationship with time that Deleuze’s eternal return makes possible,
we are finally in a position to attempt this kind of de-deified construction. The plane of
consistency that Deleuze and Guattari creates has a univocity or consistency, but one
which “has nothing to do with a form or a figure, nor with a design or a function” and whose
“unity has nothing to do with a ground buried deep within things, nor with an end or a
project in the mind of God.”91 It produces its own consistency. In Difference and Repetition,
Deleuze wrote that “‘multiplicity,’ which replaces the one no less than the multiple, is the
true substantive, substance itself” but at the same time noted the possible tensions in his
proximity or undecidability; smooth spaces, composed from within striated space.” (ATP 558) The 
emphasis throughout is on the multiplication or pluriferation of these fluid terms which are 
traditionally taken as one and placed against a static opponent (being, point etc). We touched on 
the concept of striated space in chapter one (note 54) when we discussed the way in which the 
discrete identities separated from becoming are entwined together within our causal view of the 
world. As we can see from Deleuze and Guattari's description of smooth spaces "composed from 
within striated space," we should not understand smooth space, or the plane of consistency which it
inhabits, as the ground of the striated world we perceive. The passages between the two are always
multiple and multi-directional. 
89 ATP 280
90 As O’Sullivan points out, it is Nietzsche (along with Kleist) “who best constructs this plane (for it 
is never a question of discovering a ready-made plane of consistency, but of making one)” 
(O’Sullivan 2018: 186). Our role in the construction, rather than discovery, of the plane of 
consistency is the crucial expression of its immanence.
91 ATP 280
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attempt  to  convey  this  idea.92 In  A Thousand  Plateaus,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  take  a
different approach. If we are to understand becoming as truly multiple we need to explore
the “differential elements, differential relations between those elements, and singularities
corresponding to those relations”93 that constitute this multiplicity rather than simply noting
that it contains them and then moving on. Rather than trying to explain univocity via its
conceptual history as Deleuze attempted in the first chapter of Difference and Repetition,94
A Thousand Plateaus is an attempt to explore the manifestations of the multiplicity within
it, through the many ways in which assemblages form upon this plane.
The term “assemblage” seeks to describe the inherently multiple nature of the seemingly
stable identities that compose our world. A book is an assemblage, but so too is literature
(as discipline, or genre), and so too are the “worlds” in which the book is written (provincial
France, or the 18th century). All are constantly in the process of becoming, of assembling
themselves from that which lies “outside” them and which the assemblage therefore also
links and assembles. An assemblage should therefore not be thought as a collection of
atoms or physical properties, but instead as something that forms through “comparative
rates of flow” which “produce phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or, on the
contrary, of acceleration and rupture.”95 Assemblages are composed of changes in speed,
direction,  and texture,  emerging from that  which becomes their  outside but  an outside
which is not walled off from them - each must be implicated within the other, and there
must continue to be movement from one to the other if the speed or flow (and therefore,
92 “It is, perhaps, ironic to say that everything is a multiplicity, even the one, even the many.” (DR 
230) Although he goes on to note that “irony itself is a multiplicity,” in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze
and Guattari clearly feel the need for a different approach that does not entrust multiplicity to the 
reader's irony detector alone.
93 DR 348
94 They talk of biunivocality (duality), more frequently than univocity itself, as that which A 
Thousand Plateaus is working to escape, such as the “binary logic and biunivocal relationships” that
“still dominate psychoanalysis … linguistics, structuralism, and even information science” (ATP 6). 
Badiou reads an unwilling Platonism in Deleuze’s invocation of univocality, emerging as the attempt
“not to liberate the multiple but to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One.” (Badiou 2000: 
10.1) While I agree with Widder that Badiou’s criticism misunderstands Deleuze’s univocity as unity 
rather than as “disjoined multiplicity” (Widder 2001), I think it is telling that Deleuze and Guattari 
move away from this term towards a discussion of different expressions of multiplicity in A 
Thousand Plateaus. I am arguing that the increased use of rhythm within this text provides a better 
way of addressing the problem of how to affirm both continuity and difference.
95 ATP 4
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the assemblage) is to be maintained. Once we start to think “things” as assemblages, we
must  therefore  begin  to  think  them  as  not  only  multiple  and  temporal,  but  also
transformative, as continual processes of becoming from and with their surrounding world.
The question,  as it  has been throughout,  is how these assemblages emerge from the
plane of consistency - what  we have previously  been attempting to understand as the
relationship between becoming and the individuated beings we think and perceive. Here
we can see already in the description of a plane “upon which things are distinguished from
one another only by speed and slowness”96 that we are in the realm of temporality that is
made and makes itself manifest as difference. Nietzsche’s earliest insights into the role of
rhythm  were  to  conceive  it  as  that  which  divides  up  time,  and  which  makes  time
perceptible as this difference. In  A Thousand Plateaus we are now within the realm of
rhythm  no  longer  conceived  as  the  form  of  time,  but  now  as  assemblages,  as  the
assembling function of times or “haecceities.”
Here, there are no longer any forms or developments of forms; nor are there 
subjects or the formation of subjects ... There are only relations of movement and 
rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between 
elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds. There 
are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective 
assemblages ... We call this plane, which knows only longitudes and latitudes, 
speeds and haecceities, the plane of consistency or composition (as opposed to the
plane of organization or development). It is necessarily a plane of immanence and 
univocality.97
“Haecceity” is Deleuze and Guattari’s term for an individuation, a term which “suggests a
mode of individuation that is distinct from that of a thing or a subject,”98 emphasising its
specifically  temporal  nature,  just  as  assemblage  emphasised  its  plurality.  Indeed,
assemblage and haecceity cannot be neatly separated, for a haecceity may be the “set of
speeds and slownesses between unformed particles”99 that make up an assemblage such
as  a  body,  or  the  speeds  that  lie  between such  assemblages  –  the  two  types  of
96 ATP 280
97 ATP 293-4
98 ATP 599 (note 33 to plateau 10 "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-
Imperceptible")
99 ATP 289
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assemblage are “strictly inseparable.”100 As a dynamic rhythmical construction, a “thisness”
that  makes  something  emerge  as  a  temporal  identity,  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s
understanding of  the term haecceity  further  disrupts  any idea of  a hard limit  between
becoming and being, between the presubjective realm of the plane of consistency and the
world of forms and subjects that we construct on the plane of organisation, for “we must
avoid  an  oversimplified  conciliation,  as  though  there  were  on  the  one  hand  formed
subjects, of the thing or person type, and on the other hand spatiotemporal coordinates of
the haecceity type.”101 I am a haecceity, just as much as I am subject, and the thisness of
my speeds and slownesses are not checked or reversed when they become that which I
understand as “me.” 
As temporal individuation, a haecceitiy is not restricted to the plane of consistency, it is not
“a decor or backdrop that situates subjects”102 on the plane of organisation. The plane of
consistency is not a ground, but that which, through these speeds and slownesses, bleeds
into the world of  subjects  and forms that  we construct  upon it.  Within it,  the plane of
consistency forms its own layers of organisation (strata, formed through a filtering and
compacting of the matter of the plane itself) – not one limit, as we found with the gateway
of eternal return,  but now many limits creating assemblages (beings), limits that contain
limits, “epistrata and parastrata [which] must themselves be thought of as strata,”103 limits
folded in upon themselves, in which “each stratum serves as the substratum for another
stratum.”104 The rhythms, the speeds and slownesses that resonate between and within
strata, between and within assemblage, are what drive Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to
understand univocality via the plane of consistency. 
In  both  Nietzsche and Philosophy and  Difference and Repetition,  Deleuze argues that
eternal  return  is  what  makes the  multiple  forces  of  becoming  emerge  as  individuated
beings. As a thought, eternal return is taken to reveal the generative force of becoming as
the  primacy  of  difference.  As  we  noted  in  chapter  one,  in  Difference  and  Repetition
100 ATP 290
101 ATP 289
102 Ibid.
103 ATP 81
104 Ibid.
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Deleuze aligns himself with Nietzsche’s aim to reverse Platonism, but cautions in ‘Plato
and the Simulacrum’ that any such reversal requires a greater attention to what motivates
Plato’s thought if  it  is to be effective.105 In  A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari
suggest that they share a different aim with Nietzsche, in that they are all engaged in what
they call “Cosmos philosophy.”106 Here, they turn not to Plato, but to the motivations of
Nietzsche himself,  and bring these out into the light  of day, to show that  Nietzsche is
attempting to capture or render visible the invisible forces of the Cosmos. This is what
motivates  Nietzsche’s  attempts  to  trace  the  play  of  active  and  reactive  forces  in  a
genealogical  narrative,  to  bring  before  us  the  operation  of  time  as  the  halting,  lyrical
torments of  Zarathustra,  or  to "render duration sonorous"  with the "idea of  the eternal
return as a little ditty, a refrain, but which captures the mute and unthinkable forces of the
Cosmos."107 The shift between the characterisation of these two shared tasks reveals an
important  difference  between  Difference  and  Repetition and  A  Thousand  Plateaus.
Deleuze’s earlier work is concerned to undo an existing image of thought108 – the nihilistic
history  of  an  error  that  began  with  Plato.  Eternal  return  plays  a  central  role,  with  its
insistence  on  a  fundamental  discontinuity  with  what  has  gone  before.  But  now  in  A
Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari’s focus is less on disrupting and dismantling our
current way of thinking, as attempting to think becoming in a new way. This is why the
thought of eternal return features far less prominently in the later work, and we instead find
the  concept  of  the  refrain  as  a  way  to  make  not  visible,  but  sonorous,  the  inaudible
rhythms of the Cosmos.
We always come back to this "moment": the becoming-expressive of rhythm, the 
emergence of expressive proper qualities, the formation of matters of expression 
that develop into motifs and counterpoints. We therefore need a notion, even an 
apparently negative one, that can grasp this fictional or raw moment.109
It is necessary to try several terms on for size when attempting to convey a new, non-
nihilistic  way of  thought  which can grasp the moment  of  passage from becoming into
being. In Difference and Repetition, eternal return is the notion that attempts to grasp the
105 See ch 1 note 15
106 ATP 378
107 ibid.
108 See Lambert (2012) for an account of Deleuze’s changing approach to the image of thought 
throughout his work. 
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moment  when  difference  returns,  when  something  appears  to  repeat  and  create  the
illusion of static, persistent being. But here instead, the notion they use is “the passage of
the Refrain.”110 
In  A Thousand Plateaus,  Deleuze and Guattari  move away from the notion of  eternal
return as one privileged ontological limit, and instead describe this difference as relative
speeds - a difference that has itself become plural. Rather than a single limit, the plane of
consistency has many limits - rather than one force contesting another, master against
slave, the forces push in different directions. The binary limit has ceded its place to the
many limits of the strata, constructed of para- and epistrata, which are themselves strata.
Rather than the limit-test of eternal return which forces must pass or fail, the movement of
intensities  between  strata  is  continuous,  travelling  in  all  directions.  The  interruption  to
thought  that  we  find  with  eternal  return  is  necessary  for  ushering  in  the  rhythmic
relationship with time that releases the creativity of thought from its perceived dependence
on the past, as a form of representation or repetition of the same. But when it comes to
thinking becoming in its multiplicity, rather than disrupting our existing patterns of thought,
eternal return cedes its central place. Rhythm is explicitly brought to the fore instead, and it
is this which then allows the more multiple reading of the plane of consistency that we find
in A Thousand Plateaus.
The  danger  of  eternal  return,  that  we  found  played  out  in  the  psychological  and
cosmological readings, is that it  replaces the nihilistic identity of the forms we perceive
around us, and that our thought is unable to match, with a reversed hierarcy in which our
thought is the only arbiter of taste. This, as we saw, does nothing to address the most
virulent form of nihilism that Nietzsche identifies, in which we understand that we create
the world for ourselves, but do not understand becoming as something that supports this
creativity. This is why Deleuze and Guattari shift to a more explicitly rhythmical account of
individuation and becoming in their multiplicity. We cannot hear the rhythm of multiplicity
strongly enough in Nietzsche’s published account of eternal return. In order to counter
nihilism, it is not just necessary to make us realise our creative role in the production of
identities, but to make us think them in a different way – as inherently multiple, no longer
as a unified work, but as temporal assemblage, as haecceity. 
110 ATP 356
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Eternal return, even with the esoteric reading of Deleuze’s earlier work, is not sufficient on
its own – it requires the nuance of a rhythmical account of becoming if it is to encourage us
to think difference in a way that avoids the pitfalls of nihilism. Deleuze and Guattari must
suggest  an  additional  way  to  think  difference,  which  will  allow  the  multiple  forces  of
becoming to emerge in thought. In the accounts we have seen up to now, an important
effect of the transition from becoming into thought is that difference is covered over in the
moment of selection. This rhythmic elision of the difference between instances of repetition
is how we create for ourselves a world in which we are able to live, but also raises the
danger of nihilism, of a world in which ultimately life is no longer possible. In the plateau on
the refrain, Deleuze and Guattari provide an account of how the individuation of becoming
takes place. This expands on Deleuze’s earlier ontology by bringing rhythm to the fore,
and through this making explicit the idea of becoming as a multi-directional passage, in
which multiplicity is retained throughout. 
In chapter three,  we saw how Nietzsche uncovers a fundamentally  rhythmic aspect  to
thought. He recognises the transformative role of rhythm in creative thought as that which
offers  us  an  alternative  to  nihilism.  However,  he  also  highlights  the  risks  involved  in
rhythmic thought, and how the repetitive process by which it creates can also manifest as
a  tendency  to  walk  in  place,  expecting  and  therefore  only  recognising  a  future  that
resembles the past. This retrogressive aspect of rhythm effects a disjunction between the
transformational possibilities of becoming and the nihilistic future that is all we are capable
of imagining. Nietzsche introduces eternal return to disrupt this nihilistic rhythm, attempting
to  convey  a  more  rhythmical  understanding  of  moment  time  as  the  individuation  of
becoming,  but  in  a  manner  that  does  not  clearly  emerge  from  his  published  work.
Deleuze’s account of the three syntheses introduces his own reading of eternal return to
undo the knot that takes us from rhythm as a habitualisation of the future to rhythm as
discontinuous. But if we are to understand the relationship between thought and becoming
then we need to understand not only the moment of change, but the rhythm of becoming
from which it emerges. We need to hear the rhythm, as well as the caesura of eternal
return that interrupts and drives it  on. This is what Deleuze and Guattari present in  A
Thousand Plateaus.
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In the plateau “1837: Of the refrain,”111 Deleuze and Guattari’s  account of individuating
becoming  is  expressly  read  as  rhythm.  This  rhythmic  structure  allows  Deleuze  and
Guattari to work with an account of difference that retains its multiplicity as the single limit-
test  of  eternal  return  falls  away  to  reveal  multiple  limits,  layered  within  one  another,
permeable  boundaries  traversed  by  haecceities.  In  the  plateau  “1837:  Of  the  refrain,”
Deleuze  and  Guattari  examine  the  movements  that  take  place  from  the  plane  of
consistency (which we have previously examined as becoming, or difference in itself) into
assemblages. They are dealing here with the formation of a particular kind of assemblage,
the milieu, which occurs through the repetitive drawing of a line around and around it. This
rhythmical  action  selects  and  prioritises  beats  from  the  chaos,  excluding  the  rest  as
background noise:
… The forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior space
protects the germinal forces of a task to fulfill or a deed to do. This involves an 
activity of selection, elimination and extraction, in order to prevent the interior forces
of the earth from being submerged, to enable them to resist, or even to take 
something from chaos across the filter or sieve of the space that has been drawn.112
If we compare this to Nietzsche’s account of how we learn to love in  GS §334, we find
once again the process of selection through repetition that allows us to “isolate and delimit”
the nascent identity “as a life in itself.”113 But in Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the
refrain, this selection does not shut out the rest of the world, incrementally narrowing down
until  we want  nothing more than the eternal  repetition of  this  one beautiful  thing.  The
boundaries of this “limited space”114 are not an impenetrable wall, but rather the rhythmic
repetitions of a patrol,  an officer’s “beat.”  Each iteration is a selection, that allows new
111 In the original, the “refrain” is the “ritournelle,” and the translators' preface to Dialogues II 
indicates that Deleuze preferred "ritornello" as the English translation (Dialogues II:xiii.) As Ingala 
points out, “the rhythmic condition of the ritornello is already patent in its etymology: from the Italian 
ritorno, it is something that returns, a little return.” (Ingala 2018) A “ritornello” is a section of a 
musical piece that contains a repetition of a phrase - but a “little” return, not the major return of the 
cosmological reading of eternal return that posits the return of all events within an overarching 
cycle, but instead a minor return, one of many. This concept of the minor return is already indicated 
in Nietzsche and Philosophy, where Deleuze writes that "Nietzsche does not believe in resounding 
'great events,' but in the silent plurality of senses of each event... There is no event, no 
phenomenon, word or thought that does not have a multiple sense." (NP 4)
112 ATP 343 
113 GS §334
114 ATP 343
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elements  to  be  incorporated  into  the  identity.  But  it  also  opens  in  another  temporal
direction:
Finally, one opens the circle a crack ... not on the side where the old forces of 
chaos press against it but in another region, one created by the circle itself. As 
though the circle tended on its own to open onto a future, as a function of the 
working forces it shelters. This time, it is in order to join with the forces of the future,
cosmic forces.115
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues that eternal return concerns only the future
because that which repeats is difference. In A Thousand Plateaus this task now falls to the
rhythmic repetition from which emerges the milieu, which “does in fact exist by virtue of a
periodic  repetition,  but  one  whose  only  effect  is  to  produce  a  difference  ...  it  is  the
difference that is rhythmic, not the repetition, which nevertheless produces it ..."116 Rhythm,
in A Thousand Plateaus, is what effects the passage from milieu to milieu, and from milieu
to assemblage, giving them consistency while also keeping them open, so that they can
continually emerge from their surroundings, just as much as they draw from their interior.
Aristoxenus’  separation  of  rhythm from the  rhythmezomena,  from that  which  is  made
rhythmic, here finds expression as this holding-open of the assemblage, preventing it from
descending into enclosed identity, in which “rhythm is never on the same plane as that
which  has rhythm.  Action  occurs in  a  milieu,  whereas rhythm is  located between two
milieus.”117
115 Ibid.
116 ATP 346
117 Ibid. Deleuze and Guattari draw here upon Bachelard’s Dialectic of Duration (Bachelard 2016). 
Rhythm is the site of Bachelard’s engagement with Bergson, in which he challenges Bergson’s 
understanding of the past as continuum (which Deleuze’s draws upon for his account of the second 
synthesis of time). For Bachelard, the phenomenon of rhythm is the key to understanding why 
Bergson’s pure duration of time is not in fact the “true” form of time running beneath our rational 
construct of the instant, but is itself based on a dialectical process of smoothing out time, which is 
fundamentally rhythmic and discontinuous. But despite his emphasis on movement and rhythm, 
Bachelard’s dialectic is driven by the negative which he conceives as the aporia within rhythm, and 
remains a search for "pure essence” (Bachelard 2016: 128) rather than engendering multiplicity. He
views the multiple rhythms that inform each other as a development towards essence, arguing that 
when “all life’s endeavours are dialectised,” we see “that all mental activity is a passage from one 
level to a higher one." (Bachelard 2016:134). Widder’s account (Widder 2008) brings out the points 
of both sympathy and disagreement between Bachelard and Deleuze’s respective attempts to 
overcome Bergsoninan continuity.
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But  not  all  assemblages  retain  this  fluid  character  to  the  same  extent.  In  order  for
assemblages to become what we might think of as identities, there needs to be a change
in the status of the signs they emit.  They must gain a certain perdurance, a “temporal
constancy,”118 and become what Deleuze and Guattari term “expressive” - rhythms do not
now  only,  or  primarily,  produce  the  assemblage  through  interchange  with  their
surroundings, but now become qualities of the thing, become its rhythms. Rather than the
ever-shifting  dappling  of  shadows  in  the  garden,  the  speeds  and  slowness  of  one
particular patch of darkness is different, and rather than a group of shadows we see a
black cat. This patch of black has become expressive – black has become a quality of the
cat. This is the process of territorialisation, which is “an act of rhythm that has become
expressive, or of milieu components that have become qualitative,”119 in which a rhythm no
longer  passes-between,  but  instead  encircles,  surrounds  the  assemblage,  forming  a
temporal  skin.120 The  territory  that  emerges  through  this  act  of  rhythm  becoming-
expressive is the refrain, a rhythm that no longer changes direction, as instead “the refrain
moves in the direction of the territorial assemblage and lodges itself there or leaves.”121
The  rhythmical  process  of  circling  and  repetition  effects  this  transformation  from  a
collection of meat and electrical impulses into the self, transforming the patch of field into
the campsite, the forest floor into a territory. 
In the refrain, rhythm becomes expressive. And as this becoming-expressive, we finally
discover a becoming-time as plural, as “the refrain fabricates time.”122 With the refrain we
find rhythm not as the form of time, as something imposed upon the heedless continuum
beneath, but as the making of time as plural. Everything that emerges from the plane of
consistency does so via rhythm, as an assemblage of different rhythms, a pluriferation of
rhythms that  yet  retain  their  ties to the chaos that  speaks with the same voice.  Each
territory produces a different time. “Here,” Deleuze and Guattari write, “Time is not an a
118 ATP 347
119 ATP 348
120 It is important to note here that even when territorialising, rhythm always functions to provide 
temporal, rather than spatial, consistency (See Adkins 2015: 174)
121 ATP 356
122 ATP 384
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priori form: rather, the refrain is the a priori form of time, which in each case fabricates
different times.”123 
Nietzsche recognises that it is the rhythmic operation of thought, the repetitive delimiting
and isolation of learning to love, that allows us to shape perduring identities. But he fears
the effects of the overly-accented rhythm which achieves this effect by binding the future,
eventually  leading  to  the  concept  of  eternity,  and  to  nihilism.  Deleuze  and  Guattari
however  expand  on  the  transformative  possibilities  of  rhythmic  individuation.  It  has
dangers,  as Deleuze and Guattari  recognise,  emerging most  strongly  in  music,  which,
“since its force of deterritorialization is the strongest, ... also effects the most massive of
reterritorializations, the most numbing, the most redundant.”124 The seductive strength of
rhythm is a real danger. But this arises not from an anthropomorphic denial of the forces of
the cosmos and the future, but because rhythm emerges from them, drawing them into the
identities it creates. 
Rhythm is of the plane of consistency, as much as of the assemblages that emerge from it,
and leads back towards this chaos as much as it  excludes it.  The rhythmic action that
shapes a territory at the same time also offers the possibility of it opening out again - in
other directions. It must do this, must push the territory in both directions, if it is to sustain
it. Rhythm is not a dialectic, it does not combine forces like flour and eggs baked into an
irreversibly homogenous cake from which difference has been expelled. Rhythm affects
the  bindings  of  the  forces,  not  the  difference  of  the  forces  themselves.  Deleuze  and
Guattari call the territorialising rhythm the refrain. In the territorialising rhythm of the refrain,
Deleuze and Guattari highlight all the risks of which Nietzsche was aware, the power of
rhythm  to  subdue  us,  or  sweep  us  up,  to  bind  us  -  but  the  binding  is  always  also
unravelling. Rhythm may appear to tie us into a particular future, but even as it does so it
offers numerous opportunities for this to shift and develop, to spring off in what Deleuze
and Guattari call lines of flight. It is this propulsive motion that animates the territory from
within,  without which it  would collapse.  The territorial  refrain is just one kind of refrain,
amongst a list that comprises milieu refrains, an "immense refrain of the earth," "folk and
123 ATP 385
124 ATP 383
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popular refrains," all the way to the "Cosmos refrain."125 The rhythm of the refrain is the
univocity of being that Deleuze strives to convey in Difference and Repetition. The caesura
of eternal return is the inequality of the beat that ensures that difference returns. But with
the rhythmical account of becoming in  A Thousand Plateaus, we find this pluriferation of
futures as the action of rhythm itself, always opening onto other rhythms, always pushing
out of the circle. 
It  is  rhythm in Deleuze and Guattari’s  account  that  is  the passage and the difference
between  the  strata  within  the  plane  of  consistency,  between  milieus,  between
assemblages,  and  it  is  rhythm  becoming-expressive  that  territorialises  but  also
deterritorialises. Deleuze and Guattari here draw upon the inherent multiplicity of rhythm
as that which does not, can never, elide or sublate this difference into a single whole. In
the passage from one note to the next,  from one harmonic to the next,  rhythm is the
creation of something new which retains that which it is moving between. Rhythm is built
upon the particularity of the intervals between which it moves, rather than closing them into
an unimportant triviality. Rhythm is difference. 
In Difference and Repetition Deleuze gives an account of how eternal return (understood
as an ontological, rather than anthropological or cosmological doctrine) is the structure of
becoming,  which  is  self-differentiating  rather  than  undifferentiated  chaos.  As  such,  he
argues that eternal return is the way that becoming becomes - the way in which it emerges
as the individuated beings of the world. This is what Deleuze terms the univocity of being,
in which the movement from becoming to being is an expression of the nature of becoming
rather than something opposed to it, even if this movement is then open to misconstrual as
representation. I have argued that the three syntheses of time together form a rhythmical
structure, driven by the third synthesis of eternal return. But in Difference and Repetition
Deleuze himself does not develop these rhythmical tendencies. We have therefore turned
to his later work with Guattari in  A Thousand Plateaus to see how they develop a more
explicitly  rhythmical  ontology  in  the  concept  of  the  refrain,  and  how  this  deeper
engagement with rhythm expands on the account in Difference and Repetition by opening
up a more genuinely plural conception of becoming.
125 ATP 382-3
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Rhythm is part of the chaos of becoming, rather than standing opposed to it. For early
Nietzsche,  becoming  is  a  formless  continuum.  Its  fundamental  feature  is  that  it  is
undivided. In The Gay Science Nietzsche understands reality as becoming via the notion
of the musical mechanism that eternally repeats its tune, opposed to the teleological slant
of  human thought.  Deleuze and Guattari  however  describe the “Mechanosphere”  as a
“cosmic rhythm.”126 The chaos of becoming is not a formless chaos - within it there are
“electrons in person, veritable black holes, actual organites, authentic sign sequences. It's
just that they have been uprooted from their strata, destratified, decoded, deterritorialized,
and that is what makes their proximity and interpenetration in the plane of consistency
possible. A silent dance."127 The cosmos and the plane of consistency are not opposed -
they are separated by nothing but the repetitions that organise rhythmical strata, from a
chaos that is itself rhythm. This deepened understanding of the chaos of becoming as a
“cosmic rhythm” allows Deleuze and Guattari to say more about the nature of the forces
that inhabit becoming than was possible for Deleuze in either Nietzsche and Philosophy or
Difference and Repetition, where these forces remained somewhat nebulous, described in
terms of their future but also by what they had not (yet) done - they were those forces who
had not yet reached their limit, had not yet passed the test of eternal return. Now, with the
concept of the refrain in A Thousand Plateaus, we find rhythm as the univocal movement
of becoming.
126 "There is no biosphere or noosphere, but everywhere the same Mechanosphere." which is 
described as “cosmic rhythm” (ATP 82)
127 ATP 77
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Conclusion
This thesis argues that rhythm functions as an ontological concept within Nietzsche’s work.
I  argue that  we must  understand eternal  return as the introduction of  a new rhythmic
temporality  if  it  is  to  provide  an effective  challenge  to  nihilism,  and that  the  concerns
Nietzsche  raises  about  the  transformative  capabilities  of  thought  are  ultimately  only
addressed  by  the  more  rhythmic  understanding  of  eternal  return  and  becoming  that
emerges from the work of Deleuze and Guattari.  To support this argument,  this thesis
contributes a new reading of key aspects of The Gay Science, in particular drawing out the
importance of aphorisms such as  GS §84 and  GS §334 which suggest that Nietzsche’s
understanding of rhythm provides new route into eternal return. I draw this reading of The
Gay  Science together  with  Nietzsche's  writings  on  rhythm from his  early  unpublished
notes, allowing us to trace the concept of rhythmic temporality from Nietzsche’s early work
to the introduction of eternal return in The Gay Science. In this manner, this thesis draws
out new points of convergence between Nietzsche’s understanding of the temporality of
becoming and Deleuze's mobilisation of eternal return as a rhythmic individuation of time,
which  finds  its  most  successful  expression  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari's  concept  of  the
multiplicity of the refrain. 
At the start of this thesis, we explored the way in which The Gay Science weaves together
an understanding of thought, love, and art. In the current crisis of nihilism, the manner in
which we think the world manifests as a relationship - specifically, as a failed relationship,
in  which  we  have  lost  faith  in  both  our  power  to  love the world  and in  the  world  as
something that can or should be loved. The Gay Science presents a call to action, in which
Nietzsche insists that we must learn to love - and hence to think - the world differently. The
process  of  learning  to  love  that  Nietzsche  describes  in  GS §334  is  therefore  key  to
understanding  how we should  interpret  eternal  return,  a  thought  which  is  intended  to
produce this new kind of love. In  GS §334,  Nietzsche describes the way in which we
shape identities as a repetitive and above all rhythmical process. By turning to Nietzsche's
unpublished notes on rhythm we can understand more about this process, for we find in
these early notes the insight that rhythm is temporal individuation. 
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Nietzsche's early philological work uncovers the existence of different senses of rhythm
that indicate correspondingly different senses of time, opening up the prospect that there
are different ways of thinking or loving the world, and hence different temporalities of which
we may be capable. Unlike the Platonic understanding of love and thought which is based
on lack, the rhythmic thought that Nietzsche describes is not driven by the unattainable
otherness  of  changeless  eternity.  Rather,  rhythmic  thought  is  co-creative  with,  and
emerges  as  an  expression  of,  rhythmic  becoming.  Nietzsche's  early  work  on  rhythm
provides the context for how our love of the world descended into nihilism, as he describes
the degredation  of  our  temporal  rhythmic  identities  into a leaden  "tick-tock"  that  shuts
down further  transformation.  By  applying  the insights  of  the  early  notes  on  rhythm to
Nietzsche's later thought we see that his concerns about the nature of human thought and
love in The Gay Science emerge from the sense of time that our nihilistic rhythm produces,
and the way in which this nihilistic time frames our connection to the past and the future. 
We can therefore see not  only  that  eternal  return needs to challenge and rework this
nihilistic understanding of time, but also that our current issues with temporality stem from
the nature of rhythm itself, and the tension that Nietzsche identifies in  The Gay Science
between  its  transformative  and  seductive  properties.  Rhythm is  built  of  difference,  its
individual beats giving it an infinite capacity for modulation, but it is via the ellision of this
difference that these beats are encompassed into a coherent rhythmic flow. The danger is
that this flattening of difference closes down the possibility for variation, such that we fixate
on the beloved as it was and "no longer want anything better from the world than it and it
again."1 What is required instead is a thought that desires the repetition not of the same,
but  of  the  moment  of  rhythmical  selection  that  opens  out  onto  the  future.  It  is  this
continually interruptive aspect of the time of eternal return that we find first indicated in
Stambaugh's  theory of  moment time,  and then more fully  fleshed out  within Deleuze's
mobilisation of eternal return. Deleuze's reading of eternal return in which only difference
returns seems on the face of  it  to  run expressly  counter  to  Nietzsche's  description  of
eternal return as the return of the  same. However as we see in  The Gay Science, the
"return of the same" is precisely the kind of anthropomorphic seduction of which Nietzsche
warns us to beware, in which the world is nothing more than a reflection of ourselves, the
future nothing more than a repetition of the past.
1 GS §334
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By examining the themes developed in  The Gay Science,  we can therefore understand
that the task of overcoming nihilism is the problem of how to love the world as difference, a
problem whose nuances and difficulties come from the nature of thought as a rhythmical
process of temporal individuation. Framing the task in this fashion allows us not only to
evaluate  Deleuze's  interpretation  of  eternal  return  as  that  which  comes  closest  to
reworking our understanding of time in the manner that Nietzsche indicates, but also to
situate Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the refrain as a transformed version of eternal
return,  which  shows  how this  rhythmical  process  of  individuation  takes places  as  the
activity of becoming. Nihilistic thought believes that to love becoming is necessarily to rape
it, framing our current way of thinking as an act of violence that splits apart the continuum
of becoming. But the different tempos of the will to power that Nietzsche describes indicate
that this individuating difference is the action of becoming itself, an idea Deleuze takes up
and expresses as the univocity of being. 
This  thesis  has  concentrated  on  the  phenomenon  of  rhythm  as  it  operates  on  an
ontological  level,  in  order to show that  rhythm is  the temporal  structure through which
becoming appears to us, and to situate the thought of eternal return as a disruption to our
previous nihilistic sense of rhythm. However, the disruption of eternal return is not an end
in itself, but rather something that Nietzsche intends to open up a space for new ways of
thinking. Amor fati is Nietzsche’s attempt to name a new affirmative rhythm of thought that
he  hopes  will  become  possible  once  we  have  learned  to  move  beyond  our  current
Platonically-inspired image of thought as a love based on lack. By tracing the way in which
problems with  our  current  way  of  thinking  have arisen,  we can  infer  that  what  would
distinguish amor fati as a new way of thought would be its ability to celebrate rather than
exclude the creative process that constructs thought, and that such a celebration can only
take place if  we understand the creativity of thought  as something that  emerges from,
rather than against, becoming. Nietzsche indicates that rhythm is how thought emerges
from becoming, but it is not until Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the refrain that we find
a way of locating the rhythmic tendencies of thought within becoming and are able to
understand rhythm as the “formative force of temporal proportions”2 that Nietzsche first
suggested in his early notes.
2 KGW 2:3:330
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Deleuze  and  Guattari  note  that  "it  is  odd  how  music  does  not  eliminate  the  bad  or
mediocre refrain, or the bad usage of the refrain, but on the contrary carries it along, or
uses it  as a springboard."3 The seductive  territorialising  aspects of  rhythm are always
present, the force of the ictus is always there as the accretion of land from the spikes of
becoming, and we have seen that over time our thought has succumbed to this "bad,"
overly-accented manifestation of the refrain. The problem of thought is how to open up our
current understanding of identity, to perform a rhythmic transformation of the forms of the
past, carrying these along and using them as a "springboard" to other ways of thinking: 
beginning from popular and territorial melodies that are autonomous, self-sufficient, 
and closed in upon themselves, how can one construct a new chromaticism that 
places them in communication, thereby creating "themes" bringing about a 
development of Form, or rather a becoming of Forces?4
If a rhythm is overly-accented or ictus-driven, it becomes moribund, leaden – it keeps us
still,  staid,  in  place,  as  we see with  the rhythmic  prayers  of  GS  §128.5 But  the other
extreme is just as dangerous, as a "complete degeneration of the feeling for rhythm, chaos
in place of rhythm," robs us of the ability to form any coherent thoughts at all.6 Nietzsche's
work on rhythm indicates that we must draw upon the modulating and creative aspects
within thought if we are to transform it, in order to create new rhythms that, while initially
strange, we may gradually learn to hear.
3 ATP 385
4 ibid.
5 See the discussion of rhythm as binding the future in chapter three.
6 Nietzsche highlights this problem in his criticisms of Wagner’s music, which with its “endless 
melody” releases us into the sea of becoming in such a manner that we lose our footing completely,
and instead can only “swim” (NW ‘Wagner as a danger’ §1). See Cohen (2008) for an account of 
Nietzsche's criticisms of rhythm in Wagner's music, with examples of the pieces in question.
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